I'm a noob to this page/site, but not a noob to Jaynes. The discussion re Humonculous Falacy is interesting. I think I grasp the gist, though a few points seemed to stray from the theme. A few thoughts occurred to me though, and I'll share them in a less formal structure.
First, In Thinking Without Words, Bermudez provides a structure for describing, though not proving, a process of thinking in animalia, four different species with similar results, though NOT 100% consistent results. If I recall correctly, an anomalous decision, (reasoning), with no discernible reason/logic chain. Put very simply, animals can solve problems in ways which it is impossible for us to establish a logic chain. AND, they don't all solve them the same way every time. Point being, 'reasoning' takes place. A structure exists. Without words, i.e. sans metaphor.
We can assume as fact (I will), that animalia, especially mammalia, can store and retrieve memories. Sense memories, let's 'assume' the main five senses. Animal memories play a role in their 'reasoning' or problem solving (they may be indistinguishable). Yet, if we buy Jaynes's theories, we also agree that the animal has no metaphorical mind-space due to its utter lack of lingual syntax or metaphorical 'lingo'.
Is it possible therefore, if, for instance, we teach apes to speak (in sign language), and we 'gift' them metaphorical lingo, that they subsequently develop a mind space, where none was before? (especially true for apes, but other mammals have primitive or different allegories for human bicamerality - maybe)
The point is, your blog entry requires too complex a construct to be reasonable. I.e., it just can't be that complicated. I agree on the dual consciousness piece, no brainer, except you ignore a couple factors which intrude with unpredictably unknown complexity.
First, let's assume we have two 'separate' brains or minds, (we do not). Each brain-side includes the 3D metaphorical sense capability. We must also assume that both sides have 'storage' or memory sensation. A place to store memories, even if they cannot be internally 'viewed' as such. Introspecting such memories is not necessary for them to be useful (see the first book). All I need in order to introspect, is to pass a memory stream across the 'other' visual cortex with a connected feedback loop, which we know exists. Like, having a video camera set up to a TV screen, but the camera cannot see the screen. The camera cannot be turned around to see itself.
But we have to camera-screen systems. Camera A can look at the screen of camera B (literally - left brain literally receiving feedback from the right brain visual cortex). Camera B can view the screen of camera A.
By including a high speed integrated feedback process between the two, and gifting it a metaphorical construct (English for instance) we find we've built a communications network that functions faster, as-fast, or fast enough to 'blur' the sense differences between the two brain sides. We've amalgamated the senses into an 'I', for free, with no complex reasoning at all. Other than some sort of efficacy inherent in syntax, which as far as we know, other animals do not have. I think rabbits maybe include some of the functionality I'm referring to, primates certainly do.
This, I think, removes the need for the little man. However, your assumption about introspecting ourselves 'behind the eyes' is not complete. Out of body experiences demonstrate (as do dreams) that the consciousness of the self can occur from outside the body, thus revealing the little man (in mind). But the reality is, this 'alternate' positioning can be accomplished without introspection. Jaynes explains, eloquently, (I think it's even on one of the audio lectures?), that although there are good reasons for us to sense ourselves behind our eyes (the vastly more intense visual stimulus), it is not 'required' that we perceive it so.
Would blind people sense their consciousness 'between their ears'? Yeah, probably. But why would they construct sense memories on a screen 'behind their eyes'? Why couldn't they actually perceive their movements from 'outside' their body? Perhaps like a 3rd person POV in a video game?
There is a reason. It's culture. We're 'taught' to exist behind our eyes. The metaphors we receive from the culture explain all aspects of our consciousness to us. And we don't know any better than to receive and believe them. (No other explanation is consistent with consciousness arriving after language)
This further explains hallucinatory sensation. Our sensation of an 'inner' voice, in someone else's voice, from outside our body, is a very simple displacement of an analog 1/2 brain self-perception. We 'hear' Aunt Martha as if she's standing next to us, 'because' one side's inner voice memory is playing across the other side's 'aural cortex' if you will.
In fact this kind of sensation would be entirely normal. Not 'kinda normal'. Normal period, or natural if you prefer. But the rest of us non-hallucinators have a slightly different metaphorical syntax which may simply be 'more efficient' at blurring the two sides seamlessly together, through no effort of our own.
In short, it doesn't matter how we sense our internal selves relevant to the outside, because we 'can' see them in whatever metaphorical way we've been told to. Our brains are immeasurably complex and are capable of sense models we cannot yet be aware of.
Long first post. I hope it's not a load a crap. Sorry for the lack of references. By the way, I recommend Black Swan, Taleb, for instruction on how to avoid bad inferences, and how to not ignore invisible evidence.
[Consciousness = introspection, reason = retrospection. No?]