Gods, Voices, and the Bicameral Mind: Notes & Citations

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Gods, Voices, and the Bicameral Mind: The Theories of Julian Jaynes

Number	Text
Intro-01	This is not technically “new” evidence, as Jaynes was familiar with this transition and lectured on the subject (see Julian Jaynes, “The Dream of Agamemnon,” in Marcel Kuijsten [ed.], The Julian Jaynes Collection [Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society]). But as the chapter he wrote on dreams was not included in The Origin due to space constraints, the topic is new to most readers.
Intro-02	Nolan Bushnell quoted in Zak Penn, Atari: Game Over (Xbox Video, 2014).
Intro-03	See Chapter 6 of this volume, “The Interpretation of Dreams, The Origin of Consciousness, and the Birth of Tragedy,” as well as the historian Ross R. Maxwell’s “Eternal Rome: Subjective Consciousness and Immortality” (Psychohistory Review, Vol. 14, 2, 1985), which examines the quest for immortality in Rome from the perspective of Jaynes’s theory. See also Julian Jaynes, “A Two-Tiered Theory of Emotions: Affect and Feeling,” in Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection.
Intro-04	While it is regrettable that a chapter Jaynes wrote on this subject was not included in his original book, fortunately he provides his ideas on dreams in a lecture titled “The Dream of Agamemnon,” which I’ve published in The Julian Jaynes Collection, and I recommend reading his lecture in conjunction with Robert Atwan’s chapter.
Intro-05	For more on this topic, see Julian Jaynes’s “Representations as Metaphiers” in Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection.
2.01	Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 59–62.
2.02	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976).
2.03	William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890), 1, 1–8 (New York: Dover, 1950).
2.04	Ibid., p. 1–2.
2.05	B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam/Vintage, 1971), Chapter 9.
2.06	The explanatory power of the behaviorists’ stimulus-response model was brought into question with the publication of Plans and the Structure of Behavior (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1960). The authors, George Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl Pribram, who had all been in the behaviorist camp, where consciousness is either ignored or denied, initiated what has come to be known as the “cognitive revolution” by suggesting that purposive behavior is guided by a plan. Their work is considered one of the most important recent breakthroughs in the understanding of behavior.
2.07	Carl Gustav Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1933).
2.08	Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1959).
2.09	In their recent book, The Self and its Brain (New York: Springer International, 1977), Sir Karl Popper and Sir John Eccles argue that the self-conscious mind is an independent entity, and that the unity of conscious experience comes not from neurological synthesis but from the integrating character of the self-conscious mind. In their rejection of materialism, the authors revive the ancient mind-body conundrum, and in their dictum against reductionism there is a ring of nostalgia for the human soul. However, in their method of arguing for dualism, or “psychophysical interactionism,” these eminent scholars do not attempt to define terms, for they believe every definition must make essential use of undefined terms and that meaning should not be allowed to dominate discussion as it so often does in contemporary philosophical writing. In their preface, the authors state that what they “are interested in is not the meaning of terms but the truth of theories; and this truth,” they say, “is largely independent of the terminology used.”
2.10	Robert E. Ornstein, The Psychology of Consciousness (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1972).
2.11	Thomas S. Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), notes that in “normal science” phenomena that do not fit into the paradigm are often not seen at all (p. 24). The paradigm is a criterion for choosing the questions that will be asked, the problems that will be admitted, and those which will be rejected (p. 37).
2.12	For Jaynes’s views regarding the evolution of language prior to the development of consciousness, see Julian Jaynes, “The Evolution of Language in the Late Pleistocene,” Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 1976, Vol. 280, pp. 312–325; reprinted in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2012).
2.13	Jaynes was ultimately awarded his doctoral degree from Yale in the spring of 1977 after friends urged Yale to grant it and other friends urged Jaynes to accept it. See William Woodward and June Tower, “Julian Jaynes: Introducing His Life and Thought,” in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.), Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Julian Jaynes’s Bicameral Mind Theory Revisited (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2006). — Ed.
2.14	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 1.
2.15	John Locke, An Essay Concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion and Assent (Draft B), B. Rand, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), II, pp. i–23.
2.16	Marcel Kinsbourne, “Bicameral Man and the Narcissan Conspiracy,” Contemporary Psychology, 1977, 22, 11, pp. 801–802.
2.17	I am grateful to Dr. George Weller, a psychologist at New York’s Montefiore Hospital, for pointing out the possibility of a neurological basis for self recognition that is not linguistic. There are certain cases of brain damage (anosognosia) where the patient has lost use of limbs and is unable to recognize his dysfunctioning member as part of his own body. Even individuals who are blind may lack awareness of their loss of sight.
2.18	Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (London: Hutchinson, 1967), pp. 15–18. At the same time, the attribution of consciousness to animals has been called an anthropomorphic fallacy. The debate over the issue of animal consciousness was recently revived with Donald R. Griffin’s The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experiences (New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1976). Griffin believes communication is the key to consciousness, and notes that many species of animals, from the honeybee to the chimpanzee, communicate in much finer grain messages than we give them credit for. According to Griffin, animals are conscious, and the difference between human awareness and animal awareness is quantitative, not qualitative. [For Jaynes’s thoughts on both Griffin’s research and the topic of consciousness in animals, see “In A Manner of Speaking: Commentary on Cognition and Consciousness in Non-Human Species” in Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection. — Ed.]
2.19	Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1946) pp. 74–76.
2.20	Ibid., p. 16.
2.21	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 51.
2.22	Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 140.
2.23	For an overview of Penfield’s work, see Russell Freedman and James E. Morriss, The Brains of Animals and Man (New York: Holiday House, Inc., 1972), pp. 52–54, 114–116.
2.24	Erich Lindemann, in his study of acute grief, has noted the tendency for hallucinatory experiences among surviving family members of the deceased. See Lindemann’s “Symptomatology and Management of Acute Grief,” American Journal of Psychiatry, 1944, 101, pp. 141–148.
2.25	Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books), translation by W. Small, 1873, Ch. 1.
2.26	Cassirer, Language and Myth, pp. 44–62.
2.27	The Gospel According to Saint John, Chapter 1, verse 1 (King James Version).
2.28	Cassirer, Language and Myth, p. 55.
2.29	Descriptions of preliterate societies often indicate vestiges of bicamerality. See Marcel Kuijsten, “Introduction,” in Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection. — Ed.
2.30	Jaynes believes the advance to consciousness occurred quite late in some cultures outside of this area. He suggests that the Incas may have been a bicameral society at the time of their conquest by Pizarro. He provides evidence for this by noting the conquistadors reported that the Devil himself spoke to the Incas out of the mouths of their statues. The great ease with which the empire was conquered, Jaynes says, was perhaps due to the superiority consciousness gave its plunderers.
2.31	Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan, Explorations in Communication (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 65, 69.
2.32	Marshall McLuhan, “Review of The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind,” available from Centre for Culture and Technology, University of Toronto, Canada, pp. 1, 3.
2.33	Jaynes points out that “the picture of a scientist sitting down with his problems and using conscious induction and deduction is as mythical as a unicorn.” Einstein’s greatest ideas came to him quite suddenly. He once told a friend that he had to be careful as he shaved each morning lest he cut himself with surprise at a new discovery. Michael Polanyi, a well known philosopher of science and a professor of physical chemistry, has emphasized the importance of “personal knowledge,” derived from unconscious processing of information. “All the efforts of the discoverer are but preparations for the main event of discovery, which eventually takes place,” says Polanyi, “by a process of spontaneous mental reorganization uncontrolled by conscious effort.” Science, Faith and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 34.
2.35	Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 1–31.
2.36	For a review of recent studies confirming Jaynes’s neurological model, see Marcel Kuijsten, “Consciousness, Hallucinations, and the Bicameral Mind: Three Decades of New Research,” in Kuijsten (ed.), Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness. — Ed.
3.01	Less commonly, hallucinations were also visual.
3.02	One can surely think of other barriers, such as the difficulty, for practical academic reasons known to academics, of carrying out interdisciplinary research.
3.03	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976) p. 55
3.04	This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Note that what is enumerated here is an elaboration of Jaynes’s list of features (Ibid., pp. 64–65).
3.05	Actually we are never conscious of things in their true nature, only of the excerpts we make of them.” This feature of interiority is “distinct from memory. An excerpt of a thing is in consciousness the representative of the thing or event to which memories adhere, and by which we can retrieve memories.” Reminiscence “is a succession of excerptions” (Ibid., pp. 61–62). Consciousness, then, “is not a superior unit that directs messages down to its subordinates in the brain.” Rather, consciousness is “the instance of selection that picks and chooses among the many options nonconsciousness offers up” (Tor Nørretranders, The User Illusion [New York: Penguin Books, 1998], p. 243).
3.06	Consilience (or “conciliation,” “compatibilization”) “is essentially doing in mind-space what narratization does in our mind-time or spatialized time. It brings things together as conscious objects just as narratization brings things together as a story” (Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, pp. 64–65).
3.07	Since “consciousness” is regularly used by other authors, I cannot replace it with interiority in all places. Therefore, I advise the reader to mentally substitute consciousness with interiority.
3.08	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 28.
3.09	Nørretranders, User Illusion, pp. 259, 209.
3.10	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 22.
3.11	Nørretranders, User Illusion, p. 124.
3.12	John A. Bargh, “The Automaticity of Everyday Life,” in Robert S. Wyer, Jr., (ed.), The Automaticity of Everyday Life (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), pp. 1–62.
3.13	Dietrich Trincker, “Aufnahme, Speicherung und Verarbeitung von Information durch den Menschen,” Veröffentlichungen der Schleswig-holsteinischen Universitätsgesellschaft, Neue Folge, 44 (Kiel: Verlag Ferdinand Hirt, 1966), emphasis in original; cited in Nørretranders, User Illusion, p. 126.
3.14	Nørretranders, User Illusion, p. 242.
3.15	Manfred Zimmerman, “Neurophysiology of Sensory Systems,” in Robert F. Schmidt (ed.), Fundamentals of Sensory Physiology (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986), pp. 68–116; cited in Nørretranders, User Illusion, p. 124.
3.16	Nørretranders, User Illusion, p. 125.
3.17	Ibid., p. 288.
3.18	Ibid., p. iv.
3.19	Norman F. Dixon, Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy (London: McGraw Hill, 1971), p. 5.
3.20	I am grateful to Scott Greer for suggesting to me that our equating interiority with “rationality” prevents us from conceptualizing cognition as possible without conscious thought.
3.21	Logic is technically the formalization of the means by which reason operates.
3.22	Nørretranders, User Illusion, pp. 129, 242.
3.23	Daniel Dennett, “Consciousness,” in Richard L. Gregory (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 160–164.
3.24	Charles S. Carver, “Associations to Automaticity,” in Robert S. Wyer, Jr. (ed.), The Automaticity of Everyday Life (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), pp. 95–103.
3.25	H. H. Kornhuber, “The Human Brain: From Dream and Cognition to Fantasy, Will, Conscience, and Freedom,” in Hans J. Markowitsch (ed.), Information Processing by the Brain (Toronto: Hans Huber Publishers, 1988), pp. 241–58.
3.26	Bargh, Automaticity of Everyday Life, pp. 50–51.
3.27	Lancelot Law Whyte, The Unconscious Before Freud (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978) p. 63.
3.28	St. Augustine in Rex Warner, The Confessions of St. Augustine (New York: Mentor, 1963), pp. 219, 227.
3.29	Harald Høffding, Psykologi (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1911), p. 102; cited in Nørretranders, User Illusion, p. 157.
3.30	Whyte, Unconscious Before Freud, p. 163.
3.31	Charles Sanders Peirce and Joseph Jastrow, “On Small Differences of Sensation,” Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 1884, 3, pp. 73–83.
3.32	William Lowe Bryan and Nobel Harter, “Studies of the Telegraphic Language: The Acquisition of a Hierarchy of Habits,” Psychological Review, 1899, 6, 345–75.
3.33	William James, Principles of Psychology (New York: Holt, 1890).
3.34	Leon M. Solomons and Gertrude Stein, “Normal Motor Automatism,” Psychological Review, 1886, 3, pp. 492–512.
3.35	George F. Stout, A Manual of Psychology (London: W. B. Clive, 1929).
3.36	Otakar Machotka, The Unconscious in Social Relations (New York: Philosophical Library, 1964).
3.37	Frederick S. Perls, Ralph F. Hefferline, and Paul Goodman. Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in Human Personality (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973).
3.38	Eugene T. Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and Psychological Approach to the Subjective (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).
3.39	Richard M. Shiffrin and Walter Schneider, “Controlled and Automatic Human Information Processing: II. Perceptual Learning, Automatic Attending, and a General Theory,” Psychological Review, 1977, 84, pp. 127–190.
3.40	E. E. Smith, “Theories of Semantic Memory,” in W. K. Estes (ed.), Handbook of Learning and Cognitive Processes, Vol. 6 (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 1978).
3.41	Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).
3.42	Ulric Neisser, “Changing Conceptions of Imagery,” in Peter W. Sheehan (ed.), The Function and Nature of Imagery (New York: Academic Press, 1972).
3.43	Nørretranders, User Illusion, p. 164.
3.44	Bargh, Automaticity of Everyday Life, pp. 4–5.
3.45	Dennett, “Consciousness,” p. 162.
3.46	Bargh, Automaticity of Everyday Life, p. 10.
3.47	Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953).
4.01	Julian Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 2; reprinted in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2012).
4.02	Ibid.
4.03	Julian Jaynes, “The Evolution of Language in the Late Pleistocene,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1976, 280; reprinted in Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection.
4.04	For discussions on the cortical control of vocalizations see Terrence W. Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997) and W. Tecumseh Fitch, The Evolution of Language (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
4.05	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 130.
4.06	For a discussion on primate imitation see Michael Tomasello and Josep Call, Primate Cognition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 9.
4.07	Ofer Bar-Yosef, “The Natufian Culture in the Levant: Threshold to the Origins of Agriculture,” Evolutionary Anthropology, 1998, 6, 5, pp. 159–177.
4.08	Ibid.
4.09	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 140.
4.10	Ibid., p. 149.
4.11	Ibid., pp. 134–35.
4.12	Z. M. Istomina, “The Development of Voluntary Memory in Children of Preschool Age,” Soviet Psychology, 1975, 13.
4.13	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 142.
4.14	Emma Guerrero, Miquel Molist, Ian Kuijt, and Josep Anfruns, “Seated Memory: New Insights into Near Eastern Neolithic Mortuary Variability from Tell Halula, Syria,” Current Anthropology, 2009, 50, 3, 379–391, p. 384.
4.15	Ian Kuijt, “The Regeneration of Life: Neolithic Structures of Symbolic Remembering and Forgetting,” Current Anthropology, 2008, 49, 2, p. 172.
4.16	James Whitley, “Too Many Ancestors,” Antiquity, 2002, 76, p. 121.
4.17	James Mellaart, The Neolithic of the Near East (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), p. 67.
4.18	Charles L. Redman, The Rise of Civilization: From Early Farmers to Urban Society in the Ancient Near East (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1978), p. 247.
4.19	Ibid., p. 255.
4.20	Ibid., p. 250.
4.21	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 152.
4.22	Leonard Woolley, The Excavations at Ur: 1924-1934 (Society of Antiquaries, 1934).
4.23	David N. Keightley, “The Shang: China’s First Historical Dynasty,” in M. Loewe and E. L. Shaughnessy (eds.), The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 267.
4.24	Victor W. von Hagen, World of the Maya (New American Library, 1960), p. 109.
4.25	Alexander Heidel, The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 196; p. 153.
4.26	Miguel Covarrubias, Indian Art of Mexico and Central America (New York: Knopf), p. 123.
4.27	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 165.
4.28	Ibid., p. 169.
4.29	Ibid., p. 167.
4.30	José de Acosta, The Natural and Moral History of the Indies, translated by Edward Grimstone (New York: Burt Franklin, 1900), pp. 325–326.
4.31	Ibid., p. 326.
4.32	Robert H. Pfeiffer, State Letters of Assyria (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1935), quoted in Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 174.
4.33	Zechariah 10:2, quoted in Karel Van Der Toorn, “The Nature of the Biblical Teraphim in the Light of the Cuneiform Evidence,”Catholic Biblical Quarterly, 1990, 52, 2, 203–222.
4.34	Cottie A. Burland, Montezuma, Lord of the Aztecs (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p. 47.
4.35	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 174.
4.36	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 204.
4.37	Ibid., p. 223.
4.38	Luther H. Martin, Hellenistic Religions: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 24.
4.39	Simon McCarthy-Jones, Hearing Voices: The Histories, Causes and Meanings of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 16.
4.40	Robert S. Bianchi, “Assyria in New York,” Minerva, 1995, 6, 4, p. 11.
4.41	Zainab Bahrani, The Graven Image: Representation in Babylonia and Assyria (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), p. 192.
4.42	Prudence O. Harper, Evelyn Klengel-Brandt, Joan Aruz, and Kim Benze (eds.), Assyrian Origins: Discoveries at Ashur on the Tigris (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1995), pp. 112–113.
4.43	Henri Frankfort, The Art and Architecture of the Ancient Orient (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 132.
4.44	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 230.
4.45	Ibid., p. 221.
4.46	Ibid., p. 208.
4.47	Wilfred G. Lambert, Babylonian Wisdom Literature (Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 15, 67.
4.48	Ibid., p. 33.
4.49	Ibid., p. 89.
4.50	Robert Chadwick, First Civilizations: Ancient Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt (Oakville, CT: Equinox, 2005), pp. 64–70.
5.01	Robert Drews, The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 4.
5.02	Ibid., p. 98.
5.03	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 212.
5.04	Sturt W. Manning, “Clarifying the ‘High’ v. ‘Low’ Aegean/Cypriot Chronology for the Mid Second Millennium B.C.: Assessing the Evidence, Interpretive Frameworks, and Current State of the Debate,” in Manfred Bietak and Ernst Czerny (eds.), Proceedings of the SCIEM 2000, 2nd EuroConference (Vienna, Austria: Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2003).
5.05	Drews, Bronze Age, p. 38.
5.06	Ibid., p. 39.
5.07	Ibid., pp. 40–43.
5.08	Jane C. Waldbaum, From Bronze to Iron: The Transition from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age in the Eastern Mediterranean (Göteborg, Sweden: Paul Aströms Förlag, 1978).
5.09	Jane C. Waldbaum, “Thirty Years of Archaeological and Technological Research,” in V. C. Pigott (ed.), The Archaeometallurgy of the Asian Old World (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 1999), p. 32.
5.10	Drews, Bronze Age, p. 79.
5.11	Ibid., p. 54.
5.12	Ibid.
5.13	Ibid., p. 49.
5.14	Ibid., pp. 54–57.
5.15	Ibid., p. 59.
5.16	Ibid., p. 71.
5.17	A. Bernard Knapp, Copper Production and Divine Protection: Archaeology, Ideology and Social Complexity on Bronze Age Cyprus (Coronet Books Inc., 1986).
5.18	Wolfgang Helck, “Die Seevölker in den ägyptischen Quellen,” in H. Müller-Karpe, Geschichte des 13 und 12 Jahrhundert v. Chr. Frankfurt Colloquium, Feb. 1976 (Munich, 1977).
5.19	Nancy K. Sandars,The Sea Peoples: Warriors of the Ancient Mediterranean 1250–1150 B.C. (London: Thames & Hudson, 1985).
5.20	Vincent Desborough,The Last Mycenaeans and their Successors: An Archaeological Survey ca. 1200–1000 B.C. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).
5.21	Drews, Bronze Age, pp. 91–93.
5.22	Ibid., p. 88.
5.23	Ibid., p. 104.
5.24	Ibid., pp. 194–195.
5.25	Ibid., p. 93.
5.26	Ibid., p. 97.
5.27	Ibid., p. 219.
5.28	Ibid., p. 97.
5.29	Ibid., p. 117.
5.30	Ibid., pp. 212–213.
5.31	Ibid., p. 89.
5.32	Ibid., p. 116.
5.33	Ibid., p. 88.
5.34	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, p. 195.
5.35	Ibid., pp. 207–208.
5.36	Eric H. Cline, 1177 B.C. The Year Civilization Collapsed (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 162.
5.37	Ibid., p. 170.
5.38	Ibid.
6.01	Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. by James Strachey (New York: Avon Books, 1965, p. 312). All references to Freud are from this edition.
6.02	Homer, “A Hymne to Hermes,” Chapman translation.
6.03	Carl G. Jung, “General Aspects of Dream Psychology,” in Dreams, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 34. See also Freud, p. 588.
6.04	Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, trans. by Philip Vellacott (New York: Penguin Books, 1980).
6.05	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), pp. 236–246.
6.06	For example, dreams play a considerable part in the action and imagery of the Epic of Gilgamesh, some sections of which date back to the second millennium b.c.
6.07	E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1951), p. 70. Dodds cites C. J. Gadd, Ideas of Divine Rule in the Ancient East: “oracles and prophecy tend to harden into practices of formal divination,” p. 86 (31).
6.08	Euripides, Ipigeneia, trans. by Richmond Lattimore (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
6.09	Aristotle, de somniis, 461A.
6.10	The Iliad of Homer, trans. by Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961).
6.11	The Odyssey of Homer, trans. by Richmond Lattimore (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).
6.12	See the Iliad, 22. 199–201.
6.13	Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, p. 106.
6.14	Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, p. 129.
6.15	Cicero, de divin, 1. 42.
6.16	Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, p. 82; see also p. 67.
6.17	Dodds, p. 107–109. Although it is tempting to think Homer constructed auditory dreams because he was blind, Dodds’s documentation makes it clear that reports of such dreams pervade ancient writing. In modern times, James Joyce (who was nearly blind) thought dreams were closely tied to auditory stimuli: “In sleep our senses are dormant, except the sense of hearing, which is always awake, since you can’t close your ears. So any sound that comes to our ears during sleep is turned into dreams.” Thus Finnegans Wake, the longest auditory dream in literature.
6.18	George Devereux, Dreams in Greek Tragedy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. xxv.
6.19	Ibid., pp. 30–31.
6.20	Ibid., p. 267.
6.21	Ibid., p. xxix.
6.22	Aeschylus, The Persians, trans. by Philip Vellacott (New York: Penguin Books, 1980).
6.23	This is not to claim that people in ancient times had no visual dreams. That would be absurd. The point is that auditory dreams were more highly valued than visual ones and were fairly common, though certainly not as articulate as Homer renders them. Socrates mentions having auditoryoracular dreams in Crito 44B and in Phaedo 60E.
6.24	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, pp. 202–203.
6.25	Ibid., p. 72.
6.26	Jaynes did write a chapter on dreams for The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, however it was not included due to concerns over the length of the book. His ideas on this subject are well represented in his lecture “The Dream of Agamemnon,” published in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2012), and I recommend reading it in conjunction with the present chapter. — Ed.
6.27	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 269.
6.28	Ibid.
6.29	C. J. Herington, Introduction to Aeschlus’ The Persians (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 27.
6.30	Pausanias, Descriptions of Greece, I. 21,2. Cited by Herington, p. 12.
6.31	For a full discussion of this interesting etymological connection between dreams and drama, see George Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1968), pp. 170–172.
6.32	Devereux, Dreams in Greek Tragedy, p. 123.
6.33	And, Freud would add, the playwright.
7.01	Plato, The Apology, in Great Dialogues of Plato (New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 428.
7.02	Plato, The Republic, in Great Dialogues of Plato (New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 394.
7.03	Ibid., p. 400.
7.04	Eric Havelock (The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the Present [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986]) has said of the Platonic dialogues, “Could not the whole Socratic mission be viewed as a linguistic enterprise, propelled by the oral-literate transition? If so, Socrates himself played a paradoxical role, an oralist adhering to the habit of his youth, yet using oralism in a brand-new manner, no longer an exercise in poetic memorization, but as a prosaic instrument for breaking the spell of the poetic tradition, substituting in its place a conceptual vocabulary and syntax, which he as a conservative sought to apply to the conventions governing behavior in an oral society in order to rework them.” (p. 5).
7.05	Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), pp. 183–84.
7.06	Walter J. Ong (Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the World [London: Methuen, 1982]) has incorrectly tried to make Jaynes’s theory of bicamerality identical with his own theory of orality: “Whatever one makes of Jaynes’ theories, one cannot but be struck by the resemblance between characteristics of the earlier or ‘bicameral’ psyche as Jaynes describes it — lack of introspectivity, or analytical prowess, of concern with the will as such, of a sense of a difference between past and future — and the characteristics of the psyche in oral cultures not only in the past but even today” (p. 30). Though truly bicameral cultures have always been oral, cultures can be oral without being bicameral, without being governed by hallucinated voices.
7.07	Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 17.
7.08	Ibid., p. 8.
7.09	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), pp. 103–104.
7.10	“It [consciousness] operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing an analog space with an analog ‘I’ that can observe that space, and move metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity, excerpts relevant aspects, narratizes and conciliates them together in a metaphorical space where such meanings can be manipulated like things in space” (ibid., 65–66).
7.11	Ibid., p. 134.
7.12	Ibid., p. 361–362.
7.13	E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 21.
7.14	The best book I know on the limits of sociobiology is Philip Kitcher’s Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).
7.15	Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961).
7.16	Ernst Mayr, Animal Species and Evolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 636–637.
7.17	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 321.
7.18	Joseph Fontenrose, The Delphic Oracle: Its Responses and Operations, with a Catalogue of Responses (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 9.
7.19	Robin Lane Fox, Pagans and Christians (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), p. 108.
7.20	Ibid., pp. 117–18.
7.21	Ibid., 172.
7.22	Colin M. Turnbull, The Mountain People (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), pp. 270–271.
7.23	Richard Price, Alabi’s World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 249.
7.24	Ibid., p. 277.
7.25	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 431.
7.26	Wilson, On Human Nature, p. 59.
7.27	R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience (New York: Ballantine Books, 1967); Michael Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (New York: Random House, 1973); Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
7.28	Jaynes discusses Schreber in Origin of Consciousness, pp. 414–416.
7.29	Daniel Paul Schreber, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (London: W. Dawson, 1955; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 80.
7.30	Ibid., p. 73.
7.31	Ibid., p. 69.
7.32	Ibid., p. 141.
7.33	Ibid., p. 154–155.
7.34	Ibid., p. 215.
7.35	Ibid., p. 108.
7.36	Ibid., p. 183.
7.37	Jacquetta Hawkes, Dawn of the Gods: Minoan and Mycenaean Origins of Greece (New York: Random House, 1968) has persuaded me that Minoan culture honored women.
7.38	Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 30.
7.39	Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 32–33.
7.40	Jeff Opland, Anglo-Saxon Oral Poetry: A Study of the Traditions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 20.
8.01	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1976).
8.02	Ibid., p. 437.
8.03	Harold Bloom, “The Uses of Poetry,” New York Times (November 12, 1975), p. 43.
8.04	Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 273.
8.05	Octavio Paz, Children of the Mire: Modern Poetry from Romanticism to the Avant-Garde (Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 60.
8.06	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, pp. 281–85.
8.07	Ibid., p. 317.
8.08	Ibid., p. 438.
8.09	Northrop Frye, “The Drunken Boat: The Revolutionary Element in Romanticism,” in N. Frye (ed.), Romanticism Reconsidered: Selected Papers from the English Institute (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 10.
8.10	M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977), p. 90, 120.
8.11	Florence Marsh, Wordworth’s Imagery: A Study in Poetic Vision (Yale University Press, 1952), p. 4.
8.12	Jaynes,Origin of Consciousness, pp. 361–78.
8.13	See Anatomy of Criticism, pp. 270–73.
8.14	Geoffrey H. Hartman, “Romanticism and Anti-Self-Consciousness,” in H. Bloom (ed.), Romanticism and Consciousness: Essays in Criticism (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1970), p. 52.
8.15	Thus, “symphony and song,” which is not a tautology because Coleridge means to underscore the musical as opposed to the verbal quality of the utterance he has in mind. In this regard see Joseph Sgammato, “A Note on Coleridge’s ‘Symphony and Song’,” The Wordsworth Circle, 6, 1975.
8.16	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, pp. 361–70, 363.
8.17	Ibid., pp. 361–70.
8.18	Ibid., p. 371.
8.19	Helen Regueiro, The Limits of Imagination: Wordsworth, Yeats, and Stevens (Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 43.
8.20	Hartman, “Romanticism and Anti-Self-Consciousness,” p. 53.
8.21	Robert Pinsky, The Situation of Poetry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 152. (Pinsky’s argument is that this is as much the central concern of the contemporary poet as it was of the Romantics — specifically, Keats, whose “Ode to a Nightingale” is Pinsky’s take-off point for his reading of modern poetry. Let me add that the “Ode to a Nightingale” is yet another poem that can be read profitably against the general thesis that I have been developing.)
8.22	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 378.
9.01	John Hamilton, “Auditory Hallucinations in Nonverbal Quadriplegics,” Psychiatry, 1985, 48, 382–392; reprinted in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.), Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2006).
9.02	Ibid.
9.03	Wilson Van Dusen, “The Presence of Spirits in Madness,” in James Fadiman and Donald Kewman (eds.), Exploring Madness: Experience, Theory, and Research (Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1979).
9.04	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1976).
9.05	David L. Rosenhan, “On Being Sane in Insane Places,” Science, 1973, 179, 250–258.
9.06	Julian Jaynes, “Hearing Voices and the Bicameral Mind,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1986, 9, 3; reprinted in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2012).
9.07	G. Plagenz, “Listening for God’s Voices,” Augusta Chronicle-Herald, February 28, 1987, 5A.
9.08	Wilder Penfield and Phanor Perot, “The Brain’s Record of Auditory and Visual Experience — A Final Summary and Discussion,” Brain, 1963, 86, 595–696.
9.09	Here the authors touch upon the fascinating fact that language generated in the non-dominant hemisphere is not perceived as being associated with one’s self, and is thus experienced as a hallucination. In ways yet to be explored and understood, our self concept appears to be connected to the language areas of our dominant hemisphere. —Ed.
9.10	Thomas Burling, John Sappington, and Andrew Mead, “Lateral Specialization of a Perceptual Calendar Task by a Moderately Retarded Adult,” American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1983, 88, 3, 326–328; M. Forbes, “The Mysterious Savant Syndrome,” Pursuit, 1986, 19, 1, 13–15.
10.01	Russell Hurlburt, Professor of Psychology at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, developed a method called Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) and has used this method to investigate inner experience for more than three decades. Descriptive Experience Sampling involves providing individuals with a beeper that goes off at random times throughout the day, cueing them to focus on and then document the details of their inner experience at that moment. See Russell T. Hurlburt, Investigating Pristine Inner Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).—Ed.
10.02	See Hurlburt, Sampling Normal and Schizophrenic Inner Experience.
10.03	Ibid., Chapter 17.
11.01	Alison Gopnik, “How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1993, 16, 1–14.
11.02	Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner, “Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children’s Understanding of Deception,” Cognition, 1983, 13, 103–128.
11.03	Robert M. Joseph and Helen Tager-Flusberg, “The Relationship of Theory of Mind and Executive Functions to Symptom Type and Severity in Children with Autism,” Development and Psychopathology, 2004, 16, 1, 137–155.
11.04	Stephanie M. Carlson, Louis J. Moses and Casey Breton, “How Specific is the Relation Between Executive Function and Theory of Mind? Contributions of Inhibitory Control and Working Memory,” Infant and Child Development, 2002, 11, 73–92.
11.05	For a broad cross-sectional treatment of how children come to understand mind from a social interactionist point of view, see Jeremy I. Carpendale and Charlie Lewis, “Constructing an Understanding of Mind: The Development of Children’s Social Understanding Within Social Interaction,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2004, 27, 1, 79–96.
11.06	T. Callaghan, P. Rochat, A. Lillard, M. L. Claux, H. Odden, S. Itakura, S. Tapanya, and S. Singh, “Synchrony in the Onset of Mental-State Reasoning: Evidence from Five Cultures,” Psychological Science, 2005, 16, 5, 378–384.
11.07	Richard F. Cromer, “The Development of the Ability to Decenter in Time,” British Journal of Psychology, 1971, 62, 3, 353–365.
11.08	M. A. Sabbagh, F. Xu, S. M. Carlson, L. J. Moses, and K. Lee, “The Development of Executive Functioning and Theory of Mind,” Psychological Science, 2006, 17, 1, 74–81.
11.09	Ibid., p. 80.
11.10	Ibid., p. 74.
11.11	T. Ruffman, J. Perner, M. Naito, L. Parkin, and W. A. Clements, “Older (But Not Younger) Siblings Facilitate False Belief Understanding,” Developmental Psychology, 1998, 34, 161–174.
11.12	R. B. Onians, The Origins of European Thought: About the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), p. 23.
11.13	Ibid., p. 83.
11.14	Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 4.
11.15	E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), p. 15.
11.16	S. M. Carlson, L. J. Moses, H. R. Hix, “The Role of Inhibitory Processes in Young Children’s Difficulties with Deception and False Belief,” Child Development, 1998, 69, 3, 672–691.
11.17	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976).
11.18	Francesco Antinucci and Ruth Miller, “How Children Talk About What Happened,” Journal of Child Language,” 1976, 3, 167–189.
11.19	Cromer, “The Development of the Ability to Decenter in Time.”
11.20	Richard Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently … and Why (New York: Free Press, 2003), p. 50.
11.21	Hazel Rose Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, “A Collective Fear of the Collective: Implications for Selves and Theories of Selves,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1994, 20, 568–579.
11.22	Michael Tomasello, “On the Interpersonal Origins of Self-Concept,” in Ulric Neisser (ed.), The Perceived Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 174–184.
11.23	Beatrice Beebe, Daniel Stern, and Joseph Jaffe, “The Kinesic Rhythm of Mother-Infant Interactions,” in A. W. Siegman and S. Feldstein (eds.), Of Speech and Time: Temporal Patterns in Interpersonal Contexts (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1979), pp. 23–34.
11.24	Ian Cross, 2006, “Music and Social Being,” Musicology Australia, 2006, 28, 114–126.
11.25	Daniel N. Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant (New York: Basic Books, 1985), p. 140.
11.26	Ibid., p. 142.
11.27	Daniel N. Stern, Lynne Hofer, Wendy Haft and John Dore, “Affect Attunement: The Sharing of Feeling States Between Mother and Infant by Means of Inter-Modal Fluency,” in T. Field and N. A. Fox (eds.), Social Perception in Infants (New York: Ablex Publishing, 1985), pp. 249–268.
11.28	William Labov and David Fanshel, Therapeutic Discourse (New York: Academic Press, 1977).
11.29	Stern, Interpersonal World of the Infant, p. 221.
11.30	Ibid., p. 214.
11.31	Henry M. Wellman, “Early Understanding of Mind: The Normal Case,” In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and D. J. Cohen (eds.), Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993).
11.32	Alan M. Leslie, “Pretense and Representation: The Origins of ‘Theory of Mind,’” Psychological Review, 1987, 94, 412–426; R. Peter Hobson, “Through Feeling and Sight to Self and Symbol,” in U. Neisser (ed.), The Perceived Self: Ecological and Interpersonal Sources of Self Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 254–279.
11.33	Jerome Kagan, The Second Year: The Emergence of Self-Awareness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981) p. 88.
11.34	Michel Deleau, “Communication and the Development of Symbolic Play: The Need for A Pragmatic Perspective,” in J. Nadel and L. Camaioni (eds.), New Perspectives in Early Communicative Development (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 97–116.
11.35	Helen Keller, The World I Live In (New York, NY: The Century Co., 1904), p. 113.
11.36	John H. Flavell, “The Development of Children’s Knowledge About the Appearance–Reality Distinction,” American Psychologist, 1986, 41, 4, 418–425.
11.37	Josef Perner, Understanding the Representational Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 151.
11.38	Ibid., p. 193.
11.39	John H. Flavell, Frances L. Green, and Eleanor R. Flavell, “Children’s Understanding of the Stream of Consciousness,” Child Development, 1993, 64, 387–398.
11.40	William R. Woodward and June F. Tower, “Julian Jaynes: Introducing His Life and Thought,” in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.), Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2006).
11.41	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 216.
12.01	In a personal communication (February 9, 1992), Jaynes confirmed that he is not familiar with the works of Walker Percy (1916–1990); Percy cannot, of course, also confirm that he had not read Jaynes but there is no reference to Jaynes in Percy’s writings.
12.02	Julian Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 128-137; reprinted in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.) The Julian Jaynes Collection (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2012).
12.03	Ibid., p. 132.
12.04	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 75.
12.05	Ibid., p. 209.
12.06	Jaynes, “Voices of the Mind,” p. 127.
12.07	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 262.
12.08	Ibid.
12.09	Ibid., pp. 262–263.
12.10	Ibid., pp. 274–275.
12.11	Walker Percy, The Message in the Bottle (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1975), pp. 35–36.
12.12	Helen Keller, The Story of My Life (New York: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 30–31.
12.13	Walker Percy, Lost in the Cosmos (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), p. 108.
12.14	Percy, Message in the Bottle, p. 39.
12.15	Ibid., p. 97.
12.16	Jaynes, “Voices of the Mind,” p. 142.
12.17	Jonathan Miller, “Primitive Thoughts,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 155–157.
12.18	Percy himself carefully distances himself from Lévy-Bruhl in The Message in the Bottle: “Lévy-Bruhl’s categories of ‘prelogical thought’ are not, in my opinion, a genetic stage of psychic evolution but simply a mode of symbolic behavior to which a denizen of Western culture is as apt to fall prey as a Bororo” (p. 206n).
12.19	W. T. Jones, “Julian Jaynes and the Bicameral Mind: A Case Study in the Sociology of Belief,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1982, 12, 153–171.
12.20	Linda W. Hobson, “The Study of Consciousness: An Interview with Walker Percy,” Georgia Review, 1981, 43, 1–19.
12.21	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 9.
12.22	Ibid., p. 10.
12.23	Ibid., p. 217.
12.24	Ibid.
12.25	Percy, Message in the Bottle, p. 200 (Percy’s emphases).
12.26	Judith Weissman’s “Vision, Madness and Morality: Poetry and the Theory of the Bicameral Mind” has extended Jaynes’s analysis of poetry as a bicameral vestige in her survey of the English literary tradition from Milton to Yeats, finding in English poets a hunger after divine voices and bicameral authority. Coleridge’s “Kubla Kahn” becomes under the terms of this analysis the consummate expression of the yearning for the bicameral voice.
12.27	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, pp. 317–318.
12.28	Ibid., p. 320.
12.29	Walker Percy, The Thanatos Syndrome (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1987).
12.30	Percy can be downright precious in his indirection about God. In Lost in the Cosmos, for example, the Incarnation is explained obliquely as an incident in which because we have acted like foolish cats caught up in trees, an unidentified “someone” who loves us is required “to make as big a fool of himself to rescue us” (p. 248).
12.31	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 318 (Jaynes’s emphasis). Jaynes’s own mysterious moment provided much of the direction for his theorizing about consciousness. In The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Jaynes tells of a moment of the sort of “darkest distress” he later identifies as inescapably propelling us into contacts with the numinous (p. 318). He had been under stress for some period of time, “studying and autistically pondering some of the problems of this book, particularly the question of what knowledge is and how we can know anything at all. … One afternoon I lay down in intellectual despair on the couch. Suddenly, out of an absolute quiet, there came a firm, distinct loud voice from my upper right which said, ‘Include the knower in the known!’ It lugged me to my feet absurdly exclaiming, ‘Hello?’ looking for whoever was in the room. … I do not take this nebulous profundity as divinely inspired, but I do think it is similar to what was heard by those who have in the past claimed such special selection” (p. 86). The wisdom which Jaynes hallucinated (if indeed the experience was a hallucination) — “Include the knower in the known” — exactly undoes scientific claims of total objectivity, claims Jaynes himself sees as invalid. He would certainly agree, for example, that Lovejoy’s paradox of the thinking behaviorist is a real and not an insubstantial conundrum. Consciousness is our only vehicle for understanding the world (the known); our status as subjective knowers must never be forgotten.
12.32	Ibid., p. 441.
12.33	Ibid.
12.34	Ibid., p. 443.
12.35	Jones, The Bicameral Mind, pp. 170n-171n.
12.36	Lewis A. Lawson, Following Percy: Essays on Walker Percy’s Work (New York: Whitson Press, Troy, 1988), p. 237.
12.37	Hobson, Interview with Walker Percy, p. 13.
12.38	Percy, Lost in the Cosmos, pp. 165–166.
12.39	Jones, The Bicameral Mind, p. 170.
12.40	Jones’s arguments can also be viewed as participating in a variant fall myth. To fall for Jones is to give into the shoddy thinking of mysticism. Edenic purity is found in objectivity unsullied by mythic imperatives while east of Eden is reached by meddling with discontinuities.
12.41	Jaynes, “Voices of the Mind,” p. 143.
12.42	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 299.
12.43	W. H. Auden, “Dingley Dell and the Fleet,” in W. H. Auden, The Dyer’s Hand and Other Essays (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 407–428.
12.44	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, pp. 444–445.
12.45	Ibid., p. 313.
12.46	Ibid., 1976, p. 297.
12.47	Ibid., 1976, p. 432 (Jaynes’s emphasis).
12.48	Jones, The Bicameral Mind, p. 166.
12.49	Ibid., p. 167.
12.50	Personal communication with Julian Jaynes, February 9, 1992.
12.51	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 437.
12.52	Northrop Frye, “The View from Here,” in R. D. Denham, (ed.), Myth and Metaphor (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia), pp. 63–78.
12.53	Jones, The Bicameral Mind, p. 171.
12.54	Percy’s fall myth is specifically a myth of language. As he told Phil McCombs, “words are like the original sin, the fall of man” (Phil McCombs, “Century of Thanatos: Walker Percy and his ‘Subversive’ Message,” Southern Review, 1988, 24, pp. 808–824).
12.55	Percy, Thanatos Syndrome, pp. 194–195. That of all the potential authorities Comeaux could choose to cite in support of this view that consciousness is dangerous, Vonnegut is chosen, tells us volumes about Percy’s conviction that such a view has become the common cant.
12.56	Ibid., p. 68.
12.57	Ibid., p. 69.
12.58	Ibid., p. 180.
12.59	Julian Jaynes, “A Two-Tiered Theory of Emotions: Affect and Feeling, Behavior and Brain Sciences, 1982, 5, 434–435; reprinted in Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection.
12.60	Ibid.
12.61	Ibid.
12.62	Percy, Thanatos Syndrome, p. 298.
12.63	Ibid.
12.64	Ibid., p. 299.
12.65	Ibid., p. 298.
12.66	Ibid., p. 69.
12.67	Ibid., p. 197.
12.68	Francois Pitavy has also written about Percy’s distrust of Edenic nostalgia. In “Walker Percy’s Brave New World,” she contrasts Percy in this respect to Faulkner and Fitzgerald: “Unlike Faulkner, who went back to the foundation of the city in the first prologue of Requiem for a Nun, or Fitzgerald, who recreated the original moment of the American dream at the end of The Great Gatsby in the vision of the Dutch sailors, Walker Percy need not hark back to the origins and attempt to retrieve that moment of splendor when the dream still appeared possible. … The undercurrent of nostalgia that runs through Faulkner and Fitzgerald does not run through Percy” (Francois Pitavy, “Walker Percy’s Brave New World,” in J. N. Gretlund and K.-H. Westarp (eds.), Walker Percy: Novelist and Philosopher (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), pp. 177–188.
12.69	Lewis A. Lawson, “Walker Percy’s Prodigal Son,” in J. D. Crowley and S. M. Crowley (eds.), Critical Essays on Walker Percy (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1989), pp. 243–258.
12.70	Ibid., p. 253.
12.71	Percy, Thanatos Syndrome, p. 21.
13.01	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 55.
13.02	Ibid., pp. 59–65.
13.03	I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 3.
13.04	Ibid., p. 11.
13.05	Ibid., pp. 74–75.
13.06	Ibid., p. 55.
13.07	Ibid., pp. 89–90.
13.08	Ibid., p. 91.
13.09	Ibid., p. 94.
13.10	Ibid., pp. 96, 117.
13.11	Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, p. 49.
13.12	Julian Jaynes, “Four Hypotheses on the Origin of Mind,” and “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.) The Julian Jaynes Collection (Henderson, NV: Julian Jaynes Society, 2012).
13.13	Jaynes’s actual example is “The snow blankets the ground.” I’ve taken a small liberty with the wording to avoid confusion with Richards’s use of “ground.”
13.14	W. Rhys Roberts (trans.), Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics (New York: Random House, 1954), pp. 22, 1355a.
13.15	Despite the somewhat glib subtitle of this section, I should make clear that I do not use the term “ideology” in the narrow sense of some Marxian thinking as “false consciousness,” but in a much more general way as a set of beliefs, assumptions, or values that guide social behavior. As will become clear, it would make no more sense to call ideology “false consciousness” than it would be to call consciousness (in the Jaynesian sense) itself false.
13.16	Richards, Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 134.
13.17	Ibid. One might note, by the way, the interesting parallel between this statement and Jaynes’s assertion that “to hear is in a certain sense to obey.” Both Richards and Jaynes suggest the link between simply comprehending language and having one’s thoughts shaped by it is a strong one.
13.18	Ibid., p. 135.
13.19	Stanley A. Mulaik, “The Metaphoric Origins of Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Consciousness in the Direct Perception of Reality,” Philosophy of Science, 1995, 62, 2, 283–303.
13.20	Michael Calvin McGee, “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link between Rhetoric and Ideology,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 1980, 66, 1, 1–16.
13.21	Richards, Philosophy of Rhetoric, pp. 136–137.
14.01	Research has also shown that even in modern times, the hearing of guiding voices is far from being restricted to schizophrenics or to children. See Kuijsten (2006) for a summary. See also Hamilton, 2006.
14.02	Many of the objections to Jaynes’s theory have stemmed from a failure to grasp what exactly he means by consciousness. He stipulates at the beginning of his work that “consciousness” is not to be understood as the sum total of mental functioning, as the term is commonly used in Western psychology (and sometimes in Buddhist studies as well), but rather the “introspective” ability of humanity, which is dependent on the creation of a “self ” standing apart from its surroundings in time and space. Similarly, “subjective” in his work (and in this one) refers simply to the mind that employs this reflective capacity. If this is not well understood, the rest of his theory is difficult to absorb.
14.03	In the Tibetan context, Gyatso (1999) has begun to address some of these implications within the idiom of contemporary Western academic discourse.
14.04	Michael Carr has published a number of Sinological studies that can be related to Jaynes’s theory (see below n. 8), but the early civilizations of Iran and India evidently remain unexamined by anyone familiar with his work.
14.05	Most of what follows in this section is derived from the present writer’s earlier investigations in this area (Gibson, 1991, pp. 69–104). I know of no other systematic analyses along these lines in the Tibetan sphere except for similar recent work by Walter (2009, pp. 79–164). After Jaynes, I am using the word “mentational” to describe language that deals with even the basic functioning of what we call mind, as the available alternatives (e.g. “psychological” or “mental”) have misleading connotations.
14.06	O’Flaherty (1980, pp. 17–61) observes that words in the Rig Veda dealing with fluids bear a whole spectrum of meanings quite inadequately rendered by literal translation, and discusses some of the difficulties raised by this.
14.07	Panikkar (1977, p. 24) uses the Greek roots to coin an important distinction between anachronism and katachronism: “The former means to introduce old and obsolete notions into contemporary situations; the latter means to interpret a thing of the past with inadequate categories of the present day.” The most commonly cited “anachronism,” the “striking of the clock” in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, should thus be considered a katachronism.
14.08	Owing to the very long and more easily datable written tradition, Sinologists especially have been able to utilize this approach with great profit. As examples of recent work, Carr (2006, pp. 357–84, and 1989) traces the usage of various words from oracle bones to Classical Chinese to account for apparently unconnected meanings.
14.09	Adkins (1970, p. 16) puts it bluntly, if perhaps too simply: “Homer has no non-material language.” Jaynes (1976, pp 67–83) has expanded on this theme with more nuance; I have attempted to distill the latter’s argument for the sake of brevity.
14.10	Jaynes, 1976, pp. 255–292.
14.11	Adkins, 1970, p. 17. The similarity with the Tibetan concept of gtum mo (pronounced tu mo), a fierce heat derived from the practice of internal yoga, is arresting.
14.12	It is crucial to keep in mind that to translate these early somatically-based terms with words such as “mind,” with perhaps a footnote saying that the early Greeks believed mind to be in the stomach, completely misstates the issue. The case is rather that these words gradually developed associations that were not as connected to their earlier, more concrete meanings.
14.13	Tibetan words are transcribed with the Wylie system; their modern pronunciation is supplied in parentheses. It is usually held that, at some point in history, now-silent letters in Tibetan words were pronounced, but Tibetan historical linguistics has not progressed to the point where any theories about when or why they became silent can be expressed with confidence.
14.14	See Jaynes’s treatment of phrenes in 1976, pp. 263–65.
14.15	Roerich, 1983–7, Vol. 6, p. 260.
14.16	Das, 1989, p. 903.
14.17	A good illustration of the pre-subjective use of glo / blo comes in a modern Tibetan phrase for disappointment or depression: blo pham. Using the glo spelling it would literally mean “defeat of the lungs,” very evocative of the physical sensations and respiratory changes inseparable from those emotions.
14.18	The examples are drawn from the Lhasa Zhol inscription and the inscription at the emperor’s tomb.
14.19	Jaeschke, 1980, p. 232.
14.20	As has been previously pointed out (Gibson, 1991, p. 90 n. 40), the modern honorific word for “illness,” snyung, probably comes from this usage. See also Walter (2009, p. 140 n. 30).
14.21	See Gibson (1991 pp. 90–91) and also Walter (2009, p. 273 n. 35). There is, however, one phrase in the Zhol inscription (thugs sgam, “deep thugs”) which suggests that the metaphorical associations necessary for subjectivity were at least beginning to take root.
14.22	It has also, however, developed more specific and quite sophisticated levels of Buddhistic meaning. As an example, H. V. Guenther (1989, p. 258 n. 49) translates thugs as “cognitive dynamics” and says that it is “a structure of meaning that infuses the whole texture of experience and gives it the character of situatedness.” He is in agreement with most commentators on Tibetan Buddhism that a simple translation as “mind” is wholly inadequate to cover the specific semantic fields of thugs in modern Tibetan Buddhist philosophy; Norbu and Lipman, for example (Maňjuśrïmitra, 1986), use the term “primordial experience” to translate thugs, and the preface to this work contains a thorough critique of calque translations of Buddhist mentational terms.
14.23	The Chinese xin is an obvious example, on which in this context see Carr (1983), but there is also modern Thai, which has a rich vocabulary (over 300 words) of feeling/emotion/social interaction based the term jai, “heart” coupled with an adjective or adjectival phrase. See Moore (2006) for the best single source in English. The Homeric Greek term for heart-area sensation, kradie (whence the English “cardiac”), never seems to have developed into a broader, more subjective term of mentation, although it did develop a metaphorical “inner space” that could be “looked into.”
14.24	Appropriation of pre-existing local religious terms to serve in a Buddhist context is known to have happened in China; see note 50 below.
14.25	Richardson, 1985, p. 47. Another warning: this inscription is one that some (e.g. Beckwith, 2011, p. 1) consider post-Imperial, although on what grounds is as yet unknown to me.
14.26	Yab dang gcen thugs nongs brtud par byung ba’I rjes / nga chab srid ma bzhes pa’i skabs su kha cig phan phun dang / gdon stson pa dag yod pa dang / ban de ting nge ‘dzin kyis nyam drod zin nas / dpend pa’i bk(a’) gros gsold / khrag khrug myed par byas. See Gibson (1991, pp. 152–57) for a critical discussion of earlier translations of this inscription. See also Walter (2009, p. 273 n. 35, 282 n. 52). Nongs commonly appears in the Annals as a word for death, but only for royalty other than the emperor (Richardson, 1952, pp. 143–44; Hill, 2008, pp. 72–73), and not preceded by thugs. Further, it is generally accepted that Trisong Detsen was still alive after he abdicated.
14.27	The concept of “soul” in the Western tradition is logically vague, but usually implies an entity residing in but separate from the body, and surviving the body after death. This is quite different from the original meaning of the Greek psyche (whence Western concepts of soul originated), and the history of the Greek word’s evolution is far from clear (Dodds, 1984, esp. pp. 138–39, 212–15, and Jaynes, 1976, pp. 288–292). It moreover carries a huge weight of connotations from its association with Christian doctrine. While it is useful in some contexts as a very provisional translation, it would be better not to use it in discussions of non-Western belief systems when any amount of precision is desired.
14.28	Haarh, 1969, pp. 373–4.
14.29	Stein, 1970, pp. 171 and 178 n. 22. Stein notes a “Sino-Vietnamese” parallel to the thugs gur, and, regarding the thugs gyi zhal (an image of the deceased rather than the “repast of the thugs” as Haarh thought), refers to the Chinese practice of summoning the “spirit” of the deceased into a funeral effigy or tablet, on which see note 88 below, and Part Two of this paper.
14.30	Bellezza, 2008.
14.31	Bkra shis Rgyal mtshan, 1977, p. 324; Karmay, 2005, p. 102. The phrase is rnam shes bkug thugs phab.
14.32	Vijñāna has been understood in various ways by the various Buddhist schools. Here it is enough to note that it connotes the culminating stage of the mind’s reaction to its environment, and that in this passage, it refers to that aspect of mental functioning which continues after the death of the body.
14.33	In the modern Bonpo funeral (see below) thugs no longer plays any part at all. The word’s presence in the Legs bshad mdzod seems to show that Bkra shis Rgyal mtshan, happily, employed a relatively light editorial hand with his source material. In the present writer’s opinion, this is typical of many Bonpo scholars, who seem to respect their sources even when not understanding them fully.
14.34	On the Tibetan thug, see Norbu (1995, p. 130). For an illustration, see Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, plates following p. 3294.
14.35	On the Turko-Mongol sülde tuq, see Heissig (1980, pp. 84 seq.), Tatár (1990), and Kler (1957). The Mongolian tuq can easily be viewed by image-searching “Mongolian banner” on the internet. According to Vladimirtsov (Kler, op. cit. p. 98), Chinggis Khan’s tuq was held to be the abode of a protective spirit, and it is said that after his death, his “soul” resided there; no Mongolian word is given for “soul,” but probably the word is süü; see note 36.
14.36	Tatár, 1990, p. 335. Personal communication from Jack Weatherford, February 2014: “Tug is the word for banner. Suu was the word for charisma, genius, heavenly mandate. The soul had several parts with their own fates after death, but this part remained with the family and the place of its location (adding the ending d made it a place) was suld tuq. Thus the two words became more or less synonymous …. These are all flexible, particularly over a period of 800 years.” (cf. Skrynnikova, 1992/3, p. 55). For comparison’s sake, one may note that, whatever its ultimate provenance, the Tibetan word rlung rta now popularly refers to both a vital force and the banner that is its emblem.
14.37	Heissig, 1980, pp. 11–17.
14.38	Györgi Kara, personal communication, 1990; Karlgren (1964, p. 266, n. 1016b: “d’ok / duok / tu and d’og / d’au / tao – banner, streamer.”) A connection between the Tibetan thug / thugs and the Altaic tuq would seem to be in accord with Beckwith’s hypothesis (2011, p. 169), based on comparative historical linguistics, of a migration of Old Tibetan speakers from the northeastern limits of the Tibetan plateau, where these religious concepts had been in play for a very long time (Tátar, 1990, pp. 33 seq.). The connection might imply that the migration took place centuries before the foundation of the Tibetan Empire, and before the proto-Tibetans accepted any complex of religious beliefs based on the subjective individual mind, as there is no indication at all that tuq ever evolved (or was appropriated) in a similar way to become a generalized term for mentational processes among Turkic or Mongol speakers. Beckwith (op. cit., p. 169) suggests Late Antiquity as the most likely period for the migration, and this also seems to fit rather well.
14.39	Chung wen ta tz’u tien, 1973, Vol. 7, p. 11351. It may be of some interest that Jaynes has placed the probable advent of consciousness in China to the Zhou period; see discussion in Carr (2006, pp. 347 ff.).
14.40	There is, however, one interesting case in which a more archaic use of thugs may have survived in modern Tibetan Buddhism, seen in the institution of the ma ‘das sprul sku, in which a lama names the child who is to be his “rebirth” before the lama has passed away. In such cases, it is usually said to be the thugs that is transferred from one body to another. Calkowski (2013) has discussed the issue of the ma ‘das sprul sku systematically; what is especially interesting in her presentation are the rather convoluted, overly intellectualized justifications for this tradition, which is anomalous to the well-developed theory of death and rebirth widely accepted (albeit with a number of variants) in Tibetan Buddhism since about the thirteenth century (see Cuevas, 2003, 39–68). On the other hand, transference of the thugs to a successor either living or dead, seems quite suggestive of the passage of royal authority across generations during the Tibetan Imperial period.
14.41	Karmay, 2009d, p. 311.
14.42	Treated in detail in Karmay, 2009d.
14.43	For comparable beliefs and practices among the Mongols, see Chiodo (1996); another Mongolian “soul” word, sünesü, is employed in this context; the origin and development of mentational and “soul” concepts in Mongolian is in urgent need of investigation.
14.44	Here a comparison might be drawn with a Chinese “soul” word, po. Like tu, it first appeared in the Zhou Dynasty, and connoted, among other things, the psychological integration of an individual. If it was lost, the person would exhibit what we would call mental dissociation (Yu, 1987, p. 371). The thorough — and ongoing — analysis of “soul” words in Sinology should serve as a humbling example for Tibetologists who still use the English word with no further clarification.
14.45	Gibson, 1991 p. 96; see also Walter (2009, p. 107) on the bla as a “guiding power” within an individual, though he seems to accept this meaning only in relation to later literature.
14.46	Karmay, 2009d, p. 311; unfortunately, no sources for this tradition are cited.
14.47	Hill (2009, p. 560) mentions an Old Tibetan document which has the “brla” moving throughout the body. Here, however, the unusual spelling might reflect that the word is being used as a translation from some foreign term, part of a sophisticated analysis of energy flow the likes of which were already present, for example, in China (the text deals with moxibustion). Karmay (2009d, p. 314 n. 23) does note a much later Buddhist text by Nyang ral Nyi ma ‘Od zer which similarly has the bla shifting according to the time of day and month.
14.48	Gzi brjid (1978, Vol. 3, p. 55, p. 368), Snellgrove (2010, pp. 117, 121, 160); see also Bon skyong (Vol. 1, p. 368), Norbu (1995, pp. 254–55), Karmay, (2009d, p. 312), Bellezza (2008, p. 363).
14.49	A brief description of these three aspects of mentation as seen by the Yogacara, taken from the writings of Khenpo Ngag dbang Dpal bzang (Gzhi khregs chod skabs p. 32) will sum them up for those not familiar with this school. Sems is the aspect of mind which conceives of objects of mental activity as external, yid is an organizing capability, which moves over these objects “like a king moves over a country,” and rnam shes is that which cognizes the objects as individual things.
14.50	This is not the only case we have of what seems to be an early indigenous term being replaced with an Indic Buddhist one as that religion became more established. Another Chinese “soul” word, hun, sometimes coupled with the po mentioned above, was at times used in early Chinese Buddhism to denote something which passes from life to life, but later, as this was seen to be in contradiction with Buddhist orthodoxy, it was replaced by several alternate terms intended to render the Indic vijñāna. See Park (2012, pp. 151–195) for a thorough discussion. By contrast, Tambiah (1970, pp. 223 seq.) discusses a Thai folk ritual by which the khwan of an individual is restored, either in rites of passage or after traumatic events, enabling his reintegration as a functioning member of society; in Thai religion, however, the khwan has never been conflated with the winjan (also clearly derived from an Indic original), and it is the latter that passes across existences and may become a ghost. The former is in the province of village elders; the latter, that of monks.
14.51	There is also a possibility that the triune found in the later Bonpo tradition is an adaptation of the Yogacara system, developed independently of, and perhaps even before, the triumph of the Indic Buddhist schools in Tibet. If this were the case, it may well be that an earlier conception of bla served as a bridge to the Indic Buddhist system in the same way that hun did in China. It could even be speculated that the Bonpo system was taken outright from an early Chinese (or Inner Asian) version of Yogacara, with bla in this instance employed as a calque for hun (or some equivalent in an Inner Asian language).
14.52	For example, as mentioned above, the corpse of the btsanpo was never called sku, but rather spur or thugs spur.
14.53	Jaynes’s theory, of course, holds that the first “gods” of humanity everywhere were precisely ancestral voices originating in the speech areas of the brain. Walter (2009, pp. 113 seq.) properly emphasizes the ancestral-spirit meaning of the word in the Old Tibetan material, which is often ignored because of the too-ready translation of lha by “god,” implying something abstract and otherworldly. The conclusions he draws from this, however, are quite different from those of this paper.
14.54	Samuel (1993, esp. pp. 441–2) has theorized that bla and lha originated in a single field of meaning which gradually bifurcated under the influence of increased political centralization. This is an important perception; though the present essay would consider the prime cause of the reification into “inner” bla and “outer” lha a shift from a pre-subjective or proto-subjective to a subjective mentality, a changing political situation would probably have been one of the causes of this shift. The difference between the intent of his formulation and mine may be negligible.
14.55	This can be most clearly seen in the compound ka nyen (bka’ nyan), literally, “hearing the ka’,” but meaning “obedient.” If taken literally, the term would imply no mental “space” or deliberation between the hearing and the obeying; according to Jaynes, this would have been a characteristic of bicameral man.
14.56	The same system prevailed among the earliest Greeks. In the records of the Mycenean state, the word for the head of state is wanax; in later Greek, this word is used only for gods. The later Greek word for king is basileus, but in the Greek of the Linear B records, basileus merely denotes the ranking servant of the wanax. (Jaynes, 1976, p. 80).
14.57	Again, this is such a widespread phenomenon that there is no reason to attribute its presence in Tibet (discussed below) to any particular outside influence, whether that of China or of Central Eurasia.
14.58	Jaynes (2006) discusses the Osiris myth in relation to a mural on the wall of Tutankhamen’s tomb.
14.59	That different mythologies surrounded the Tibetan emperor is indisputable. See, for example, Karmay (2009c) which discusses several of these, only two or three of which survived intelligibly to the post-Imperial era; Haarh (1969, pp. 171–230) has discussed the later versions of these in detail. There is no reason that differing viewpoints could not have existed simultaneously during the Empire.
14.60	Beckwith has studied this sort of kingship the most thoroughly; see particularly his forthcoming contribution, and the bibliography contained therein.
14.61	Some have doubted that this inscription is authentically from the Imperial Era, though again, on what grounds is presently unknown to the present writer. The reference to the sku bla it contains is moreover very hard to make sense of. See Hill (2013) for the most recent translation as well as a critical evaluation of some of the previous ones.
14.62	The orientation of the corpse within the tomb (or probable orientation, if the tomb has already been looted) might be something for archaeologists excavating Tibetan tomb sites in the future to be aware of.
14.63	Malandra, 1983, p. 89. Malandra notes the connection but does not attempt to explain it.
14.64	Waida, 1973.
14.65	Tekin, 1968, p. 261.
14.66	It is crucial to recognize that the myth of the descent of the first king onto the mountain is not inseparable from the belief in mountains themselves as sacred. On the contrary, the latter seems rather to provide a subjective mythological rationale for the former, one which is moreover quite useful in a political ideology. Based on the similarities of the myth with that of other Northern Asiatic cultures, one might speculate that, like the thugs, the myth came to the plateau with the proto-Tibetans. On the other hand, of course, the possibility cannot be dismissed that it preceded them, and that it simply reflects increasing subjectivity and/or political sophistication among earlier denizens of the plateau.
14.67	Macdonald, 1971, pp. 303 seq.; Karmay, 2009a, p. 437.
14.68	The eleventh century Muslim writer Mahmud Kāśgarī writes disparagingly about the religious sensibilities of the pre-Islamic Turks of Inner Asia: “The Infidels — may God destroy them! — call the sky tängri; also anything that is imposing they call tängri, such as a great mountain or a tree, and they bow down to such things.” (Dankoff, 1975, p. 70).
14.69	The ultimate expression of this affect may be found in Tibetan folklore in which someone’s bla is tied up with an external object to the extent that destroying the object, even unbeknownst to that person, will cause his death. For two examples, see O’Connor (1975, pp. 103–115 and 147–157). This motif is also found in the Gesar Epic (David-Neel, 1987, pp. 101, 174).
14.70	The words in the 121st Psalm (“I will lift my eyes unto the hills, whence cometh my help”), are, because of their provenance, seldom taken to indicate a belief in “animistic mountain deities.” The word “animism” itself is a prime example of the superciliousness certain scholars bring to the subject of religion. It is almost never defined by those who use it, and it is generally dependent on the notion of “soul” (which is vague and slippery enough in itself — see note 27), and, more importantly, it implicitly assumes that the substantial differences in so-called “soul” (and other) conceptions among varied non- or pre-literate people are insignificant enough to be ignored, which is simply absurd. It is thus employed as a condescending, shorthand way of avoiding the questions that these nonliterate traditions raise, and should never be used by conscientious historians of religion, betraying as it does either a bias towards scriptural monotheism (see note 68) or an intellectual laziness. See Bolle (1987) for a brief summary of the issue.
14.71	Walter, 2009, pp. 230–31.
14.72	Karmay, 2009, p. 435. According to Walter (2009, p. 151), gnyanpo is in fact the only adjective associated with the sku bla in the Old Tibetan material. The association of sku bla / lha and gnyanpo has also been retained into modern times in the Gesar epic; see Norbu (1995, p. 9 n. 45) and Stein (1959, p. 184).
14.73	Das, 1989, p. 401.
14.74	Norbu, 1995, pp. 51, 67.
14.75	Snellgrove, 2010, p. 309.
14.76	Karmay, 1972, pp. 43, 225.
14.77	Karmay, 1972, pp. 65, 239.
14.78	Karmay, 2009a, p. 443.
14.79	Bellezza, 2008, p. 811.
14.80	Discussed in Karmay (2009a, pp. 441–447). According to Karmay, the gnyan are closely connected to another, rather obscure, class of spirit called ma sangs (ma sang) who are popularly believed to have governed Tibet at a certain period in in prehistory. At times, Karmay says, the two are identified, while at others, the ma sangs have gnyan as an epithet, like the sku bla. Haarh (1969, pp. 297–8) believes the ma sangs to have been deified ancestors.
14.81	Again, while at present we are talking about mountains, there is no reason that the bicameral voices of the rulers could not have been triggered by other objects, as will be seen in Part Two.
14.82	Macdonald (1971, p. 304) cites one example in an Old Tibetan document which she takes to indicate nyen as a type of spirit-being (“bdagi smon lam du go lha gnyan thams cad la ‘us la phyag ‘chal lo”), but it is more likely an adjective modifying go lha, about which see more in Part Two. The same is true of Stein’s reading (1959, p. 205) of ma sang gnyan as referring to two groups of beings.
14.83	Gibson, 1991, especially pp. 217–45.
14.84	Gibson, 1991, esp. pp. 218–219. A reiteration of my arguments is not possible in this space, but the years since that work have seen the appearance of no evidence that would make my conclusions untenable. Karmay (2009b, pp. 365–66) independently reached the same historical conclusion regarding the gyalpo (rgyal po), a closely related group of spirits. See also Walter (2009, p. 59 n. 50 and pp. 241 seq., in particular p. 247).
14.85	Bellezza, 2008, p. 364.
14.86	See Kværne (1985) for a complete description of a modern Bonpo funeral procedure.
14.87	Kværne’s informants for the work cited immediately above used the Indic Buddhist rnam shes in place of bla.
14.88	Here a comparison can be drawn with ancestral tablets used in China, with the significant difference that the Tibetan tablets are destroyed after the funeral, which is supposed to effect the definitive separation of the deceased from the living. See Yu (1987, p. 369) and Bellezza (2008, p. 555 n. 718).
14.89	The following is drawn from Bellezza (2008, esp. pp. 367–68).
14.90	As, to my knowledge, this pairing has not appeared in the scholarly literature before Bellezza’s work, I reproduce relevant passages here. My translations are definitely provisional; as I suspect Bellezza’s to be the same, I have not included them. p. 615, xvii : gshin rje’i bla sgram ma bres na / bka’ thugs stong khams ‘gugs thabs med / “If the bla sgram of the lords of death is not spread out, there is no way to summon the bka’ (and?) thugs of (from?) the empty realm.” p. 619, ii: da lta sku lus phung po g.yar po la / mi rtag khrom pa’I rkyen ngan ‘jigs / sku lus phung po bdud kyis bshig / bka’ thug gri bog shed dmar ‘khor / “Now, the borrowed heap of the body’s remainder has been destroyed by a gathering of impermanent bad causes. The heap of the body’s remainder has been destroyed by Death, and the red power of death circles the bka’ thug. p. 619, iii: bka’ thug gral du (+ma) pheb tshe / yab gdung chen sras po rigs kyi bu / khyod kyi bka’ ni nam (= gnam) gyi gang (= gung) na ‘bod / thugs ni bar snang gling nas skyabs / brla (mod. = bla) ni na rag rtsang so snyags / “When the bka’ (and?) thug are/is (not) set in order, child of good family, son of the great paternal clan, your bka’ calls out in the high point of space, the thugs protects from (?) the middle sphere, and the bla hastens rtsang so to hell.” p. 621, i: dang po bla khor ma ‘khor na / bka’ thugs phab pa’I rten med pa’i (= pas) / khar tsang bla ‘khor rten du bzhengs / “If the bla-circle is not established first, there will be no receptacle for the descent of the bka’ thugs. Therefore, the bla-circle was established yesterday.”
14.91	91. Bellezza, 2008, pp. 363–364. In note 717 (op. cit. p. 554) he sees a “self-evident” parallel between the bka’ (= thugs) / bla (= yid) pairing with the Chinese hun / po concepts mentioned above, but the present writer finds this not so obvious (why is bka’ used at all?) and a little oversimple, though the subject is worthy of more detailed investigation. The possibility I have suggested above, that the bka’ was the voice of the bla / lha might find a comparable pairing elsewhere; see Jaynes (1976, pp. 189–94). Given the paucity of source material for comparison, it is even possible that bka’ thug simply referred to a thug that had a quality of bka’, on which more in Part Two.
14.92	See Carr (2006, esp. pp. 364–90) for a discussion of the extensive scholarship on this matter. The modern Chinese “spirit tablets” representing ancestors mentioned above probably originated in this practice.
14.93	Carr (2006, p. 389–90) notes that the descriptions of the formal and dignified bearing of the personator, who may have still been a child, contrast sharply with the frenzies of other spirit mediums attested for that era, who are moreover named with a different word.
14.94	The following translation is from Gibson (1991, pp. 154–55).
14.95	Bkra shis rgyal mtshan, (1977, p. 324): chab srid lo gcig dang zla ba bdun du mdzad de bcu bdun pa la yum gyis dug stang ste ‘das so / de ban des ‘dur bas bla ma bkug ste / mi rnams kyi khong tu zhugs nas glo brdol gyi btam smra bar byed la / ban de la ‘dur phug med pas bon la dpe blangs pa bod ‘bangs rnams kyis shes nas gzod yid ma ches so / der dran pa nam khas rnam shes bkug thugs phab pas / rje khri srong yang bon la thugs ches nas gshin ‘dur gyi bon med nag shin po gnas mi ‘brong bar ‘dug gsungs / Karmay’s translation (1972, p. 102) is much the same as mine, but he renders the key phrase here as “The Buddhists tried the ‘evocation ritual’, but failed to summon the spirit (bla). It would enter someone and babble.” He offers no explanation.
14.96	For those who find this improbable, the present writer offers an experience he had in a rural Thai village, where two villagers drowned in a shallow, not-very-threatening fish pond on two successive days; this was considered very inauspicious. Soon after the funeral ceremonies, another villager began speaking in a voice that was widely attributed to one of the deceased, detailing further procedures he wanted done. He was “possessed” for about two hours. Regardless of how one views such occurrences, there does not appear to be any real reason that twenty-first century Thai villagers should be considered any more susceptible to them than medieval Tibetans.
14.97	In an earlier contribution (2004), the present author suggested that all the ever-more-elaborate stories of miracle contests between Bonpos and Buddhists that appear in the later literatures of these traditions may have stemmed from an actual conflict between Indic Buddhists and some practitioners of non-Indic-Buddhist traditions (whatever one chooses to call them) over funerary procedures at the death of Mune, which may in turn be the same spiritual crisis referred to in the inscription at Zhwa’i Lhakhang mentioned above (again, whether or not this inscription is genuinely from Imperial times is not crucial to this hypothesis). Given the importance of the btsanpo’s sacral position in the Empire, it is understandable that concrete issues such as the proper performance of funerals would have had considerably more urgency for the Tibetan people of the time than doctrinal disputes.
14.98	Snellgrove, 2010, p. 24; Bellezza, 2008, p. 443; see also citations of Tibetan works in Norbu (1995, p. 279 n. 5).
14.99	This story has understandably drawn quite a bit of scholarly interest; see Dotson (2011, p. 88 n. 18) for a partial list of studies. It must be emphasized, however, that the Chronicle cannot be considered in the least historical, being a weaving together of sacral kingship legends from most of the cultures surrounding Tibet in the early medieval period. Haarh (1969, p. 156), followed by Dotson (op. cit., pp. 90–91) has discerned influence of the Ramayāna in the Chronicle, and Takeuchi (1985) has found borrowings from the Grand Historian of China there. Dotson (op. cit. p. 95 n. 43) has also perceived elements of the “First Story” typical of the Central Asiatic Cultural Complex (on which see Beckwith, 2009, pp. 1–2), and Hummel (1974) has demonstrated convincing similarities between the Drigum story and the myth of Osiris, which may have come to Inner Asia with other elements of Hellenistic culture such as medicine, art, and the revival of religious imagery discussed in Part Two.
14.100	Haarh (1969, p 330) has properly emphasized that, under the mythological trappings, the story of Drigum is at bottom about the inability of the King Drigum to rule because of insanity, and how his successors dealt with the problems this caused. Dotson (2011, pp. 87 seq.) has discussed the theme of the sacrally flawed ruler’s inability to function found in Frazer’s Golden Bough, and the influence it might have had on such early scholars of the Tibetan kingship as Tucci; Jaynes’s theory provides a lucid raison d’etre for this myth.
14.101	The probable conflict between the existing tradition and the Buddhists over the Imperial funeral, which may have crystallized with Mune Tsenpo’s death, has already been mentioned. A proclamation preserved in an early Buddhist account of early Tibet (Dpa’ bo gtsug lag ‘Phreng ba, 1980, Vol. Ja, p. 55) purportedly dating from the reign of Trisong Detsen, talks about the conflict between the supplication and rituals of the sku lha with those of Buddhism, and people’s apprehension that the new religion would result in degradation of the btsanpo’s sacred presence (sku) and the weakening of the government associated with it, as well as causing famine and disease. This source has earlier been discussed by both Tucci (1950, p. 48), and Macdonald (1971, p 308), but the latter’s translation is much preferable; see discussion in Gibson (1991, pp. 149–52). In the present author’s view, the fact that the proclamation does not label the opposition to Trisong Detsen as “Bonpo,” but instead mentions only the cult of the sku lha strengthens the case for its authenticity. Besides buttressing the case for the sku bla’s importance, however, it does not contribute much to the present exploration. On the other hand, in the legends carried down by the Bonpo tradition (Bkra shis Rgyal Mtshan, 1977, p. 319; Karmay, 1972, p 99, 266; see also Blo gros Rgyal mtshan, 1974, pp. 55–56), it is said that during Trisong Detsen’s rule, the mountain divinities of the ruler (here called rje’i mgur lha) turned away from Tibet in response to “unclean” Tantric Buddhist rites, resulting in misfortune for the country. This “departure of the gods” is similar to that which Jaynes documents in the literature of the Near East, and might well indicate the failure of the bicameral voices which had earlier been associated with mountains, although this occurrence need not be dated to precisely the time of Trisong Detsen, as this polemical passage would suggest. It is also possible that the descriptions of the early Tibetan courts found in these same Bonpo sources, in which representatives of pre-Buddhist traditions held exalted positions — inspiring Tucci (1955, p. 197) to describe the emperors as “sacred but inert symbols” — are exaggerated memories of a period in which religious specialists were increasingly filling the sacral role once played by the btsanpo himself. See Blo gros Rgyal mtshan (op.cit., pp. 115–17) for the Tibetan, translated e.g. in Gibson (1991, pp. 133–36), and Bellezza, (2008, p. 286).
14.102	This may also a contributing factor to the family-based succession of the Khon Sa skya tradition.
14.103	Martin, 1996.
15.01	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1976), p. 326.
15.02	Ibid., p. 321–332.
15.03	For those unfamiliar with the literature, but interested in the Tibetan aspects of the question, one might begin with Samuel (2005) particularly the introduction to that volume and the chapter titled “Shamanism, Bon, and Tibetan Religion,” including its fairly comprehensive (though now a bit dated) bibliography.
15.04	Eliade (1964) is by far the most erudite of those who hold to this position, but his case is based on assumptions that are dubious at best, such as that beliefs in a celestial god and ascent to heaven are primordial cultural universals.
15.05	Samuel (1993), for example, uses the term to indicate an approach to religion that is based on the spiritual abilities and experiences of individual practitioners, as opposed to a text-based, “clerical” approach.
15.06	Macdonald (1971, pp. 275) notes the presence of a group called mu sman in the Old Tibetan documents, and believes these were female shamans.
15.07	By “cultural idiom,” I mean the terminology that the society used to express what was happening to the specialist practitioner: spirit possession, celestial flight, medium for the departed, etc. It should of course be kept in mind that all such categories are merely provisional, and that, as Samuel points out (2005a, pp. 73–74), more than one may be present at the same time.
15.08	The present author has noted (1997) that most of the names used for modern-day shamanic practitioners in Inner Asia originate in Buddhist culture, even among those peoples who have since converted to Islam. The Tungusic word shaman itself, from which the word in all European languages is derived, probably comes from the Sogdian or Chinese version of the Indic śramāna (Eliade, 1964, pp. 496 seq.; no convincing alternative has yet been proposed).
15.09	There has long been speculation on an early “shamanic aristocracy” on the steppes (Heissig, 1980, p. 114, n. 2; Voigt, 1984, p. 18 n. 17). Waida (1976) has seen similarities between modern-day shamanic initiations among Siberian peoples such as the Buriat and Samoyed and the medieval Turkic enthronement ceremony described in historical sources, and concluded that the Turkic qagans were shamans. Rosen (2009) describes Inner Asian artistic techniques, and motifs associated with Inner Asian shamans, on an early crown of the Silla Dynasty, and concludes that those kings, too, were shamans. These suppositions are certainly possible or even likely, but not certain; it may also be that the later shamanic initiations simply took the enthronement ceremonies as an authorization model after the institution of sacral kingship in the steppes declined. There is even one Islamic source, the Tabaqat-i-nasiri, which has an extensive description of Chinggis Qan himself acting as a possessed oracle (Boyle, 1972, p. 81); such a description seems to appear nowhere else, but see Znamenski (2011, pp. 140–41) for a modern Mongolian political leader who also claimed such powers.
15.10	Gibson, 1991; see also Walter, 2009, p. 98.
15.11	The Sherpas studied by Ortner (1989, pp. 52–53) used the word ongchermu for supernormal force directed towards political ends: “Rolwa Dorje was very ongchermu. The people did not want to obey him. But … he twisted an iron rod into a knot. And people were scared.” The word btsanpo might easily be substituted for ongchermu here. Walter (2009, p. 59 n. 50, p. 63 n. 62) has since compared the btsanpo to the Nordic berserker, from the other geographical extreme of the Central Eurasian Cultural Complex.
15.12	On the post-Imperial displacement of the term btsanpo “emperor” by rgyalpo “king,” see Beckwith (1993, 14–15 n. 10). Btsanpo, being a title which connoted supreme power, was unacceptable to prevailing ideas of sangha — state relationships in Buddhism. In post-Imperial mythology, both btsan and rgyalpo spirits are wrathful and martial, and they share many other characteristics.
15.13	Taken from Gibson (1991, pp. 61–63). This description is based on accounts by Nebesky-Wojkowitz (1975, pp. 429–31), Avedon (1984, pp. 191–99), and Harrer (1954, pp. 203–205).
15.14	This lateralization of facial muscles is congruent with Jaynes’s theory of hemispherical division of brain function. Compare this to an account of a negatory (involuntary) possession in Japan, in which the left side of the face undergoes contractions (Jaynes, 1976, pp. 350–351).
15.15	This is taken to be an indication of possession by a wrathful spirit; a peaceful spirit causes the face to turn white.
15.16	It may be recalled that, in Old Tibetan writings, the helmet (dbu rmog) of the emperor was held to be an important attribute of his authority. Scholars such as Macdonald and Tucci believed that the imperial helmet was a “symbol” of the emperor’s power, but this may be too rationalistic. Perhaps the dbu rmog was none other than a heavy helmet that the btsanpo would wear in order to demonstrate his supernatural qualities. See discussion in Gibson (1991, pp. 74–76); mentioned also by Walter (2009, p. 98 and especially p. 281 n. 49).
15.17	The Delphic oracle ceased to function soon after Delphi was ransacked by the Christian emperor Constantine in 360 c.e.
15.18	As Geoffrey Samuel has reminded me, this is of course not true in anthropological studies of religion, which tend to approach the topic more evenhandedly; I thank him for this and several other helpful suggestions.
15.19	Stove (2006, pp. 286–87) tells a wry story about two Virgin Marys competing for lucrative pilgrim traffic in eleventh century France — a difficult situation to account for if they were only surrogates or representations of the same deity, as orthodox doctrine would have it.
15.20	Here again, it is easy to imagine the Mongolian onggot figurines having had such a function.
15.21	Jaynes, 1976, pp. 174–75. Jaynes hypothesizes that subjective consciousness may have come to the New World much later than to the Old. Even in the Near East, though, we have a source from the early Islamic period, the Kitāb Al-Asnam, testifying to an oracular idol on the Arabian peninsula (Hisham Ibn Al-Kalbi, 1952, p. 35): My young camels were startled by the blood of sacrifice Offered around Su’ayr where Yaqdum And Yadkhur go on pilgrimage, and stand before it in fear and awe, Motionless and silent, awaiting its oracular voice. When, or how long, this idol was worshipped is not mentioned in the Kitāb, and the contents of its pronouncements are not detailed. Needless to say, Islam considered such idols abominations (though not because of their association with blood sacrifice).
15.22	Jaynes, 1976, p. 332. See also Strickmann, “L’icône animée” (1996, pp. 165–74). Strickmann notes the outright chicanery sometimes associated with such efforts, which was doubtless one cause for the scorn that much of the Greek intellectual world and, later, the European Enlightenment held for idols. Jaynes mentions in passing (1976, p. 333) that during this period there seems to have been a minor cult centered on the cult of severed heads, which were held to have the power of oracular speech; on this practice see also Ogden (2001, pp. 208–15). In the Asian context we may recall not only the postmortem laughter of Ong Khan’s head in The Secret History of the Mongols (de Rachewiltz, 2006, pp. 110–11), but also the preserved heads of Branka Dpal gyi Yon tan in Tibet (Shakabpa, 1984, p. 51; Richardson, 1998, pp. 69–70; thanks to Dan Martin for the latter citation), and Tairo no Masakado in Japan (Samuel, 2005b, p. 110); both of the latter were considered “protective spirits.” Here Jaynes’s theory provides a plausible rationale for a practice which would otherwise be considered either distortion on the part of early historians, raconteur’s fantasy, or simply inexplicable lunacy.
15.23	As an example, one need look no further than the so-called Erawan Brahma (image searchable), an image in the heart of the wealthiest shopping district in Bangkok, which still sees a day-long busy traffic of supplicants seeking (and evidently being granted) favors. There are probably thousands of Brahma images in spirit houses across Thailand, but this one in particular is undoubtedly paramount in popular esteem.
15.24	See Bentor (2004) for a succinct summary of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist procedures. Strickmann (1996, pp. 165–74) points out interesting parallels between Hellenistic and Buddhist consecration rituals.
15.25	See Strickmann (1996, pp. 177 seq.), Bentor (2004, pp. 208–209), Gombrich (1971, pp. 103–43), et. al. The eyes of idols during the earliest period of their history were generally created disproportionally large. Countless idols that consist of merely a trunk and a pair of eyes have been uncovered in Mesopotamia (see illustrations in Jaynes, 1976, pp. 168–171); these bear visual comparison with the Tibetan thog lcags figurines shown in Norbu (2009, pp. 173–174), though nothing of the latter’s history can be established. Many idols of Sumerian gods have huge eyes (Jaynes, op. cit.). Recent discoveries at Sanxingdui in Sichuan province in China, dating from the twelfth to eleventh centuries b.c.e., included forty bronze masks with exaggerated eyes, as well as large isolated bronze eyes, probably meant to be attached to wooden effigies (Carr, 2006, pp. 398–403). As Strickmann notes (1996, p. 189) perhaps the ultimate testimony to the power of eyes to provoke the appearance of life in the inert are those that gaze from the tops of the mountainous stupas of Svāyāmbhunāth (and Bauddhanath) in Kathmandu.
15.26	Cited by Walter (2009, p. 99). Jaynes (1976, pp. 179–180) notes that lists of very ordinary foodstuffs meant to be offered to idols have been found in ancient cuneiform tablets.
15.27	See Carr, 1988, p. 37 seq.; 2006, p. 380.
15.28	For an interesting account of the use of banners in twentieth century Mongol warfare, see Tatár (1990, p. 328). This episode is also mentioned in Znamenski (2011, p. 140).
15.29	The Sba bzhed (Stein, 1961, pp. 36–42) and Nyang ral Nyi ma ‘Od zer’s Chos byung (pp. 466–76), some of the earliest examples of Buddhist historiography from post-Imperial Tibet, contain long lists of “protective deities” that the Tibetan emperors caused to reside at Samye; most of their names are unknown to Buddhist scholars today. Perhaps these were local idols, brought to what was meant to be the new center of sacral power of the Empire. One may recall that at the same time the Tibetan Empire was beginning to expand, the Ka’aba in Mecca, the sacral center of the Arabian Peninsula, was reputed to have contained 360 idols, and so was religiously a neutral ground where trade could be carried on peacefully.
15.30	See for example Wylie (1962, p. 71) and Dowman (1988, pp. 46, 135). Bentor (2004, p. 200) also mentions “numerous stories” of Buddha-images in Thailand speaking to their worshippers.
15.31	Stearns (2007, p. 417), translates the word as “fierce,” but since the statues earned the epithet only after they started to speak, it is clear that it was their ability to be heard that was the cause for it. Images of wrathful deities appearing fierce would hardly be “astonishing.”
15.32	Gibson, 1985; see also Gibson, 1991, pp. 256–263.
15.33	Snellgrove, 2010, p. 258 n. 20. It is very much to Snellgrove’s credit that he did not “correct” the spelling he found to make it accord with the Buddhist concept.
15.34	Karmay, 1998, p. 257 n. 54.
15.35	Nobu, 1995, pp. 60–62.
15.36	Clemente, 1994.
15.37	The following discussion is based on Berounsky (2009, pp. 22–23, 50).
15.38	In recent times, an interpretation of the term based on the dgra bla spelling has come into vogue with some Buddhist teachers, with a (clearly contrived) meaning of “above the enemy,” and so “beyond aggression” (cf. Trungpa, 2007, p. 103). This is a distortion of the intent of the term as found in the early materials, but it provides a more contemporary illustration of how Buddhist clerics and scholars sometimes “edit” received concepts to fit them into frames of reference they are more comfortable with, just as their non-ecclesiastical counterparts (both Tibetan and otherwise) sometimes do.
15.39	This is the G.yag ru dgra chos kyis shug mgon dgra brub chung ba gris kha mtshon bsyur by Dpon gsas khyung rgod rtsal (b. 1175).
15.40	It may be splitting hairs to mention that Nebesky (1975, pp. 330–31) mentions a group of thirteen dgra lha supplicated in a lha bsangs text which includes at least three female deities whose duties include melting butter, supporting the pillars of the house, and aiding in the birth of children. None of these is fierce or bears weapons.
15.41	On the other hand, one might also propose an overlap of the two meanings during a certain period in the term’s history. Norbu, (1995, p. 61) based on sources unavailable to the present writer, makes the interesting claim that the thug, the Tibetan apotropaic standard discussed in Part One, is the receptacle of the sgra bla. Perhaps Kublai Khan (1215–1294) was looking at a tuq when he “heard from afar / Ancestral voices prophesying war” (the lines are from Coleridge’s “Xanadu”), and perhaps this is the significance of bka’ thug in the Mu cho khrom dur.
15.42	Bellezza, 2008, p. 443.
15.43	See Mumford, 1989, p. 118 n. 1. Mumford’s informants, however, listed only four spirits. Further, some of them reported that only high-born males were born with them (though his female informants evidently did not share that view).
15.44	Grwapa Mngon shes, 1976, pp. 361–99.
15.45	Other sources show some slight variation in the names of the five, but all sets include the dgra lha; see also Macdonald (1971, p. 301 n. 407); Tucci (1980, p. 193).
15.46	There is some indication that the perceived “location” of hallucinated voices may be tied to the divided hemispherical functioning of the brain. While this is not altogether consistent among schizophrenics, many patients have reported associating good voices with the upper right, and bad ones with the lower left (see Jaynes, 1976, pp. 86, 89–90), but also Jaynes (2006, p. 86), Kuijsten (2006, pp. 103, 121), Hamilton (2006, pp. 150–51), and Mumford (1989, p. 129).
15.47	Macdonald (1971, pp. 299–302). While there is no indication at all that the sku bla of the Imperial Period was considered in any way fivefold, the individual lha in the system described (or likely invented) by Grwa pa Mngon shes can be seen as aspects of the individual’s basic “psychological” constitution earlier subsumed under the term bla.
15.48	Norbu, 1995, p. 67.
15.49	Martin, 2010, pp. 65, 112: glang = voice, sound, dar = shoulder, upper arm. His name has often been related to the Tibetan word glang “ox,” but none of these folk etymologies makes any sense.
15.50	Parenthetically, the unofficial name of another emperor, Sad na leg, could be translated from Zhang Zhung as “existing in the ancestral spirit” (Gibson, 1991, p. 158 n. 55). Norbu (1995, p. 25) believes that the names of the ancient mythic kings of Tibet are in the Zhang Zhung language, but he does not mention the cases of the historical rulers established here.
15.51	An image search for “Milarepa” will suffice to illustrate this.
15.52	Stein, 1980, p. 272. The Tibetan word used to describe the inspired songs of Milarepa and other poet-saints is mgur (gur), as distinct from ordinary songs which are called glu (lu). As noted in Part One, the mountain deities of the early emperors are sometimes referred to in Bon sources by the name mgur lha.
15.53	Stein, 1959, pp. 350–51 and 361.
15.54	Stein, 1980, p. 272.
15.55	Kunzang Choden, 2009, pp. 316–317.
15.56	Lopön Tenzin Namdak in Ermakov, 2008, pp. 612–613.
16.01	Hereinafter abbreviated as OC, followed by the page number. References to the New Science will be NS, followed by the page number. While Vico is most noted for his social and historical theory, the scope of this paper is largely confined to his contributions to psychological phenomena. A further limitation: it is not possible in this short space to emphasize the many differences between Vico and Jaynes. I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Dr. Jaynes for reading and discussing my accuracy in rendering his bicameral theory in a near-final draft of this manuscript.
16.02	Danesi, 1986, 1987, 1989; Gardner, 1976; Haskell, 1978, 1987b; Singer, 1976.
16.03	While the literature on Vico is replete with insightful comparative articles (e.g., Mora, 1976a; Verene, 1976a), a comparative course is not without its risks. Tagliacozzo (1976) observed that while many resemblances to Vico are substantive, others may be purely coincidental. Others have lamented that Vico is often used instrumentally (Battistini, 1981; Kiernan, 1986; Lilla, 1986). Mora (1976b) characterized some similarities as “amazing.” Vico’s mental dictionary common to all people (NS: 144; 161) would perhaps predict such amazing resemblances; Cotroneo (1969) and Faucci (1969) suggest similarities of Vico to scholars before him. To I. A. Richards (1936), comparative studies are “interactive metaphors” writ large, with the potential to provide insights into both terms of the comparison.
16.04	It seems prudent here to cite Jaynes’s 1986c succinct explanation of his use of the term consciousness, since it has a nearly all-meaningful nature in psychology and philosophy: “ ‘conscious expereience’ with its episodic memory is precisely what I call consciousness … I prefer to remain with consciousness as Locke and Descartes … would define it, as what is introspectible.” Elsewhere Jaynes says it is “All our introspective experience, including retrospection and imagination” (1982, 434). In this regard, he says a more precise title for his 1976 book would be The Origin of Conscious Experience in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
16.05	It is particularly interesting to note, given the centrality of Vico’s epistemological verum-factum principle of the convertability of the true and the made, that Jaynes experienced a nearly identical insight: that of the human construction of knowledge. Jaynes recounts that while lying down, one afternoon, in intellectual despair, “Suddenly, out of an absolute quiet, there came a firm distinct loud voice from my upper right which said, ‘Include the knower in the known’ ” (OC: 86, my italics). Jaynes does not elaborate on this Vichian-like verum-factum epistemological principle, nor apply it to his own analysis. In discussion with Jaynes, he said he simply used this auditory episode to illustrate that normal contemporary people hear such hallucinated voices, as indeed the literature attests (Jaynes, 1976a, 1990; Singer, 1973). Though Jaynes does not intend any epistemological implications for his own work, it is reasonable to expect that such a profoundly experienced concept is implicit in his work. It could certainly be suggested that, at the least, Jaynes’s entire thesis of the bicameral mind in the evolution of consciousness implies including the knower in the known.
16.06	Recognizing the fundamental transformative nature of this event in Vico’s New Science, Verene (1976a), says, “All the original powers of mind that are manifest in the various forms of poetic wisdom are present in this initial act. It is this act that must be sought out and followed in its development if we are to grasp the origin point of any nation” (419), that “it is from the initial act of forming the thunder as Jove that human consciousness is born” (418). (A kind of “Big Bang” theory of consciousness [Haskell, 1987b], as it were.)
16.07	A hallucination is a sensory experience, auditory, visual, etc., which does not referentially exist external to the individual. Technically speaking, the first men experiencing thunder as anger or Jove was not a hallucination but a delusion since the sensory experience was based on a distortion of an external event. Experientially, the transmutation of thunder into a feeling of anger is what Werner and Kaplan (1963) in their classic but infrequently cited work call a holophrastic phenomenon, i.e., just as a verbal insult may be experienced as a “slap in the face.” They also discuss in seminal detail the process of Vichian-like inner speech.
16.08	Verene (1976b; 1981) insightfully points out and examines the significance of memory or memoria in Vico’s concept of imagination, or what he calls fantasia. According to Jaynes: “Men who did not live in a frame of past happenings, who did not have ‘lifetimes’ in our sense, and who could not reminisce because they were not conscious …” (OC: 371) “Reminiscent memory (or episodic memory, as it is sometimes called), in sharp contrast to habit retention (or semantic memory), is new to the world with consciousness” (OC: 457). Research on memory has always been a significant area in psychology. Most of the research, however, has been largely on what is called memory span at a point in time, not on everyday memory or memory of the past. Ulric Neisser, the father of modern cognitive psychology (1967), laments this in Memory Observed: Remembering in Natural Contexts: “Shouldn’t memory have something to do with the past?” (1982, 7). From Verene’s (1981) extensive analysis of Vico’s “concept” of memoria, it is clear that further examination of the philosophy and psychology of memory as well as of imagery may prove useful.
16.09	Like Vico, Jaynes “reads” previous evidence quite differently than most other scholars, whom, both men maintain, have imposed the epistemology of their own times on the evidence. Jaynes says: “It is generally agreed that the ancient Egyptian language, like the Sumerian, was concrete from the first to last. To maintain that it is expressing abstract thoughts would seem to me an intrusion of the modern idea that men have always been the same” (OC: 186), and: “When the Memphite Theology speaks of the tongue or voices as that from which everything was created, I suspect that the very word ‘created’ may also be a modern imposition, and the more proper translation might be commanded ” (ibid.). Jaynes points out other areas of unwarranted impositions (see OC: 184). This imposition of a modern epistemology upon translations of works that may not have been based on such an epistemology, this “conceit of scholars,” to turn a Vichian phrase, is a serious epistemological issue, one that, as I have suggested (Haskell, 1978, 1987b), may have implications in the translations of Vico’s New Science, especially given his “new” epistemological stance. Like Vico, Jaynes, in his bicameral theory, calls for a radical departure in understanding many human mental phenomena. The work of both men engenders an epistemological paradigm shift.
16.10	Like Vico, Jaynes sees language development in children as paralleling language development historically. Jaynes (1976b) suggests that despite the outdated nineteenth-century Biogenetic Law of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny, “it is nevertheless proper to ask whether or not the sequence of language development in the child in any way resembles its sequence in the species as a whole” (323).
16.11	In previous works (Haskell, 1978, 1987b), I suggested Vico was, in effect, a cognitive psychologist and as such was concerned with cognitive operations. Vico says, “the first age of the world occupied itself with the primary operation of the human mind” (NS: 496) and that the primary operation to which he refers is metaphorical operations. As a consequence, I suggest that he was the first to “discover” metaphor to be a fundamental cognitive operation, rather than a simple literary device. In recent years there has been a new literature in psychology finally viewing metaphoric and analogical reasoning as important cognitive and learning operations. (See, e.g., Honeck and Hoffman, 1980; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Vosniadou and Ortony, 1989). For a theory of equivalence transformations that reference Vico’s notion of sensory topics, see Haskell (1989).
16.12	For an early and insightful exposition of how the four major tropes are related to major institutional and cultural changes, see White (1976).
16.13	From my personal discussions with Jaynes, it is clear that he had no knowledge of Vico before writing his 1976 book. He had been aware of Snell’s The Discovery of the Mind (which also had many similarities to Vico’s interpretation of Homer and the Iliad); he says in a footnote, “I was well along into the ideas and material of this chapter before knowing of Snell’s parallel work on Homeric language. Our conclusions, however, are quite different” (OC: 71). It is not surprising that Jaynes did not know of Snell, let alone Vico: being a psychologist, as well as a solitary scholar, Jaynes was working far outside his field. However, given his early interest in the problem of consciousness and in philosophy and literature, it is not particularly surprising that he went to Greek texts. Vico, too, appears to have had precursors for the idea that Homer was not a single author (see Adams, 1935; Wellek, 1969). In addition to the Greek texts, Jaynes examines the ancient texts of numerous other cultures.
16.14	An interesting example of the implications of a different epistemological approach to phenomena is the following: A bicameral perspective suggests that a concept of an ‘other’ developed before the concept of an ‘I’. Since there is no ‘interior self ’, Jaynes suggests quite a different twist on the old philosophical puzzle of the problem of other minds. “The tradition in philosophy that phrases the problem in the logic of inferring other minds from one’s own has it the wrong way around. We may first unconsciously [sic] suppose other consciousness, and then infer our own by generalization” (OC: 217). Jaynes’s perspective, like Vico’s, tends to turn Western philosophy on its head, as great ideas often do.
16.15	Jaynes saw the significance of these neurological findings before this literature became widely cited. As much as these data seem to explain and support his theory of bicamerality, he points out that his theory does not stand or fall on the basis of them; he considers such evidence as a model of bicamerality. He is emphatic on not connecting consciousness directly to the material brain and its structures. It should be pointed out that much of the early and widely cited evidence on hemispheric functions has not stood the test of time. Jaynes’s use of this evidence, however, remains basically sound. In one of the few citations to Jaynes’s work in the Vichian literature, Gardner (1976) insightfully recognized and briefly noted this literature in relation to Vico.
16.16	It should be noted that findings cited here are stated as being “associated” with the hemispheres, rather than as a necessary consequence or the sole function of each structure. Research suggests that some functions may be the result of reciprocal inhibition or other effects of one hemisphere on the other and/or may vary according to the task (see Kitterle, 1991). Thus, technically, many functions cannot always be strictly attributed to a given hemisphere.
16.17	See Jaynes’s Ch. 5 for his more detailed, but quite understandable, neurological analysis. See also Springer and Deutsch (1981) for a readable review of brain lateralization research. See also Gazzaniga, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1988; Kimura, 1967; Sperry, 1984. For more specialized neurophilosophical analysis of the brain and lateralization see Churchland, 1986; Kitterle, 1991.
16.18	It is instructive to note that the findings from the “split brain” research can be seen as supporting Vico on the issue of the voices of the gods commanding behavior and Jaynes’s further hypothesis that these voices were man’s volition. In Gazzaniga’s (1988) research, he found that commands to the right hemisphere can elicit behaviors without left hemisphere awareness, leaving the subject not conscious of why they engaged in the behavior. By way of instantiation, Gazzaniga gives the case of a patient who, when the command “walk” was given to the right hemisphere, began to walk out of the testing area. When asked why the subject was leaving, the left hemisphere had to come up with a plausible reason. This kind of “non-volitional” (from a left hemisphere perspective) behavior is identical to subjects’ explanations of behavior resulting from a post-hypnotic suggestion.
16.19	Galin, 1974. For selected literature on non-conscious processing, much of it experimentally generated, see Bowers and Meichenbaum, 1984; Dixon, 1981; Hilgard, 1977; Marcel, 1983a, 1983b, 1988; Piaget, 1973.
16.20	Vico (NS: 461, 288, 230) and Jaynes (OC: 364) note that early speech, that is, poetry, was in fact melodious singing, and both observed similar pathologies of language of brain-impaired individuals to the normal functioning of early man (OC: 365–68) and utilize such instances as support of their theories. In terms of hemispheric laterality, in the open brain stimulation procedure of Wilder Penfield, patients occasionally heard singing and music. It is significant to note that much of the musical function appears to be associated with right cerebral hemisphere functions; for example, as Jaynes explains, when sodium amytal is injected through the left carotid artery, inactivating the left hemisphere, where the language function is largely found, the person can no longer speak but can still sing. Jaynes suggests that during the breakdown of the bicameral mind singing served to stimulate those parts of the right hemisphere from which the divine auditory hallucinations originated, and that later the use of musical instruments and chanting served the same function. For a clear exposition of Vico in relation to the traditional singing to speaking to writing hypothesis, see Trabant (1991).
16.21	See Wood, Flowers, and Naylor, 1991.
16.22	Springer and Deutsch, 1981; see esp. Waber, 1976, Witelson, 1976.
16.23	From a rhetorical perspective based on Vico’s description of the first prayers, the origin of prayer can be viewed as being born in what Gresson (1977), in another context, has called the “rhetoric of protest.” In the breakdown of the bicameral mind and the beginnings of reflection and their felt loss of communication with their gods, of their feeling abandoned by them, the first men can be said to have experienced the first sense of betrayal. (For a rhetorical analysis of the experience of betrayal in human affairs, see Gresson, 1982.)
16.24	Jaynes suggests that contributing to this breakdown was some sort of catastrophic geological event which occurred around 2100 b.c. Referring to ancient texts that relate a time when the Nile became dry and the sun was hidden (OC: 196), suggesting that this may have been due to a series of volcanic eruptions on the island of Thera, that geologists have estimated may have been 350 times more powerful than a hydrogen bomb explosion. Elsewhere (Jaynes, 1986c) he speculates that since about half of the world’s population was killed during the bicameral period, the bicameral population may have been largely the victim of such circumstances. While this would have biogenetic implications, he more strongly believes in learning as the predominant mechanism of consciousness.
16.25	Beginning in 1999, numerous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated a right/left temporal lobe interaction during auditory hallucinations, confirming Jaynes’s neurological model. — Ed.
16.26	Jaynes’s position of sensory pain can be seen to be supported by Ernest Hilgard’s Stanford University Hypnosis Laboratory research on pain (Hilgard and Hilgard, 1975), which found that pain was composed of two parts: sensory and suffering. Under hypnosis the concious “suffering” aspect was often eliminated or reduced, with the sensory pain still evident. The “pure” sensory experience of pain did not seem to bother subjects. Similar findings have been noted with subjects with brain implants for the control of pain.
16.27	The laboratory research on hypnosis suggests that in the hypnotic “state,” consciousness and context are narrowed so that the individual accepts induced realities uncritically, as though they were real. Given the restricted consciousness of Vico’s first men, it is not unreasonable to suggest that what we call “hypnosis” is a vestige of the early state of human consciousness.
16.28	Jaynes had originally written two chapters on dreaming for Origin, but his publisher suggested deleting them because of the size of the manuscript. It should be noted that like hypnosis the study of dreams has not until recently been accepted in academic psychology (see Haskell, 1986). For research that could be interpreted to support Jaynes on dreaming, and, by implication, the dreaming of Vico’s first men, the reader is particularly referred to the laboratory research on children’s dreams (as well as his view on the cognitive importance of sleep mentation data); from a Vichian perspective, it would be in the dreams of children that we may see the vestiges of the mentality of the first men. The psychological literature on dreaming, imagination, imagery, and memory are significant areas that I think could be profitably applied to Vico’s concept of imagination and Verene’s concept of fantasia in relation to Vico.
16.29	It is interesting to note that both Vico and Jaynes seem to assume a hyper-sexuality on the part of males, not females. Is this an example of Vico’s “conceit of scholars,” or more specifically, the conceit of male scholars? To the contrary, Mary Jane Sherfey (1996), a physician, has suggested that in early history the female sexual appetite was stronger than the male and therefore had to be controlled by the male in order to create and maintain social order.
16.30	Just as Vico suggests that the origin of nations began in multiple places, Jaynes speculates there were probably many bicameral theocracies spread throughout the world, rising up and then breaking down. He hints there may have been other bands of primate-like creatures who were neither bicameral or conscious. He does not imply that all humans at that time exhibited such behavior; rather he intends his theory to describe a norm (OC: 222). Similarly, Vico suggests that the New Science may not apply exactly to all nations, as it is only “perfect in its idea” (NS: 1096) and in principle.
16.31	In Rhodes, 1978 p. 78.