Why Even Discuss Bicamerality?
Posted: Tue Jan 05, 2016 7:32 pm
Here's a thought I've had about Jaynes' theory, I'd be interested in comments.
I gather that there are two central planks to Jaynes' theory. These are firstly that in early man, the mind existed in a partitioned state with directive thoughts 'heard' as voices apart, and secondly that as the brain integrated this state into a single unified mind 'Jaynesian consciousness' was formed through the capacity for linguistic introspection.
It seems to me that the first plank is rather inconsequential, it is his second plank that should interest us most. Whether or not bicamerality ever existed, Jaynes' idea that modern consciousness arose through language and is a learned phenomenon retains its explanatory power regardless of what led us to this state. That is, if language gives rise to 'consciousness', then it will have done that whether language and culture simply developed over time or whether a bicameral mind eventually integrated itself.
Jaynes' insight is that consciousness is a uniquely human phenomenon inherently tied to language use. As I see it, there is little reason to argue the likelihood for a bicameral mind. It may or may not have happened, but so what? It is not of any great value in itself when it comes to understanding just what consciousness is. We are where we are.
Jaynes suggests that much of our everyday behavior does not require conscious consideration when we define consciousness as Jaynesian consciousness, and I would agree with this. A lot of what we do - our behaviors - simply occur without conscious apprehension. We don't conduct a running commentary from moment to moment upon all of our behaviors. We are certainly aware of what is happening around and to us, but that is a different thing.
So, language is the mechanism through which the introspective "I" is formed, the internal mind-space in which we create a metaphorical representation of the external and internal environments in the form of a living self that can narrate and direct the body's behaviors.
However, and this is my point, if this IS the case then it follows that this kind of "I" is entirely learned. Without language one would not be 'conscious' in the Jaynesian sense. This seems to be how Jaynes' idea is interpreted from other comments I've read here, in which case I think there is a MAJOR implication. Simply put, Jaynesian consciousness is therefore a spectrum property, ranging from no consciousness for a person without language (eg Helen Keller) to a limited or perhaps narrow form of consciousness (eg Piraha people) to a more complex form of consciousness (eg various modern societies).
If this is so, then we really don't need to worry about whether primitive humans, or modern tribal societies (say pre-white settlement Australian Aborigines) were 'bicameral'. Bicamerality of itself is a dead-end philosophically - it would be but a curiosity of history. What is of interest is the extent to which any individual is conscious in a Jaynesian sense.
Which of course, leads me to suggest that Jaynesian consciousness is a cultural construct which probably varies - and has varied - according to time and place. And Bicameralism is a red herring more likely to detract from Jaynes' idea than add to it.
Thoughts? Why should we even discuss the bicameral mind theory?
I gather that there are two central planks to Jaynes' theory. These are firstly that in early man, the mind existed in a partitioned state with directive thoughts 'heard' as voices apart, and secondly that as the brain integrated this state into a single unified mind 'Jaynesian consciousness' was formed through the capacity for linguistic introspection.
It seems to me that the first plank is rather inconsequential, it is his second plank that should interest us most. Whether or not bicamerality ever existed, Jaynes' idea that modern consciousness arose through language and is a learned phenomenon retains its explanatory power regardless of what led us to this state. That is, if language gives rise to 'consciousness', then it will have done that whether language and culture simply developed over time or whether a bicameral mind eventually integrated itself.
Jaynes' insight is that consciousness is a uniquely human phenomenon inherently tied to language use. As I see it, there is little reason to argue the likelihood for a bicameral mind. It may or may not have happened, but so what? It is not of any great value in itself when it comes to understanding just what consciousness is. We are where we are.
Jaynes suggests that much of our everyday behavior does not require conscious consideration when we define consciousness as Jaynesian consciousness, and I would agree with this. A lot of what we do - our behaviors - simply occur without conscious apprehension. We don't conduct a running commentary from moment to moment upon all of our behaviors. We are certainly aware of what is happening around and to us, but that is a different thing.
So, language is the mechanism through which the introspective "I" is formed, the internal mind-space in which we create a metaphorical representation of the external and internal environments in the form of a living self that can narrate and direct the body's behaviors.
However, and this is my point, if this IS the case then it follows that this kind of "I" is entirely learned. Without language one would not be 'conscious' in the Jaynesian sense. This seems to be how Jaynes' idea is interpreted from other comments I've read here, in which case I think there is a MAJOR implication. Simply put, Jaynesian consciousness is therefore a spectrum property, ranging from no consciousness for a person without language (eg Helen Keller) to a limited or perhaps narrow form of consciousness (eg Piraha people) to a more complex form of consciousness (eg various modern societies).
If this is so, then we really don't need to worry about whether primitive humans, or modern tribal societies (say pre-white settlement Australian Aborigines) were 'bicameral'. Bicamerality of itself is a dead-end philosophically - it would be but a curiosity of history. What is of interest is the extent to which any individual is conscious in a Jaynesian sense.
Which of course, leads me to suggest that Jaynesian consciousness is a cultural construct which probably varies - and has varied - according to time and place. And Bicameralism is a red herring more likely to detract from Jaynes' idea than add to it.
Thoughts? Why should we even discuss the bicameral mind theory?