Critica e Risposte

da Marcel Kuijsten

"Rifiuto riflessivo di nuovi concetti e l'antitesi della scoperta."
− Michael Persinger, Ph.D. in Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness

Qui di seguito sono una selezione di critiche pubblicate della teoria di Jaynes, seguito da brevi risposte o riferimenti a più risposte di lunga durata. Per le risposte ai miti e pregiudizi generali, vedere Miti vs fatti circa la teoria di Julian Jaynes.

La natura della Coscienza

Critico: "La coscienza e una caratteristica innata biologico, allora la coscienza non può essere una costruzione sociale basato sul linguaggio e imparato durante l'infanzia" (parafrasando) − Ned Block, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, New York University, in a book review of The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind in Cognition and Brain Theory (1981). Risposta: Questa critica e stato trattato esaurientemente dal Prof. Jan Sleutels in un capitolo intitolato "Zombies Greco: Sulla Assurdità Presunta Minds greco Sostanzialmente Inconscio" in Riflessioni sul Dawn of Consciousness e da Gary Williams, in un articolo intitolato "What Is It Like to Be non cosciente: una difesa di Julian Jaynes", pubblicato nel Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2010). Vedi anche Dennett (1986).

Critico: "La coscienza e biologicamente innata e non si basa sul linguaggio, la coscienza comprende una gamma di processi mentali di base che Jaynes lasciare fuori, la schizofrenia sia dovuta a qualche forma di atrofia neurologica e non ha nulla a che fare con la mente bicamerale, ecc." (parafrasando). − John Smythies, Center for Brain and Cognition, U.C. San Diego, book review of Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness in the Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 21, Issue 4 (2007). Risposta: Ho contrastato ciascuna di queste critiche in "Close-Mindedness and Mysticism in Science: Commentary on John Smythies's Review" in The Jaynesian, Vol. 3, Issue 2 (Winter 2009).

Incontri di Coscienza / Il Iliade e Vecchio Testamento

Critico: "Ci sono casi che mostrano introspezione nell'Iliade, quindi Jaynes la teoria deve essere sbagliata " (parafrasando) − Ivan Leudar, Professor of Analytical and Historical Psychology, University of Manchester, and Philip Thomas, Consultant Psychiatrist with Bradford Community Trust and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Bradford, in Voices of Reason, Voices of Insanity (2000). Risposta: Secondo la grecista Richmond Lattimore (1951), gli eventi che hanno portato alla leggenda del Iliade avvenne probabilmente da qualche parte intorno 1250-1150 aC, e sono stati raccontati attraverso cantante-poeti scritto da Omero fino a circa 850 aC Queste date sono solo speculativi e sulla base delle dichiarazioni da Erodoto (484 aC-ca. 425 aC) e altri. Inoltre, la tradizione vuole che Omero fosse cieco e che le poesie non sono stati effettivamente scritti da lui, ma potrebbe essere stato dettato a uno scriba. Questa e anche una questione di dibattito. Molto poco si sa di Omero e alcuni studiosi questione se ha effettivamente esistito. Anche messo in dubbio e se l'Iliade e l'Odissea furono composti (o addirittura trascritto) dalla stessa persona, con la maggioranza degli studiosi ora concludere che non erano, semplicemente riferendosi a loro come "letteratura omerica". Di particolare rilevanza per la discussione attuale, Lattimore osserva che "e del tutto possibile che il testo e stato modificato ad Atene al tempo di Pisistrato" (~ 560-528 aC). Jebb (1887) scrive che "Le poesie sono state tramandate con la recitazione orale, e nel corso di quel processo subito alterazioni molti, intenzionale o accidentale, dal rhapsodes. Dopo le poesie erano state svalutate circ. 550 aC, hanno sofferto ancora ulteriori modifiche ". I neoclassici sostengono inoltre che l'Iliade e fatta di strati piu vecchi e piu recenti. Un esempio di prova di cio e l'armatura di Ajax, che viene da un periodo di tempo molto anteriore (Cline, 2006). Dopo la modifica e l'integrazione dei Iliade sono molto rilevanti, ma non sono nemmeno menzionati da Leudar & Thomas nella loro critica di questo aspetto della teoria di Jaynes. E 'probabile che l'Iliade e costituita da vari strati piu vecchi e piu recenti, con gli strati piu anziani che riflette una mentalita piu bicamerale e gli strati piu recenti mostrano segni di coscienza. Jaynes affronta il problema del aggiunte successive a pagina 77 di L'origine , cosi come in lezioni successive. Forse non lo sottolineeremo mai abbastanza. Per maggiori informazioni sulla questione delle aggiunte successive al Iliade , vedi Foglia (1886), Lawton (1905), Jebb (1887) e Cline (2006). Nel valutare le prove per la coscienza nell'Iliade (e in contrasto con l'Odissea), dobbiamo tenere a mente alcuni fatti (Weissman, 1993): Il Iliade e stata recitata oralmente per secoli prima di essere scritto (o dettato) da (molto probabilmente) qualcuno di nome Omero. Al momento non e scritto in modo che qualcuno potrebbe comporre una poesia di oggi. I'Iliade dice solo verso la fine del periodo bicamerale, non l'inizio. Gran parte del Iliade spettacolo bicameralita, cioe quando i personaggi ricevere i comandi emerge dalla divinita simile al comando allucinazioni sperimentato da schizofrenici. Parti delle istanze spettacolo Iliade di coscienza, cioe quando gli dei si parlano l'un l'altro e non dare i comandi. La discussione degli dei tra loro le cose dimostrano come la pianificazione e l'inganno, sembrano riflettere una mentalità piu tardi, e puo indicare una aggiunta in seguito per la poesia. Diverse parti del poema riflettono diverse fasi nella coscienza umana. E 'difficile sapere quali sezioni del Iliade riflettere periodi di tempo specifici, cioe quali sono state le aggiunte successive alla poesia orale dei secoli precedenti. L'utilizzo di preghiera e di presagi nella Iliade mostra che le persone non erano piu completamente bicamerale, o queste sezioni sono state aggiunte al momento e stato scritto verso il basso, o qualche tempo dopo. Inoltre, i presagi sono talvolta ignorati. L'Odissea contiene differenze importanti dal Iliade , tra cui un minor ricorso a comandi diretti dagli dei, una crescente dipendenza preghiera, presagi, e divinazione, maggiore utilizzo di inganno, la possibilita di disobbedienza agli dei, una maggiore consapevolezza del tempo, e meno regole e piu liberta per gli uomini e le donne. E 'opportuno sottolineare che le prove per la coscienza nel Iliade si riferisce principalmente alla seconda ipotesi Jaynes, o la datazione della nascita della coscienza, e non necessariamente ipotesi di impatto uno, tre e quattro (see Miti vs Facts). In altre parole, anche se questa critica era esatto, non e in contrasto con le istanze di molti comportamenti umani diretto da divinita trovato nell'Iliade, e l'intero processo di Jaynes describes potrebbe teoricamente hanno avuto luogo in un precedente data. Il Iliade e un pezzo di prova per la teoria della mente bicamerale Jaynes, che non dovrebbe essere visto isolatamente, ma piuttosto nel contesto piu ampio del modello generale di prove, che comprende prove di allucinazioni uditive in altri testi antichi, comandi comportamentali vissuta da moderni voce-ascoltatori, linguistica storica (l'evoluzione delle parole utilizzate per la 'mente' in greco antico e cinese), idoli, oracoli, divinazione, split-brain di ricerca, la psicologia della pre-moderna tribu, ecc Nessuno di questi altri settori sono oggetto di Leudar & Thomas.

Critico: "Nel Libro di Daniele, i pensieri sono attribuiti a persone fisiche e non solo per gli dei " (parafrasando). − David Martel Johnson, Professor of Philosophy, York University, in How History Made the Mind, p. 122. Risposta: Il libro di Daniele si stima sia stata composta intorno al 160 aC - buona parte del periodo cosciente. Jaynes non ha asserito che tutto l'Antico Testamento era puramente bicamerale in natura. Quello che afferma e che nel confronto tra i libri piu antichi (ad esempio Amos, ~ 750 aC) con i libri piu recenti (ad esempio Ecclesiaste, ~ 200 aC) si puo vedere il passaggio dalla bicameralità alla coscienza. Tutti i profeti vivevano nel periodo post-bicamerale epoca − era il fatto che erano ancora in funzione in maniera parzialmente bicamerale (cioe regolarmente sperimentare stati di trance e allucinazioni uditive) che li ha fatti di interesse. Il libro di Daniele − ancora una volta, uno dei libri piu recenti dell'Antico Testamento − include una serie di visioni allucinatorie

Mente bicamerale / Modello neurologico di Jaynes

Critico: "[Roger] Sperry ha respinto l'idea che ci fossero due individui nella testa di nessuno, e la maggior parte d'accordo." − Robert M. Sapolsky, Professor of Biological Sciences and Neurology, Stanford University, in The Trouble with Testosterone (1998), p. 217. Risposta: In una breve critica della teoria di Jaynes, Sapolsky confonde descrizione Jaynes della mente bicamerale nell'uomo antico con il dibattito correlati ma molto diverse sulla questione di piu 'io' (una per ogni emisfero) nella moderna coscienza split-brain pazienti. Oltre a questa confusione, Sapolsky i commenti sono fuorvianti. Per esempio, per quanto riguarda split-brain pazienti, Roger Sperry (1964) molto chiaramente: "Tutto quello che abbiamo visto finora indica che l'intervento ha lasciato ognuna di queste persone, con due menti separate, cioe con due sfere separate di coscienza ". Altrove, Sperry (1974) nota che "sia l'emisfero destro e sinistro possono essere contemporaneamente cosciente diversi, anche contrapposti, le esperienze mentali che scorrono in parallelo." (Vedi anche Sperry, 1984.) Dichiarazione di Sapolsky travisa chiaramente vista Sperry in materia. Inoltre, Sapolsky lascia fuori il fatto che due dei colleghi Sperry − Michael Gazzaniga, uno psicologo, e Joseph Bogen, un neurochirurgo, che hanno studiato i pazienti split-brain per decenni - hanno anche affermato che la scissione-cervello risultati della procedura di due distinti 'io', una per emisfero. Bogen commenta che "i dati sono coerenti con l'interpretazione che la disconnessione degli emisferi divide non solo il cervello ma anche le caratteristiche psichiche del cervello" (1973, vedi anche 1983). Gazzaniga osserva che dopo la scissione del cervello procedura "comune unita normali cosciente e interrotto, lasciando la split-brain paziente con due menti" (1972) e "entrambi gli emisferi può essere visto come consapevole" (2002, vedi anche 1967). La questione continua ad essere dibattuto.

Critico: "It seems very unlikely that such a dramatic remodelling of extensive neural networks could have come about in the space of three millennia or so − the time taken, according to Jaynes' theory, for the transition from the bicameral mind to the modern conscious mind." (In other words, Jaynes's theory proposes that a dramatic neurophysiological change to the human brain took place that couldn't possibly have happened in such a short time frame.) − Andrea E. Cavanna, Michael Trimble, Federico Cinti and Francesco Monaco, in "The 'Bicameral Mind' 30 Years On: A Critical Reappraisal of Julian Jaynes' Hypothesis," Functional Neurology, Vol. 22, Issue 1 (2007). Critico: "I do not think of the Greek intellectual revolution (a la Jaynes) as, or as involving, some dramatic, inner, physiological transformation of the human brain." − David Martel Johnson, Professor of Philosophy, York University, in How History Made the Mind, p. 129. Critico: "One [problem for Jaynes's theory] is the unlikely possibility that in the short span of a couple of thousand years of recent history, humans switched from schizophrenic-like to concious beings." − W.R. Klemm, Professor of Neuroscience, Texas A & M University, in Atoms of Mind, p. 35. Risposta: These critiques reflect a misunderstanding of Jaynes's theory. Jaynes did not suggest that the shift from bicamerality to consciousness was a neurophysiological one (see Jaynes p. 122-125). Rather, the same biological brain was used in a new and innovative way based on adaptations to changes that occurred culturally. A child today raised in a bicameral society would be bicameral and a child from an ancient bicameral civilization raised in modern culture would be conscious. Consciousness in the Jaynesian sense is a learned process based on language. To use the computer metaphor, the transition from bicamerality to consciousness was a software change using the same hardware (Dennett, 1986). Having said that, there could have been a slight genetic component to this change, and new research in genetics shows that humans are still evolving and that genetic changes can move through a population much more rapidly than was previously believed. Consider this quote from the anthropologist Gregory Cochran: "There is evidence that such change has occurred. My anthropologist colleague at the University of Utah Henry Harpending and I have made a strong case that natural selection changed the Ashkenazi Jews over a thousand-year period or so, favoring certain kinds of cognitive abilities and generating genetic diseases as a side effect. The geneticist Bruce Lahn's team has found new variants of brain development genes: One, ASPM (abnormal spindle-like microcephaly associated) appears to have risen to high frequency in Europe and the Middle East in about six thousand years. We don't yet know what this new variant does, but it certainly could affect the human psyche ... This concept opens strange doors. If true, it means that the people of Sumeria and Egypt's Old Kingdom were probably fundamentally different from us: Human nature has changed − some, anyhow − over recorded history. ... Jaynes may have been on to something" (Cochran, 2007). Cochran also states that recent discoveries have revealed that "...the rate of human evolution over the past few thousand years is far greater than it has been over the past few million years" (Biello, 2007). Or this from neuroscientist Michael Persinger: "Within the last five years science has found that single point mutations on genes can produce permanent changes in speech production. There is now evidence that point mutations, whose mechanisms must still be discerned, can diffuse within decades throughout entire populations. There have been approximately 15 million changes in our species' genome since our common ancestor with the chimpanzee. There are human accelerated regions in the genome with genes known to be involved in transcriptional regulation and neurodevelopment. They are expressed within brain structures that would have allowed precisely the types of phenomena that Jaynes predicted had occurred around 3,500 years ago. Related genes, attributed to religious beliefs, are found on the same chromosome (for example, chromosome 10) as propensities for specific forms of epilepsy (partial, with auditory features) and schizophrenia. ..." (Persinger, 2007). Finally, recent studies of brain plasticity show that massive changes can take place in an individual's brain during their developmental years. For example, if someone is blind, their occipital lobe (normally used for vision) can take on new roles, in some cases processing auditory or tactile information instead. Hemispherectomy patients, who have had one brain hemisphere removed (usually performed during childhood as a treatment for severe epilepsy), also show dramatic changes in the function of brain areas. Language processing can switch from the left to the right hemisphere in cases where the left hemisphere is removed. Musical abilities, motor capabilities, and attention span can switch to the left hemisphere in cases where the right hemisphere is removed (Battro, 2001). If the brain can adapt this rapidly in an individual, we can also imagine changes in brain function over just a few generations due to cultural or environmental factors given the right conditions. I address this critique in much greater detail in "New Evidence for Jaynes's Neurological Model: A Research Update" in Vol. 3, Issue 1 of The Jaynesian.

Critico: "Jaynes postulates that hallucinations arise in the right hemisphere and in normal humans are suppressed by the dominance of the left hemisphere ... but there are few modern studies using sophisticated quantitative EEG that address this question." − W.R. Klemm, Professor of Neuroscience, Texas A & M University, in Atoms of Mind, p. 36. Critico: "...It is now well known that lesions of the right-sided areas corresponding to Broca's or Wernicke's areas result in expressive or receptive aprosodias ... these areas would thus seem more related to the negative symptoms of schizophrenia (such as restricted affect) than to the positive hallucinatory symptoms." (In other words, Jaynes's neurological model is wrong and he was incorrect in his speculation that the right temporal lobe areas are the source of auditory hallucinations.) − Psychiatrists Ghazi Asaad and Bruce Shapiro, in response to "What About the Bicameral Mind?" (Letter to the Editor) by H. Steven Moffic, M.D., in American Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 144:5 (1987). Risposta: Drs. Asaad and Shapiro's comment that there is no evidence for the involvement of the right temporal lobe in auditory hallucination was incorrect even at that time (see Buchsbaum, 1982), and an increasing number of studies since that time provide additional evidence for right hemisphere involvement in auditory hallucinations. Beginning in 1999, neuroimaging studies have provided compelling evidence supporting Jaynes's neurological model, i.e. auditory hallucinations arising in the right temporal-parietal lobe and being transmitted to the left temporal-parietal lobe. This was pointed out by Dr. Robert Olin in Lancet (1999) and Dr. Leo Sher in the Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience (2000). There are now dozens of brain imaging studies showing a right/left temporal lobe interaction in auditory hallucinations. For a complete discussion of the new evidence for Jaynes's neurological model, see my chapter "Consciousness, Hallucinations, and the Bicameral Mind: Three Decades of New Research" in Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited (pgs. 116-120), as well as my essay "New Evidence for Jaynes's Neurological Model: A Research Update," and book review of Language Lateralization and Psychosis in The Jaynesian (Vol. 3, Issue 1 and Vol. 4, Issue 1).

Critico: "Evidence on the evolution of cerebral asymmetry ... suggests that the left cerebral dominance for language may go back to at least H. habilis." − Michael Corballis, Dept. of Psychology, University of Auckland, in The Lopsided Ape, p. 212. Risposta: Corballis presents this as a critique of Jaynes's theory but in reality it is not. First, Jaynes never argues that some degree of language laterialization could not have occurred prior to the bicameral period, as the hallucinatory commands do not contain the same level of language sophistication as normal speech. Neuroimaging studies over the past decade have confirmed Jaynes's neurlogical model (i.e. that auditory hallucinations arise in the right hemisphere language areas and are processed in the left hemisphere language areas). Again, see my chapter "Consciousness, Hallucinations, and the Bicameral Mind: Three Decades of New Research" in Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness, and my essay "New Evidence for Jaynes's Neurological Model: A Research Update," and book review of Language Lateralization and Psychosis in The Jaynesian. This again brings up the issue of brain plasticity (see my discussion above in the second response in this section): in children who have their left hemisphere removed, the right hemisphere language areas take over. Finally, the evidence for language in H. habilis is highly speculative at best.

Critico: "We can in any case rule out the idea that only the left hemisphere is conscious." − Michael Corballis, Dept. of Psychology, University of Auckland, in The Lopsided Ape, p. 212. Risposta: This reflects a misunderstanding of Jaynes's theory. Jaynes never states that "consciousness is mediated by the left hemisphere," as Corballis suggests. Writing decades before the advent of fMRI brain imaging technology in the early 1990s, Jaynes never speculates on the brain areas that might be involved in consciousness (Jaynes, writing on brain plasticity: "... it would be wrong to think that whatever the neurology of consciousness now may be, it is set for all time," p. 125). Perhaps because the "man-side" of the bicameral mind resides in the left hemisphere and the "god-side" in the right, Corballis took this to mean that after the breakdown of the bicameral mind, consciousness would be predicated on activity in the left hemisphere. There is evidence from split-brain studies that demonstrate that the left hemisphere is associated with one's sense of self when the connection between the hemispheres has been severed. For example, commands given to the right hemisphere are acted upon outside of the person's conscious awareness, similar in some ways to a post-hypnotic suggestion. Corballis, who also comments on the split-brain research of Roger Sperry in the same section, may have confused some of Jaynes's conclusions with Sperry's. Corballis continues, "There is evidence that patients remain aware of their surroundings when the left hemipshere is incapacitated..." Readers of Jaynes will immediately recognize that "awareness of one's surroundings" is not evidence of consciousness. If this were the case then all living things with awareness of their surroundings would be conscious, rendering the term practically meaningless. This gets back to the problem of confusing consciousness with more basic mental processes such as sensory perception, addressed in the responses in the first section of this page. In my view the limited language and independent preferences of the right hemisphere (in left hemisphere dominant individuals), documented in the split-brain studies by Sperry, Gazzaniga, and Bogen, provide supporting evidence for Jaynes's bicameral mental model by demonstrating that the two hemispheres can act in a more independent fashion than they typically do today.

Critico: "[A problem] for Jaynes' argument is the fact that billions of todays's evolved humans who do not hallucinate still hold religious beliefs of one sort or another. Mentally normal people still believe at least some of what their prophets may have hallucinated about." − W.R. Klemm, Professor of Neuroscience, Texas A & M University, in Atoms of Mind, p. 36. Risposta: Here Klemm seems to be confusing the bicameral mind with vestiges of the bicameral mind. According to Jaynes, textual, archaeological, and anthropological evidence supports the fact that first everyone experience hallucinations, then only a select few. First these people were labeled oracles and prophets; today they are labeled mentally ill. Jaynes's theory does not predicate modern religious belief on the direct experience of auditory hallucinations by each individual believer. While divine relevation in the form of auditory hallucinations was the historical basis for ancient religion, modern religion is a vestige of the bicameral mind maintained through social conditioning, cultural tradition, and some degree of neurological predisposition. Many people suffering from temporal lobe epilepsy, for example, experience sudden hyperreligiosity. To my knowledge, only Jaynes's theory explains why both auditory hallucinations and hyperreligiosity would be associated with the right temporal lobe.

Referenze

Bogen, J.E. 1973. The Other Side of the Brain: An Appositional Mind. In Robert Ornstein (ed.), The Nature of Human Consciousness: A Book of Readings.

Bogen, J.E. 1983. Mental Duality in the Anatomically Intact Cerebrum. Presidential Address to the Los Angeles Society of Neurology and Psychiatry on January 19, 1983.

Cavanna, A.E., Trimble, M., Federico, C., and Monaco, F. 2007. The 'Bicameral Mind' 30 Years On: A Critical Reappraisal of Julian Jaynes' Hypothesis. Functional Neurology, 22 (1): 11-15.

Cochran, Gregory. 2007. In J. Brockman (ed.) What Is Your Dangerous Idea? Harper Perennial.

Cline, Eric. 2006. Archaeology and the Iliad: The Trojan War in Homer and History. The Modern Scholar (audio lecture series).

Dennett, Daniel. 1986. Julian Jaynes's Software Archeology. Canadian Psychology, 27, 2.

Gazzaniga, M. 1967. The Split Brain in Man. Scientific American.

Gazzaniga, M. 1972. One Brain - Two Minds?. American Scientist, 60.

Gazzaniga, M. 2002. The Split Brain Revisited. Scientific American.

Jaynes, Julian. 1976/1990. The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Houghton-Mifflin.

Jebb, R.C. 1887. Homer: An Introduction to the Iliad and the Odyssey. James Maclehose and Sons.

Kuijsten, Marcel (ed.). 2007. Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. Julian Jaynes Society.

Kuijsten, Marcel. 2009. New Evidence for Jaynes's Neurological Model: A Research Update, The Jaynesian, Vol. 3, Issue 1.

Kuijsten, Marcel. 2009. Close-Mindedness and Mysticism in Science: Commentary on John Smythies's Review, The Jaynesian, Vol. 3, Issue 2.

Lattimore, Richard. 1951. The Iliad of Homer. University of Chicago Press.

Lawton, William Cranston. 1905. Ideals in Greek Literature. The Chautauqua Press.

Leaf, Walter. 1886/1900. The Iliad. New York, London: Macmillan and Co.

Leudar, Ivan and Philip Thomas. 2000. Voices of Reason, Voices of Insanity: Studies of Verbal Hallucinations. Routledge.

Olin, Robert. 1999. Auditory Hallucinations and the Bicameral Mind. Lancet, 354 (9173): 166.

Persinger, Michael. 2007. Foreword. In M. Kuijsten (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. Julian Jaynes Society.

Sher, Leo. 2000. Neuroimaging, Auditory Hallucinations, and the Bicameral Mind. Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience, 25 (3).

Sleutels, Jan. 2007. Greek Zombies. In M. Kuijsten (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. Julian Jaynes Society.

Sperry, Roger. 1964. Problems Outstanding in the Evolution of Brain Function. James Arthur Lecture. New York: American Museum of Natural History.

Sperry, Roger. 1974. Lateral Specialization in the Surgically Separated Hemispheres. In: Schmitt FO, Worden FG, eds. Neurosciences: Third Study Program.

Sperry, Roger. 1984. Consciousness, Personal Identity, and the Divided Brain. Neuropsychologia. Vol. 22 (6).

Weissman, Judith. 1993. Of Two Minds: Poets Who Hear Voices. Wesleyan.

 

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