Marcel Kuijsten – The Gods of Mesopotamia and the Presentist Fallacy

[Moderator]

Marcel Kuijsten, Invited address at The Julian Jaynes Society Conference on Consciousness and Bicameral Studies, Charleston, WV, June 2013.

Abstract: Some individuals have an initially skeptical reaction when first exposed to Jaynes’s theory. In the first part of my talk, I will introduce a model for better understanding these skeptical reactions. I will propose that skeptical reactions to Jaynes’s theory (or any new idea) are frequently the result of a conflict with existing false premises or beliefs. Examples of false premises or beliefs relevant to Jaynes’s theory include: the idea that consciousness evolved biologically, mystical views of consciousness such as panpsychism, and the presentist fallacy (as it pertains to Jaynes’s theory, imposing a modern psychology on ancient cultures and the translation of ancient texts). Finally, critiques of the theory resulting from a conflict with false premises or beliefs can often be categorized in one of three ways: binary or “either/or” thinking, a narrow focus on one or two points of evidence at the expense of the entire patter of evidence, and misunderstandings as to Jaynes’s actual claims, resulting in myths and misconceptions. In the second part of my talk, I will explain one false premise, the presentist fallacy, and provide representative examples. I will then demonstrate how the pattern of evidence can be used to counter critiques of Jaynes’s theory that are based on the presentist fallacy, using the evidence for bicameral mentality in Mesopotamia as an example. In the process, I will introduce new evidence for Jaynes’s theory that has not been previously discussed.



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