Articoli correlati a mente la teoria di Jaynes Bicamerale
Articoli direttamente correlati alla mente la teoria di Jaynes Bicamerale
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A Systems Approach to the Bimodal, Interactive Nature of Human Consciousness and the Reintegration of the Bicameral Mind Through Education
Allen, John D. Dissertation Abstracts International, June 1983, Vol. 43 (12-A): 3886
Ramifications of Julian Jaynes's Theory of Consciousness for Traditional General Semantics
Ardery, P. ETC.: A Review of General Semantics, 2004, Vol. 61
Explores why general semantics theorists for over 70 years generally have overlooked the human behaviors that give rise to the sharpest and most violent of today's conflicts of world views — namely, religious behaviors. Introduces theories formulated by cultural anthropologist Julian Jaynes which "explain" religion and which have helped extensionalize my own definition of the so-called "verbal levels," a general semantics term I previously had defined intentionally.
The Interpretation of Dreams, the Origin of Consciousness, and the Birth of Tragedy
Atwan, Robert. Research Communications in Psychology, Psychiatry and Behavior, 1981, Vol. 6 (2): 163-182
Discusses J. Jaynes's (1976) hypothesis that the subjective consciousness developed as late as the 1st millennium BC; before then, men and women were bicameral. Their actions were guided by auditory hallucinations activated in the right temporal parietal region of the brain. Jaynes's theory suggests why the ancient idea of the dream as a divine experience followed a distinctly auditory pattern. The shift in dream patterns from the auditory dream of the Homeric period to the visual dreams of 5th-century tragedies approximates the timetable Jaynes proposed for the bicameral mind's breakdown and the evolution of left-hemispheric specialization.
The Consciousness of John's Gospel: A Prolegomenon to a Jaynesian-Jamesonian Approach
Bernier, Jonathan. The Bible and Critical Theory, 2010, Vol. 6, No. 10.
This article is concerned with what I call the consciousness of John's Gospel. This term needs to be clarified: I am concerned not with the psychological biography of the evangelist, nor am I interested in performing psychoanalysis upon this saint, now long dead. The possibilities of and for such historical psycho-biography and/or psychoanalysis remain open but, thankfully, need not be addressed herein. This article is concerned rather with what I call the 'cognitive form(s)' immanent within John's gospel, including consciousness, construed primarily through exegetical engagement with the prologue (1:1-18) and the Johannine Jesus' interactions with the Samaritan woman (ch. 4). The theories advanced by the late psychologist Julian Jaynes will largely inform the understandings of cognition and consciousness presupposed in this article, with Jaynes' theories brought into dialogue with Fredric Jameson's historical materialist hermeneutics. Hence, this is something of an experiment (what genuine exegesis is not?), an exploration of certain homologies between Jaynes' thought and Jameson's, wherein Jaynes provides a grammar for commentary upon Jameson and Jameson a grammar for commentary upon Jaynes. This commentarial dialectic in turn constitutes a grammar for commentary upon John's Gospel in a (hopefully) innovative and enlightening fashion. It is thus a prolegomenon (and claims to be no more than that) to possible future directions in the study not only of John's Gospel but also early Christianity and the history-of-religions more generally.
Sidelights of Xin "Heart, Mind" In the Shijing
Carr, Michael. Proceedings of the 31st CISHAAN, 1983, Tokyo and Kyoto, 824-825.
Big Heads in Old Chinese
Carr, Michael. Paper presented at the 18th International Conference on Sino-Tibetan Languages and Linguistics, August 27-29 1985, Bangkok
The historical linguistics of the big head words fit in well with the bicameral hypothesis. During the Shang dynasty (ca. 1500 - 1050 B.C., when Jaynes says people were still bicameral), many oracle graphs were written with unusual heads. During the Zhou dynasty (ca. 1050-221 B.C., when he says consciousness became prevalent), the heads on these graphs were graphically altered, and other archaic words for 'big head' wre used to mean 'great; grand'. By the beginning of the Han dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D., when people were undisputably conscious), all the big head words had become obsolete.
Personation of the Dead in Ancient China
Carr, Michael. Computational Analyses of Asian and African Languages, March 1985, 24 : 1-107.
The unusual practice of personating dead ancestors is a several thousand year old puzzle that has never been fully solved. No one has ever successfully explained how and why personation began and ended. The pieces of this personation puzzle can now be put together with Julian Jaynes' bicameral hypothesis for the origins of consciousness. The evidence concerning personation of the dead strongly suggests that consciousness - "consciousness" as we understand it today - did not develop in China until sometime after 1000 B.C.
The Shi 'Corpse/Personator' Ceremony in Early China
Carr, Michael. In Kuijsten, M. (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. 2006. Julian Jaynes Society.
The "Bicameral Mind" 30 Years On: A Critical Reappraisal of Julian Jaynes' Hypothesis
Cavanna, A.E., M. Trimble, F. Cinti, and F. Monaco. Functional Neurology, 2007, 22 (1): 11-15.
In 1976 Julian Jaynes published his controversial book The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, introducing the hypothesis of a two-chambered brain-mind model that preceded the evolutionary development of the conscious mind. Jaynes' speculative model gave rise to a huge debate, which has reverberated throughout the current neuroscientific and neurophilosophical literature. Has the bicameral mind stood the test of time? To answer this question, the present paper adopts a multidisciplinary perspective and, after briefly summarizing Jaynes' hypothesis, addresses two main critical issues: the neurological basis of the bicameral model and the philological accuracy of Jaynes' arguments. Finally, the concept of a non-unitary Self is presented as one of the most relevant contemporary legacies of the bicameral mind.
Hypnosis in the Theory of the Bicameral Mind
Casiglia, Edoardo. The Jaynesian, 2008, Vol. 2, Issue 1.
Terror and the Bicameral Mind: Joyce Carol Oates's Use of Julian Jaynes in Her Pseudonymous Fiction
Dean, Sharon L. A Journal of Detection, Spring-Summer 1994, Vol. 15 (1)
Julian Jaynes' Software Archeology
Dennett, Daniel. Canadian Psychology, April 1986, Vol. 27 (2): 149-154
Considers the problem of consciousness discussed by J. Jaynes and points to the lack of a definition for this phenomenon. Seven factors used by Jaynes to account for his theory are identified. Jaynes' theory is described as software archaeology without much of a fossil record or print product. Jaynes's idea of the need for a software revolution - in the organization of the human information-processings there are 2 linguistic agencies within the human brain, with the left side evolving phylogenetically to create intelligible utterances and the right side associated with more holistic, imaginative, and creative capabilities, is questioned. It is argued that there is little neurological evidence to support Jaynes's claims that the brain is partitioned and that there is evidence of bicamerally provoked hallucination.
The Brain-Mind Relation, Religious Evolution, and Forms of Consciousness: An Exploratory Statement
Doyle, Paul J. Sociological Analysis, Spring 1988, Vol. 49, No. 1., pp. 52-65
The major thesis of this paper is that Julian Jaynes's theory of the evolutionary transition from a bicameral mind to consciousness corresponds roughly to Robert Bellah's "histonic" stage of religious evolution. This synthesis provides a perspective for relating the physiological level of brain organization, the subjective level of religious experience and consciousness, and large-scale patterns of social organization and change.
Julian Jaynes and the Ancient Mindgods
Gliedman, J. Science Digest, April 1982, Vol. 90: 84-87
A Knowing Noos and a Slippery Psychê: Jaynes's Recipe for an Unnatural Theory of Consciousness
Greer, Scott. In Kuijsten, M. (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. 2006. Julian Jaynes Society.
Gods, Voices, and the Bicameral Mind: The Theories of Julian Jaynes
Hamden-Turner, Charles. Maps of the Mind, 1981, New York, Macmillian, 90-94.
Auditory Hallucinations in Nonverbal Quadriplegics
Hamilton, John. Psychiatry, November 1985, Vol. 48 (4): 382-92. Reprinted in Kuijsten, M. (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. Julian Jaynes Society.
When a system for communicating with nonverbal, quadriplegic, institutionalized residents was developed, it was discovered that many were experiencing auditory hallucinations. Nine cases are presented in this study. The
"voices" described have many similar characteristics, the primary one being that they give authoritarian commands that tell the residents how to behave and to which the residents feel compelled to respond. Both the relationship of this phenomenon to the theoretical work of Julian Jaynes and its effect on the lives of the residents are discussed.
Vico and Jaynes: Neurocultural and Cognitive Operations in the Origin of Consciousness
Haskell, Robert E. New Vico Studies, 1993, Volume XI.
This paper will first explore significant parallels between Vico and Jaynes; second, suggest the equivalence of the mind of Vico's "first men" with Jaynes' bicameral mind; third, and what is perhaps more important, it will suggest that Jaynes' theory of consciousness and its evidential base generally support Vico's historical theory of mental development.
Did 'Voices' of Gods Guide the Ancients?
Ingram, J. The Toronto Star, September 25 1994, E10.
Chinese Pictograms and the Bicameral Mind
Ishimori, Masanori and Takashi X. Fujisawa. The Jaynesian, 2007, Vol. 1, Issue 1.
The Brain-Mind Relation, Religious Evolution, and Forms of Consciousness: An Exploratory Statement
Johnson, Doyle Paul. Sociological Analysis, Spring 1988, 49 (1): 52-65.
It is proposed that Julian Jaynes's theory of the evolutionary transition from a bicameral mind to consciousness (The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, 1976) corresponds roughly to Robert Bellah's "historic" stage of religious evolution (see SA 12:8/64B3726). This synthesis provides a perspective for relating the physiological level of brain organization, the subjective level of religious experience and consciousness, and large-scale patterns of social organization and change. Jaynes's model of language and brain processes is compared briefly with our contemporary understanding (derived from George Herbert Mead and others) of the internal conversations that are part of the subjective experience. As an alternative to evolutionism, it is suggested that both Jaynes's and Bellah's theories can be applied to alternative forms of mentality that may exist in any historical stage with varying degrees of acceptance. A major distinction among different people in this regard is their need for external authority and their self-autonomy, especially in coping with stress.
Julian Jaynes and the Bicameral Mind: A Case Study in the Sociology of Belief
Jones, W. T. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, June 1982, Vol. 12 (2): 153-171.
The Lost Voices of the Gods (Interview with Julian Jaynes)
Keen, Sam. Psychology Today, November 1977, 11: 58-64.
Julian Jaynes: Portrait of the Psychologist as a Maverick Theorizer
Keen, Sam. Psychology Today, November 1977, 11: 66-67.
Bicameral Mind and the Narcissan Conspiracy
Kinsbourne, Marcel. Contemporary Psychology, November 1977, 22 (11): 801-2.
The Evolution of Self-Awareness: Advances in Neurological Understandings Since Julian Jaynes' 'Bicameral Mind'
Kretz, Robert Karl. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences & Engineering, 2000, Vol. 60 (12-B), pp. 6413.
While the most important survival enhancing change in the evolution of the human species is generally accepted to be the tremendous growth of the cerebral cortex, there are few models explaining the evolution of its cognitive processes. Julian Jaynes (1976) synthesized data from neurology, anthropology and ancient texts to address the question of when humans developed the cognitive process of self-awareness. Jaynes defined self-awareness as a specialized function of the language centers of the left hemisphere and posited that self-awareness emerged only after a more primitive form of behavioral control, dominated by right hemisphere language function, proved inadequate in responding to increasingly complex environmental and social demands.
Voice of Reason: Julian Jaynes's Enduring Ideas on Hearing Voices and Our Emerging Consciousness
Kuijsten, M. New Therapist Magazine, July/August 2004, Vol. 32.
We like to think of ourselves as a particularly conscious species. But the consciousness of 21st century human beings is not a done deal. At least not according to the theories of Julian Jaynes, the controversial thinker whose theory of the bicameral mind has survived the vigourous challenges it has experienced in the past 25 years. First propounded in his book, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Jaynes' theory argues that in less conscious time our predecessors based profound decisions on voices that were not unlike those experienced by sufferers of schizophrenia. But the difference was that such voices were understood as directives emanating straight from the gods or other supreme authorities. Only with the gradual emergence of consciousness did these voices begin to be usurped in their authority by our conscious faculties of reasoning. In this exclusive interview, New Therapist invites Marcel Kuijsten, Executive Director of the Julian Jaynes Society, to extend Jaynes' radical thinking to the psychotherapeutic realm.
Consciousness, Hallucinations, and the Bicameral Mind: Three Decades of New Research
Kuijsten, Marcel. In Kuijsten, M. (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. 2006. Julian Jaynes Society.
The Quest for Jaynes's Unpublished Writings
Kuijsten, Marcel. The Jaynesian, 2008, Vol. 2, Issue 1.
New Evidence for Jaynes's Neurological Model: A Research Update
Kuijsten, Marcel. The Jaynesian, 2009, Vol. 3, Issue 1.
Close-Mindedness and Mysticism in Science: Commentary on John Smythies's Review
Kuijsten, Marcel. The Jaynesian, 2009, Vol. 3, Issue 2.
Consciousness and Dreams
Kuijsten, Marcel. The Jaynesian, 2010, Vol. 4, Issue 1.
Psychoanalysis and the Two Cerebral Hemispheres
Levin, F.M. and Vuckovich, D.M. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 1983, Vol 11: 171-197
Reviews recent neurological knowledge of the two cerebral hemispheres and the implications of bicameral structure and functions for psychoanalysis. The onset and pattern of myelinization of the interhemispheral tracts are discussed as they relate to the Oedipal phase. Hypoconnection states and data on hemispheric idiosyncracies also are examined, and it is suggested that topographic and structural psychoanalytical models are entirely compatible with the latest neurological understanding of the bicameral brain. Following a discussion of Freud's work on aphasia and primary and secondary process, the bridging role of the metaphor in the analyst's transference interpretations is discussed. How this bridging of metaphor applies specifically to states of disordered connection of the 2 hemispheres is described, and neuropsychiatric hypotheses of disavowal and repression are presented. Clinical examples of communication from and with the bicameral mind are presented, and it is suggested that in the psychoanalytic situation the analyst may serve as a functional linkage between the analysand's 2 hemispheres.
The Oral Aesthetic and the Bicameral Mind
Lindahl, Carl. 1991. Oral Tradition, January, Vol. 6 (1)
Reprinted in Gilgamesh: A Reader, ed. John Maier. Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci. 1997, pp. 328-36
The Lost Voices of the Gods
Leo, John. Time, March 14 1977, 51-53.
Language and Consciousness: Jaynes's "Preposterous Idea" Reconsidered
Limber, John. In Kuijsten, M. (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. 2006. Julian Jaynes Society.
Psychologist Concentrates of How We Think (Interview)
Macklin, Beth. Tulsa World, October 7, 1980.
Eternal Rome: Subjective Voices and Immortality
Maxwell, Ross. The Psychohistory Review, 1985, 14: 35-43.
Joan of Arc - the Messenger
Maxwell, Ross F. History Today, April 2000, Vol. 50.
The Bicameral Mind
McCandless, Richard L. Religious Education, July-August 1980, Vol. 75 (4): 436-440.
Summarizes the functions of attention, perception, and specialized left and right cerebral hemispheres, suggesting that systematic private prayer and liturgical worship help structure a subjective reality of religious faith.
Beyond Confusion: Culture, Cognition, and Consciousness
McVeigh, Brian. Cross Culture, March 1993, Vol. 11.
This article has two purposes; 1. to suggest why and how at least two terms, "consciousness" and "cognition" (or introspecting and thinking) can and should be distinguished and 2. to take a step toward demonstrating why consciousness is a cultural, sociohistorical construction learned through language, and not an inborn, automatic response of our neurological systems.
Society In the Self: Towards An Anthropology of Agency
McVeigh, Brian. Toyo Gakuen University, March 1995.
Many have convincingly argued that the self, rather than an acultural, essentialist entity, is locally constituted from a matrix of age, class, gender, occupation, politics, and other variables. However, there still seems to be an implicit notion that willing, deciding, choosing, wishing - i.e., volitional acts - originate from an essentialist, asocial "executive ego." I offer the question: is decision-making ability itself a social construct? If so, how is our sense of agency built by society? I propose: 1. there are no essentialist, indissoluble selves; 2. society does not merely "influence" but builds selves; 3. as a social construction, selves were inventeed sometime in history; and 4. therefore it is possible to be a person without a self. I offer suggestions for how personal decision-making capabilities and volition are socially grounded in mental models of agency. In short, I discuss how overt, public power exchanges become covert, private intentions; how social relations construct psychological events; how "society is in the self." ...I examine two varieties of sociopsychological experience, namely spirit possession and hypnosis, that question our assumptions about agency.
The Self as Interiorized Social Relations: Applying a Jaynesian Approach to Problems of Agency and Volition
McVeigh, Brian. In Kuijsten, M. (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. 2006. Julian Jaynes Society.
What About the Bicameral Mind? [letter]
Moffic, H. S. American Journal of Psychiatry, May 1987, Vol. 144 (5): 696
Dr. Moffic questions why Jaynes's theory was left out of a discussion of hallucinations by Drs. G. Assad and B. Shapiro.
The Origin of Consciousness, Gains and Losses: Walker Percy vs. Julian Jaynes
Mooneyham, Laura. Language and Communication: An Interdisciplinary Journal, July 1993, Vol. 13 (3).
Julian Jaynes and Ezekiel's Wheel
Novak, Peter. Journal of Religion and Psychical Research, January 2002, Vol. 25, Issue 1, p. 33, 19 pages.
As a follow-up to the discussion of the binary soul doctrine in my book, "The Division of Consciousness," a further discussion of the binary soul doctrine is given highlighted by Julian Jaynes' hypothesis and the four modes of perspective.
Brain Mechanisms for Consciousness and Conscious Experience
Ojemann, George. Canadian Psychology, April 1986, Vol. 27 (2): 158-168.
Reviews the brain mechanism that underlies consciousness, with reference to J. Jaynes's ideas on consciousness and its origin in evolution. The present author distinguishes between individual and collective consciousness, the former being biologic and the latter recorded in culture through language. It is suggested that collective consciousness is the source of Jaynes's evidence for changes in individual consciousness. Evidence is cited to demonstrate a relationship between discrete cortical areas for different language functions and consciousness. It is concluded that conscious experience depends on the left brain language cortex and the thalamocortical activating mechanisms that select appropriate cortical mosaics for a language task and modulate retention of verbal information.
Auditory Hallucinations and the Bicameral Mind
Olin, Robert. Lancet, 1999, Vol. 354, p. 166.
Discusses recent neuroimaging studies that have "illuminated and confirmed the importance of Jaynes' hypothesis."
The Feeling of A Presence and Verbal Meaningfulness in Context of Temporal Lobe Function: Factor Analytic Verification of the Muses?
Persinger, Michael, A. and Katherine Makarec. Brain and Cognition, November 1992, Vol. 20 (2): 217-226.
Hypothesized that the feeling of a presence, particularly during periods of profound verbal creativity (reading or writing prose or poetry), is an endemic cognitive phenomenon. Factor analyses of 12 clusters of phenomenological experiences from 348 men and 520 women (aged 18-65 yrs), who enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses over a 10-yr period, supported the hypothesis. The authors conclude that periods of intense meaningfulness (a likely correlate of enhanced burst-firing in the left hippocampal-amygdaloid complex and temporal lobe) allow access to nonverbal representations that are the right hemispheric equivalents of the sense of self; they are perceived as a presence. The relevance of results to the theories of J. Jaynes (1986) and others is discussed.
Presence, Poetry, and the Collaborative Right Hemisphere
Platt, Carole Brooks. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2007, Vol. 14 (3): 36–53.
Neuropsychologist Michael Persinger's 'Muse Factor' experiment holds up in the study of mystics and poets with the added caveats of enhanced temporal lobe lability being preconditioned by adverse childhood circumstances, especially maternal deprivation, and the sexual abuse factor or loss of a significant male figure, in women. The wounded mind searches for enhanced personal meaning and the stabilization of the self through a restorative dialogic with conjured Others and real collaborators. Whether aroused by intense verbal meaningfulness, meditation, pathologies, drug usage, ritualistic behaviours or electromagnetically, the creative output can provide healing perceptions, a change of course and, often, an inspired poetic voice.
The Evolution of Self-Talk
Pos, Robert. The Jaynesian, 2007, Vol. 1, Issue 1.
Auditory Hallucinations of Hearing Voices in 375 Normal Subjects
Posey, T. B. and Losch, M. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 1983, Vol. 3.
Jaynes' elaborate theory of the evolution of human consciousness speculates that unconscious language use by the right hemisphere produced frequent auditory hallucinations in primitive people. Jaynes offers some explanation as to why hearing voices would now be less common. It is parsimonious, however, to predict that hearing voices is still common, although usually unreported, in the modern normal population. Some clinical literature gives support to this prediction. This study tested the prediction by means of surveying 375 college students with a two-part questionnaire. The first section presented fourteen different examples of auditory hallucinations and asked whether the subject had experienced such occurences. The second section asked for information concerning the characteristics of any hallucinated voices and for information about the subject that might relate to cerebral laterality. The results support the prediction that hearing voices is common within the normal population. Overall, 71 percent of the sample reported some experience with brief, auditory hallucinations of the voice type in wakeful situations. Hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations were also reported. Teh most frequent incidents were hearing a voice call one's name aloud when alone (36%) and hearing one's thoughts as if spoken aloud (39%). Interviews and MMPI results obtained from twenty selected subjects suggested that these reports of hearing voices were not related to pathology. Further findings of a significant relationship between high rates of auditory hallucinations and the extent to which subjects reported skills in music, art, and poetry were interpreted as weak support for Jaynes' speculation that right hemisphere activity may account for auditory hallucinations. Overall, the results are seen as supportive of several of Jaynes' theoretical points.
Romanticism, Bicamerality, and the Evolution of the Brain
Profitt, Edward. The Wordsworth Circle, 1978, 9: 98-105.
Pain and Behavior
Rachlin, Howard. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, March 1985, Vol. 8 (1): 43-83.
Discusses sensory pain (a direct function of the intensity of pain stimuli) and psychological pain (modifiable by hypnotism, placebos, and the sociocultural setting). According to physiological and cognitive theory, psychological and sensory pain are both internal processes, with the former influencing the latter as central processes influence peripheral processes. According to behavior theory, sensory pain is a reflex, while psychological pain is an instrumental act; both are overt behaviors. It is suggested that there is no basis for the claim by antibehaviorist philosophers and psychologists that behaviorism, because it cannot explain pain, is less capable of explaining mental phenomena than physiology or cognition. Comments are offered by Julian Jaynes and others.
The Emergence of the Modern Concept of Introspection: A Quantitative Linguistic Analysis
Raskovsky, I., D. Fernandez Slezak, C.G. Diuk and G.A. Cecchi. 2010. Young Investigators Workshop on Computational Approaches to Languages of the Americas: Proceedings of the Workshop, June 6, pgs. 68–75.
The Origin of Rhetoric in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind
Remington, Ted. The Jaynesian, 2007, Vol. 1, Issue 1.
Alone in the Country of the Mind: The Origin of Julian Jaynes
Rhodes, Richard. Quest, 1978, 2, 71-78
Auditory Hallucinations in Princeton University Undergraduates
Rosenburg, Michael E. Senior thesis at Princeton University on file in the Mudd Library. 1988.
Jaynes' Chimeric Faces: Another Look into the Mirror
Roszkowski, Michael J., Glenn E. Snelbecker and Robert S. Rosen. Personality and Individual Differences, 1986, Vol. 7 (6).
Asked 704 5-14 yr olds to indicate which of 2 faces (drawings) appeared happier. The main difference between the faces was the lateral location of their happy side. Selection of the face in which the happy features appear on the observer's left is indicative of a left-visual-field bias (LVF) and is interpreted as a sign of right-hemisphere control of face perception. Despite defects in the published version of this study, results have consistently documented differences between left- and right-handers in their selection of the happier face.
Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory as a Metaphor for Alcoholism
Sandoz, Jeff. The Jaynesian, 2007, Vol. 1, Issue 2.
The Lonely Odyssey of Julian Jaynes: Searching for Inner Voices
Schorr, Steven. Harvard Crimson, May 1977, 12, 2-3.
Neuroimaging, Auditory Hallucinations, and The Bicameral Mind
Sher, Leo. Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, 2000, 25 (3): 239-40.
Discusses neuroimaging studies that lend support to Jaynes's hypothesis.
Poe's Longing for a Bicameral Mind
Skaggs, Merrill Maguire. The Southern Quarterly: A Journal of the Arts in the South, Winter 1981, Vol. 19 (2).
Greek Zombies: On the Alleged Absurdity of Substantially Unconscious Greek Minds
Sleutels, Jan. In Kuijsten, M. (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. 2006, Julian Jaynes Society.
Jaynes' Ideas About Consciousness
Stevens, Richard. In Stevens, R. Social Psychology, 1983, Milton Keynes; Open Unversity Press, p. 87-92.
The Oracles and Their Cessation; A Tribute to Julian Jaynes
Stove, David C. Encounter, April 1989, Vol. 72: 30-38. Reprinted in Kuijsten, M. (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. Julian Jaynes Society.
There is no mystery about why there is farming or industry, why there is instruction of the young, why there is architecture, medicine, or law. But the most salient fact of all human history is this: that all those things, and many others, have almost always been suffused through-and-through with religion, and subordinated by it. All right: but why does religion exist? This is the question of questions concerning Homo sapiens. And I want to commend - and argue with - a book published some dozen years ago which to my mind comes closer to answering that question than everything else I have read about the matter put together. Its author is Julian Jaynes.
Engogenous Hallucinations and Bicamerality
Strassman, Rick. The Jaynesian, 2009, Vol. 3, Issue 2.
The "Sensed Presence" in Unusual Environments
Suedfeld, Peter and Jane S. Mocellin. Environment and Behavior, Vol. 19 (1), Jan 1987,, pp. 33-52.
The literature on human reactions to certain kinds of extreme and unusual environments indicates the occasional experience of another entity appearing to provide help or advice, when no such entity was in fact present.
Sources of such reports include spirit quests, solitary sailing, polar and mountain explorations, and the traumatic experiences of shipwreck and air-crash survivors. The experience is frequently interpreted as a sign of psychiatric symptomatology, whereas it is not only common in such situations but may in fact be an adaptive reaction. This type of experience can be described in terms of J. Jaynes's (1976) theory of bicamerality, but its specific etiology and characteristics have not been adequately investigated.
Vision, Madness, and Morality: Poetry and the Theory of the Bicameral Mind
Weissman, Judith. The Georgia-Review, 1979, Vol. 33 (1): 118-148.
Somewhere in Earshot: Yates' Admonitory Gods
Weissman, Judith. Pequod, 1982, Vol. 14: 16-31.
Schizophrenic Process, the Emergence of Consciousness in Recent History and Phenomenological Causality: The Significance for Psychotherapy of Julian Jaynes
Wilkinson, Heward. International Journal of Psychotherapy, March 1999, Vol. 4(1): 49-66.
This paper on Julian Jaynes's "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (J. Jaynes, 1990) illustrates the concept of "phenomenological causality," whose affinity to the Buddhist concept of "co-dependendent origination" is also touched on. Jaynes's work is explored through its relevance to schizophrenic experience. He holds that hallucination was a normal aspect of human decision-making in stress situations until around 1200 BC - the bicameral mind. This does not imply a simple equation of schizophrenic experience and hallucination; for originally there was consensual authorization, now lost, of hallucinatory experience of gods and ancestors. Jaynes has 4 main hypotheses: bicamerality (the two modes of mentality); the constitution of consciousness; the dating; and brain localization of the different modes of experience. Consciousness replaces bicameral resort to hallucination in situations of stress; it is constituted through metaphor. Schizophrenic experience transforms bicamerality through the shift in consensuality: as alienation, deconstruction of thinking and language, loss of the 'analog' constitution of normal consciousness and self, a fusion of consciousness, and bicameral modes.
What Is It Like To Be Nonconscious? A Defense of Julian Jaynes
Williams, Gary. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, October 2010.
I respond to Ned Block's claim that it is "ridiculous" to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being "ludicrous" that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes' behaviorism and J.J. Gibson's ecological psychology, I draw a distinction between the experience or "what-it-is-like" of nonhuman animals engaging with the environment and the "secret theater of speechless monologue" that is familiar to a linguistically competent human adult. This distinction grounds the argument that consciousness proper should be seen as learned rather than innate and shared with nonhuman animals. Upon establishing this claim, I defend the Jaynesian definition of consciousness as a social–linguistic construct learned in childhood, structured in terms of lexical metaphors and narrative practice. Finally, I employ the Jaynesian distinction between cognition and consciousness to bridge the explanatory gap and deflate the supposed "hard" problem of consciousness.
Julian Jaynes: Introducing His Life and Thought
Woodward, William and June Tower. In Kuijsten, M. (ed.) Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes's Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited. 2006, Julian Jaynes Society.