Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness: Notes & Citations

The entire list of notes and citations for Reflections on the Dawn of Consciousness (2nd Edition).

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Intro-01	For a more in-depth explanation of Jaynes’s theory see “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” which can be downloaded from the Julian Jaynes Society (julianjaynes.org) in the “Articles by Julian Jaynes” section.
Intro-02	William Woodward, “Review of The Origin of Consciousness,” Isis, June 1979, 70, 293.
Intro-03	New evidence for Jaynes’s theory is the topic of Chapter 4.
Intro-04	For further discussion of this topic see Chapter 6, “Language and Consciousness.”
Intro-05	See Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1976), pp. 21–66.
Intro-06	Robert K. Kretz, “The Evolution of Self-awareness: Advances in Neurological Understandings Since Julian Jaynes’s ‘Bicameral Mind’,” Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences & Engineering, 2000, 60, 12-B, 6413.
Intro-07	Brian J. McVeigh, “Beyond Confusion: Culture, Cognition, and Consciousness,” Cross Culture, 1993, 11.
Intro-08	Julian Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 2, 128.
Intro-09	More information on Jaynes-related conferences and events can be found at julianjaynes.org.
Intro-10	Brian J. McVeigh, “Overcoming Intellectual Barriers to Understanding Jaynes’ Theory,” paper presented at the Julian Jaynes Conference on Consciousness, University of Prince Edward Island, August 4–5, 2006.
Intro-11	There is a great deal of pressure toward conformity in psychology beginning with students. Undergraduates planning to go on to graduate school gain experience and improve their chances for acceptance by assisting with the research of a professor at their university. When I was applying to doctoral programs in neuroscience, it was suggested by a well intentioned professor that I remove the reference to Jaynes as one of my interests from my letters of introduction. This unfortunately was good advice, as in order to be accepted to a graduate program, typically a professor has to decide you are a good match to work in his or her lab, which means sharing their research interests. The focus often is not on finding someone with diverse interests or original ideas but on selecting someone that will be a productive lab assistant. Graduate students work in their professor’s lab and publish articles related to their professor’s research, often in the same area they studied as an undergraduate. Branching off into new areas or attempting to publish original research is difficult and (while there are exceptions) usually not encouraged.
Intro-12	There are a few exceptions, such as Flemish psychologist Dr. Herman Somers, who studies the psychopathology of Biblical prophets and the prophet Mohammed, and the partnership of psychiatrist Jerome Kroll and historian Bernard Bachrach, who study the psychology of medieval religious figures.
Intro-13	Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind.”
Intro-14	For recent critical discussions of Jaynes’s theory, see David Martel Johnson, How History Made the Mind: The Cultural Origins of Objective Thinking (Open Court Publishing Company, 2003) and Ivan Leudar and Philip Thomas, Voices of Reason, Voices of Insanity: Studies of Verbal Hallucinations (Florence, KY: Taylor & Francis/Routledge, 2000). I think both critiques contain major flaws, which I address on the Julian Jaynes Society website, along with many others.
Intro-15	For examples in this section, see Peter Watson, Ideas: A History of Thought and Invention, from Fire to Freud (HarperCollins, 2005).
Intro-16	Robin M. Henig, The Monk in the Garden: The Lost and Found Genius of Gregor Mendel, the Father of Genetics (Mariner Books, 2001).
Intro-17	Kretz, “The Evolution of Self-awareness: Advances in Neurological Understandings Since Julian Jaynes’s ‘Bicameral Mind’”; Tor Nørretranders, The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size (Penguin Books, 1999); Wilkinson, 1999; Robert Olin, “Auditory Hallucinations and the Bicameral Mind.” Lancet, 1999, 354, 9173, 166; Leo Sher, “Neuroimaging, Auditory Hallucinations, and the Bicameral Mind,” Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience, 2000, 25, 3, 239–40. For a more complete list of related books and articles please see julianjaynes.org.
1.01	Richard Rhodes, “Alone in the Country of the Mind,” Quest, 1978, 2, 71–78.
1.02	Julian Jaynes to June Tower, ca. 1980.
1.03	Julian Clifford Jaynes, Magic Wells: Sermons by Julian Clifford Jaynes (Boston: Press of Geo. H. Ellis Co., 1922), p. 4.
1.04	Ibid., pp. 9, 12.
1.05	Ibid., pp. 16–17.
1.06	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 26. Reprinted in 1982 with a new Preface and in 1990 with a new Afterword.
1.07	Julian Jaynes to Clara Bullard Jaynes, February 6, 1938.
1.08	Julian Jaynes to Clara Bullard Jaynes, May 16, 1938.
1.09	Julian Jaynes to Clara Bullard Jaynes, April 27, 1942.
1.10	Julian Jaynes to Francis Biddle, December 14, 1942.
1.11	Julian Jaynes to the Boston Globe Editor, 1943.
1.12	Julian Jaynes to Clara Bullard Jaynes, April 12, 1944.
1.13	Julian Jaynes to Clara Bullard Jaynes, April 25, 1944.
1.14	Julian Jaynes, Lewisburg tape, 1984.
1.15	Julian Jaynes to Clara Bullard Jaynes, May 21, 1946.
1.16	Frank A. Beach, “The Snark was a Boojum,” The American Psychologist, 1950, 5, 115–124, pp. 123, 121.
1.17	Donald A. Dewsbury, “Frank A. Beach, Master Teacher,” in Gregory A. Kimble and Michael Wertheimer (eds.), Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology, Vol. 4 (Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum, 2000).
1.18	Frank A. Beach and Julian Jaynes, “Effects of Early Experience upon the Behavior of Animals,” Psychological Bulletin, 1954, 51, 239–263; “Studies of Maternal Retrieving in Rats: I: Recognition of Young,” Journal of Mammology, 1956, 37, 177–180; “Studies of Maternal Retrieving in Rats: II: Effects of Practice and Previous Parturitions,” American Naturalist, 1956, 90, 103–109; “Studies of Maternal Retrieving in Rats: III: Sensory Cues Involved in the Lactating Female’s Response to Her Young,” Behavior, 1956, 10, 104–125. Frank A. Beach, Julian Jaynes and Arthur Zitrin, “Neural Mediation of Mating in Male Cats: I. Effects of Unilateral and Bilateral Removal of the Neocortex,” Journal of Comparative Physiological Psychology, 49, 4, 321–7; “Neural Mediation of Mating in Male Cats. III. Contributions of Occipital, Parietal and Temporal Cortex,” Journal of Comparative Neurology, 1956, 105, 1, 111–25.
1.19	Julian Jaynes, “Imprinting: The Interaction of Learned and Innate Behavior: I. Development and Generalization,” Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1956, 49, 201–206; “Imprinting: The Interaction of Learned and Innate Behavior: II. The Critical Period,” Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1957, 50, 6–10; “Imprinting: The Interaction of Learned and Innate Behavior: III. Practice Effects on Performance, Retention, and Fear,” Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1958, 51, 234–237; “Imprinting: The Interaction of Learned and Innate Behavior: IV. Generalization and Emergent Discrimination,” Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1958, 51, 238–242.
1.20	Frank A. Beach and Julian Jaynes, “Effects of Early Experience upon the Behavior of Animals” (Bobbs-Merrill Reprints, 1960).
1.21	Julian Jaynes, “Imprinting: The Interaction of Learned and Innate Behavior: I. Development and Generalization,” Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1956, 49, 201–206.
1.22	E.G. Boring to Julian Jaynes, February 21, 1963.
1.23	Julian Jaynes to E.G. Boring, March 3, 1963.
1.24	Dewsbury, “Frank A. Beach, Master Teacher.”
1.25	Julian Jaynes to E.G. Boring, October 28, 1965.
1.26	E.G. Boring to Julian Jaynes, November 15, 1965.
1.27	E.G. Boring to Julian Jaynes, March 31, 1966.
1.28	Julian Jaynes to E.G. Boring, May 23, 1966.
1.29	James H. Capshew, Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in America, 1929–1969 (Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 262.
1.30	Julian Jaynes, “Edwin Garrigues Boring, 1886–1968,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1969, 5, 99–112, p. 605.
1.31	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, 1982 Preface.
1.32	EveLynn McGuinness, interview by telephone with W.R. Woodward, June 21, 2000.
1.33	Julian Jaynes, unpublished Preface, 1975.
1.34	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, pp. 2, 10, 15, 23.
1.35	Ibid., p. 143.
1.36	Ibid., pp. 169–173.
1.37	Ibid., p. 217.
1.38	Judith Greismann to Julian Jaynes, July 27, 1972.
1.39	Thomas H. Quinn to Julian Jaynes, April 4, 1974.
1.40	Julian Jaynes, “Imprinting: The Interaction of Learned and Innate Behavior: I-V.”
1.41	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, pp. 236–246.
1.42	Ibid., pp. 332–338.
1.43	Ibid., pp. 344–360.
1.44	Ibid., pp. 433–446.
1.45	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), pp. 456–469.
1.46	Julian Jaynes, “Paleolithic Cave Paintings as Eidetic Images,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1979, 2, 605–607; “The Meaning of King Tut: A Review of the Tutankhamun Exhibition from the Perspective of Bicameral Theory,” Art/World, 1979 (reprinted in Princeton Alumni Weekly, June 25, 1979); “Dragons of the Shang Dynasty: The Hidden Faces,” Art/World, May 21, 1980, 4, 9; “Ghost of a Flea: Visions of William Blake,” Art/World, 1981, 5, 1, 1–6; “Art and the Right Hemisphere,” Art/World, 1981, 5, 10, 3–6.
1.47	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, pp. 209, 214.
1.48	Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy D. Wilson, “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” Psychological Review, 1977, 84, 3; Gordon G. Globus, et al. (eds.), Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry (N.Y.: Plenum, 1976); William James, “The Stream of Thought,” in W. James, The Principles of Psychology (Henry Holt and Company, 1890); Joseph Bogen, “The Other Side of the Brain,” in R.E. Ornstein, (ed.), The Nature of Human Consciousness (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1973); Thomas B. Posey and Mary E. Losch, “Auditory Hallucinations of Hearing Voices in 375 Normal Subjects,” Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 1983, 3, 99–114; David Galin, “Implications for Psychiatry of Left and Right Cerebral Specialization,” Archives of General Psychiatry, 1974, 31, 572–583; Robert G. Ley and and M.P. Bryden “Consciousness, Emotion, and the Right Hemisphere,” in Geoffrey Underwood and Robin Stevens (eds.), Aspects of Consciousness (N. Y.: Academic Press, 1979); Julian Jaynes, “The Evolution of Language in the Late Pleistocene,” in S. Harnad, H.D. Steklis and J. Lancaster (eds.), “Origins and Evolution of Language and Speech,” Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 280, 312–325.
1.49	Jaynes, “The Meaning of King Tut”; Ernest R. Hilgard, “Amnesia and Repression,” in Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action (N.Y.: Wiley, 1977); Eugen Bleuler, Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias (N.Y.: International Universities Press, 1950); E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1951); Martin Orne, “The Nature of Hypnosis: Artifact and Essence,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 58, 3, 277–299; Theodore X. Barber, Hypnosis: A Scientific Approach (N.Y.: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969); Nicholas P. Spanos, “Hypnotic Behavior and Commentaries,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1986, 9, 449–502.
1.50	Julian Jaynes, “Remembrance of Things (Far) Past,” Quest, Nov.–Dec. 1977, 77, 1; Bernard Gorman and Alden Wessman, “Images, Values, and Concepts of Time in Psychological Research,” in B.S. Gorman and A.E. Wessman (eds.), The Personal Experience of Time (N.Y.: Plenum, 1979); Hilgard, “Amnesia and Repression”; Chester G. Starr, The Awakening of the Greek Historical Spirit (N. Y.: Knopf, 1968); Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational; Gordon H. Bower, “Analysis of a Mnemonic Device,” American Scientist, 1970, 58, 5; J.T. Fraser, The Voices of Time: A Cooperative Survey of Man’s Views of Time (N.Y.: G. Braziller, 1968); Endel Tulving, “Episodic and Semantic Memory,” in E. Tulving and W. Donaldson (eds.), Organization of Memory (N.Y.: Academic Press, 1972); Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1966).
1.51	Julian Jaynes, “A Two-Tiered Theory of Emotions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1982, 5, 379–380 and “Sensory Pain and Conscious Pain,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1985, 8, 61–63; Michael Lewis, “The Origins of Self,” in M. Lewis and J. Brooks-Gunn (eds.), Social Cognition and the Acquisition of Self (N. Y.: Plenum Press, 1979); John F. Benton, “Consciousness of Self and Perceptions of Individuality” in R. L. Benson and G. Constable (eds.), Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); John O. Lyons, The Invention of the Self: The Hinge of Consciousness in the Eighteenth Century (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978); William James, “The Consciousness of Self,” in W. James, The Principles of Psychology (Henry Holt and Company, 1890); Robert A. Wicklund, “Objective Self-Awareness,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 8, 233–275.
1.52	Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, Chapter 1 (N.Y.: Modern Library, 1900/1950); Erich Kahler, The Inward Turn of Narrative (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973); Judith Weissman, “Vision, Madness, and Morality: Poetry and the Theory of the Bicameral Mind,” Georgia Review, 1979, 33, 118–148; Edward Proffitt, “Romanticism, Bicamerality, and the Evolution of the Brain,” The Wordsworth Circle, 1978, 9, 98–105.
1.53	A.A. Sheikh, P. Richardson and L.M. Moleski, “Psychosomatics and Mental Imagery,” in A.A. Sheikh and J.T. Shaffer (eds.), The Potential of Fantasy and Imagination (N.Y.: Brandon House, 1979); C.S. Jordan, “Mental Imagery and Psychotherapy: European Approaches,” in A.A. Sheikh and J.T. Shaffer (eds.), The Potential of Fantasy and Imagination (N.Y.: Brandon House, 1979); Lerner, “Cognitive Therapy,” Carrier Foundation Letter No. 92, October 1983; Donald Meichenbaum, Cognitive-Behavior Modification (N. Y.: Plenum Press, 1977); Joseph R. Cautela and Leigh McCullough, “Covert Conditioning,” and Alan E. Kazdin, “Covert Modeling,” in J.L. Singer and K.S. Pope (eds.), The Power of Human Imagination: New Methods in Psychotherapy (N.Y.: Plenum Press, 1978); Philip E. Berghausen and Lewis B. Sachs, “Hypnotic Treatment of Hallucinations and Disordered Impulse Control,” Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 1986,5, 311–319.
1.54	Jerome L. Singer, “Some Theoretical Implications,” in J.L. Singer, The Child’s World of Make-Believe. (N.Y.: Academic Press, 1973); Lev Vygotsky, “The Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech,” In L.S. Vygotsky, Thought and Language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964); Charles J. Brainerd, “The Stage Question in Cognitive Developmental Theory and Commentary,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1978, 1, 173–214; Arthur Applebee, The Child’s Concept of Story: Ages Two to Seventeen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); John H. Flavell and Henry M. Wellman, “Metamemory,” in R.V. Kail and J.W. Hagen (eds.), Perspectives on the Development of Memory and Cognition (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977).
1.55	Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1922/1973); Ernest Gellner, “The Savage and the Modern Mind,” in R. Horton and R.H. Finnegan (eds.), Modes of Thought (London: Faber, 1973); E.E. Evans-Pritchard, “Essays on Thinking in Western and Non-Western Society,” in Theories of Primitive Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); C.R. Hallpike, “Is There a Primitive Mentality?” Man, 1976, 11, 2, 253–270; Paul Heelas and Andrew Lock (eds.), Indigenous Psychologies: The Anthropology of the Self (N.Y.: Academic Press, 1981); Maurice Leenhardt, Do Kamo: Person and Myth in the Melanesian World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).
1.56	Julian Jaynes, University of New Hampshire tape, 1983.
1.57	Julian Jaynes, Lewisburg tape, 1984.
1.58	For a list of many of Julian Jaynes’s lectures and appearances, see the “About Julian Jaynes” page on the Julian Jaynes Society website (https://www.julianjaynes.org/about/about-julian-jaynes/).
1.59	Julian Jaynes, Harvard lecture, 1988.
1.60	Ibid.
1.61	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness (1990), p. 448, citing Bertrand Russell, Analysis of Mind (London: Allen and Unwin, 1921) and Philosophy (N.Y.: Norton, 1927).
1.62	John Hamilton, “Auditory Hallucinations in Nonverbal Quadriplegics,” Psychiatry, 1985, 48, 382–392 (reprinted as Chapter 5 of this volume).
1.63	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness (1990), pp. 455–456, citing M.S. Buchsbaum, et al., “Cerebral Glucography with Positron Tomography: Use in Normal Subjects and in Patients with Schizophrenia,” Archives of General Psychiatry, 1982, 39, 251–259.
3.01	When the interviewer tried to correct Thomas’s misunderstanding by saying that he didn’t hear voices but was a student at Princeton University doing research with Professor Jaynes, Thomas immediately cut in, “That’s just the kind of thing they tell you! I said don’t listen to them.”
3.02	Michael E. Rosenberg, “Auditory Hallucinations in Princeton University Undergraduates,” Senior thesis at Princeton University on file in the Mudd Library, 1988.
3.03	Thomas B. Posey and Mary E. Losch, “Auditory Hallucinations of Hearing Voices in 375 Normal Subjects,” Imagination, Cognition, and Personality, 1983, 3, 2, 99–113.
3.04	Nathan A. Harvey, Imaginary Playmates (Ipsilanti: State Normal College, 1918); Maya Pines, “Invisible Playmates,” Psychology Today, 12, 4, 38–42.
3.05	John Hamilton, “Auditory Hallucinations in Nonverbal Quadriplegics,” Psychiatry, 1985, 48, 382–392. Reprinted as Chapter 5 of this volume.
3.06	See M.V. Moore, “Binary Communication for the Severely Handicapped,” Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 1972, 53, 532–533.
3.07	John Sappington, S. Reedy, R. Welch and John Hamilton, “Validity of Messages from Quadriplegic Persons with Cerebral Palsy,” American Journal on Mental Retardation, 1989, 94, 49–52.
3.08	Modern translations are notorious for naïvely projecting modern consciousness into the text.
3.09	I apologize for what must seem contentious and provocative in its brevity. I go into these matters fully in Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), Chapter 1.1, and Julian Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 128–186, particularly pages 140–142.
3.10	Julian Jaynes, “The Evolution of Language in the Late Pleistocene,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1976, 280, 312–325.
3.11	This theory is thus one that explains the origin of gods and therefore religion.
3.12	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
3.13	See Bruno Snell, The Discovery of Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); A.W.H. Adkins, From the Many to the One: A Study of Personality and Views of Human Nature in the Context of Ancient Greek Society, Values and Beliefs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).
3.14	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
3.15	By “pure” I mean books of the Bible that for the most part are not mixtures from various sources as is most of the Old Testament. Prophets such as Amos were transitional persons retaining enough bicamerality to relay the words of gods to others with an authenticity that convinced.
4.01	Julian Jaynes, “Verbal Hallucinations and Pre-Conscious Mentality,” in M. Spitzer and B. Maher (eds.) Philosophy and Psychopathology (New York: Springer Verlag), p. 449 (reprinted as Chapter 3 of this volume). See also Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), pp. 48–66.
4.02	Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens (New York: Harcourt, 1999), pp. 187–188.
4.03	Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 42.
4.04	Ibid., p. 253.
4.05	Howard Margolis, Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 60.
4.06	Bruce Bridgeman, Psychology and Evolution: The Origins of Mind (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 248.
4.07	José Luis Bermúdez, Thinking Without Words (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 187.
4.08	Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1991), p. 301.
4.09	Daniel Dennett, in Edge Foundation, “What Do You Believe is True Even Though You Cannot Prove It?” 2005, https://www.edge.org/response-detail/11902.
4.10	Oliver Sacks, Seeing Voices: A Journey into the World of the Deaf (Pan Books, 1991), quoted by William H. Calvin in Edge Foundation, 2005, https://www.edge.org/response-detail/11886.
4.11	Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child (Basic Books, 2000); Dorothy G. Singer and Tracey A. Revenson, A Piaget Primer: How a Child Thinks (Plume, revised edition, 1996).
4.12	See Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, pp. 84–99.
4.13	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, p. 85.
4.14	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, pp. 85–99; see also Chapter 3 of this volume.
4.15	Julian Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 2, 128.
4.16	Daniel Dennett, “Julian Jaynes’s Software Archeology,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 2, 149–154; David Stove, “The Oracles and Their Cessation: A Tribute to Julian Jaynes,” Encounter, 1989, 75, 30–38 (reprinted as Chapter 9 of this volume).
4.17	See, for example, studies of hallucinations in children: Sandra Escher, et al., “Independent Course of Childhood Auditory Hallucinations: A Sequential 3-Year Follow-up Study,” The British Journal of Psychiatry, 2002, 181, s10–s18; Sotiris Kotsopoulos, et al., “Hallucinatory Experiences in Nonpsychotic Children,” Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 1987, 26, 3, 375–380; Peter Mertin and Steve Hartwig, “Auditory Hallucinations in Nonpsychotic Children: Diagnostic Considerations,” Child and Adolescent Mental Health, 2004, 9, 1, 9–14; David Pearson, et al., “Auditory Hallucinations in Normal Child Populations,” Personality & Individual Differences, 2001, 31, 3, 401–407; Daniel Pilowsky and William Chambers, Hallucinations in Children (Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1986); Herbert A. Schreier, “Hallucinations in Nonpsychotic Children: More Common Than We Think?” Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 1999, 38, 5, 623–625; Bea Vickers and Elena Garralda, “Hallucinations in Nonpsychotic Children,” Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 2000, 39, 9, 1073; college students: Steven R. Feelgood and Andrew J. Rantzen, “Auditory and Visual Hallucinations in University Students,” Personality and Individual Differences, 1994, 17, 2, 293–296; Ana M.L. Rodrigo, et al., “Hallucinations in a Normal Population: Imagery and Personality Influences,” Psychology in Spain, 1997, 1, 1, 10–16; women: François Chédru, et al., “Visual and Auditory Hallucinations in a Psychologically Normal Woman,” Lancet, 1996, 348, 9031, 896; the elderly: G.E. Berrios and P. Brook, “Visual Hallucinations and Sensory Delusions in the Elderly,” British Journal of Psychiatry, 1984, 144, 662–664; Agneta Grimby, “Hallucinations following the Loss of a Spouse: Common and Normal Events among the Elderly,” Journal of Clinical Geropsychology, 1998, 4, 1, 65–74; Toshiyuki Kobayashi, et al., “Commentary Hallucination in the Elderly: Three Case Reports,” Psychogeriatrics, 2004, 4, 3, 96–101; low-income urban populations and various ethnic groups: A.M. Izquierdo, “A Study of Manifestations of Hallucinations in a Non-Psychiatric Population of Caribbean Descent,” Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences & Engineering, 2000, 61, (5-B), 2764; Mark Olfson, et al., “Psychotic Symptoms in an Urban General Medicine Practice,” American Journal of Psychiatry, 2002, 159, 1412–1419; evangelical Christians: Martin F. Davies, et al., “Affective Reactions to Auditory Hallucinations in Psychotic, Evangelical and Control Groups,” British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 2001, 40, 361–370; high altitude climbers: Peter Brugger, et al., “Hallucinatory Experiences in Extreme-Altitude Climbers,” Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology, & Behavioral Neurology, 1999, 12, 1, 67–71; Eduardo Garrido, et al., “Hallucinatory Experiences at High Altitude,” Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology, and Behavioral Neurology, 2000, 13, 2, 148; and near-death experiencers: Bruce Greyson and Mitchell B. Liester, “Auditory Hallucinations following Near-Death Experiences,” Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 2004, 44, 320–336.
4.18	Marius Romme and Sandra Escher, Making Sense of Voices: A Guide for Mental Health Professionals Working with Voice-hearers (Mind Publications, 2000).
4.19	Salvador P. Garcelán, “A Psychological Model for Verbal Auditory Hallucinations,” International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 2004, 4, 1, p. 135.
4.20	See B. Spivak, et al., “Acute Transient Stress-Induced Hallucinations in Soldiers,” The British Journal of Psychiatry, 1992, 160, 412–414; M.B. Hamner, et al., “Psychotic Features in Chronic Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Schizophrenia: Comparative Severity,” Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 2000, 188, 4, 217–221; N.L. Comer, et al., “Observations of Sensory Deprivation in Life-Threatening Situations,” American Journal of Psychiatry, 1967, 124, 164–169; S.E. Hobfoll, The Ecology of Stress (Taylor & Francis, 1988); L.A. Wells, “Hallucinations Associated with Pathologic Grief Reaction,” Journal of Psychiatric Treatment and Evaluation, 1983, 5, 259–61; B. Knudson and A. Coyle, “Coping Strategies for Auditory Hallucinations: A Review,” Counseling Psychology Quarterly, 1999, 12, 1, 25.
4.21	See T.M. Lee, et al., “Command Hallucinations among Asian Patients with Schizophrenia,” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 2004, 49, 12, 838–42; D.E. McNeil, “The Relationship between Command Hallucinations and Violence,” Psychiatric Services, 2000, 51, 1288–1292; Y. Suraya and K.C. Saw, “Psychiatric and Surgical Management of Male Genital Self-Mutilation,” Singapore Medical Journal, 1999, 40, 10; S. McGraw, “Marc Sappington: The Kansas City Vampire,” Court TV’s Crime Library, 2001, crimelibrary.com; T. Kobayashi, et al., “Commentary Hallucination in the Elderly: Three Case Reports,” Psychogeriatrics, 2004, 4, 3, 96– 101.
4.22	R.K. Erkwoh, et al., “Command Hallucinations: Who Obeys and Who Resists When?” Psychopathology, 2002, 35, 272–279.
4.23	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, pp. 223–313.
4.24	Sam Keen, “The Lost Voices of the Gods,” Psychology Today, 1978, 11, 58–60.
4.25	Julian Jaynes, “Paleolithic Cave Paintings as Eidetic Images,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1979, 2, 605–607.
4.26	Nicholas Humphrey, “Cave Art, Autism, and the Evolution of the Human Mind,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1999, 6, 116–143.
4.27	David Lewis-Williams, The Mind in the Cave: Consciousness and the Origins of Art (Thames & Hudson, 2002); D. Lewis-Williams and D. Pearce, Inside the Neolithic Mind: Consciousness, Cosmos, and the Realm of the Gods (Thames & Hudson, 2005).
4.28	B. Holldobler and E.O. Wilson, Ants (Harvard University Press, 1990).
4.29	An ant’s brain has an estimated 10,000 neurons, a bee’s brain has an estimated 1 million neurons, and the human brain has in excess of 100 billion neurons.
4.30	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 144.
4.31	Alun Anderson, quoted in J. Brockman (ed.), What We Believe but Cannot Prove: Today’s Leading Thinkers on Science in the Age of Certainty (Harper Perennial, 2006).
4.32	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 42.
4.33	Ibid., p. 43.
4.34	Hermann von Helmholtz quoted in R. Woodworth, Experimental Psychology (H. Holt & Co., 1938).
4.35	Joseph LeDoux, Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (Penguin Books, 2002).
4.36	Tor Nørretranders, The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size (Penguin. 1999).
4.37	Charles Laughlin, “The Nature of Intuition,” in R. Davis-Floyd and P.S. Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story (Routledge, 1997), p. 23.
4.38	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 297.
4.39	Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Little, Brown, and Company, 1986).
4.40	Jaynes, 1990, new Afterword to The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
4.41	Judith Weissman, Of Two Minds: Poets Who Hear Voices (University Press of New England, 1993), p. 7.
4.42	Ibid., p. 25.
4.43	See Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, pp. 100–125.
4.44	For an interesting discussion of multiple “selves” and disunity of consciousness in split-brain patients see Charles E. Marks, Commissurotomy, Consciousness and Unity of Mind (The MIT Press, 1981). In a series of articles highly relevant to Jaynes’s theory (but beyond the scope of this chapter), philosopher Roland Puccetti (“Bilateral Organization of Consciousness in Man,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1977, 299, 448–457; “The Case for Mental Duality: Evidence from Split-Brain Data and Other Considerations,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1981, 4, 93–123; “Two Brains, Two Minds? Wigan’s Theory of Mental Duality,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1989,40, 137–144) argues that everyone has two distinct minds, one for each hemisphere, and that this only becomes evident after commissurotomy when (in right-handed individuals) the left or dominant hemisphere is no longer inhibiting the right hemisphere. Dr. Fredric Schiffer (Of Two Minds: The Revolutionary Science of Dual-Brain Psychology [The Free Press, 1998]) has applied dual-brain concepts to mental health. Further evidence that each hemisphere can function independently as a complete “brain” comes from children that have, for medical reasons, had one hemisphere removed (Antonio M. Battro, Half a Brain is Enough: The Story of Nico [Cambridge University Press, 2001]).
4.45	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 105.
4.46	W. Penfield and P. Perot, “The Brain’s Record of Auditory and Visual Experience: A Final Summary and Discussion,” Brain, 1963, 86, 595.
4.47	M. Baldwin, “Neurologic Syndromes and Hallucinations,” in W. Keup (ed.), The Origins and Mechanisms of Hallucinations (Plenum Press, 1970).
4.48	M.S. Buchsbaum, et al., “Cerebral Glucography with Positron Tomography: Use in Normal Subjects and in Patients with Schizophrenia,” Archives of General Psychiatry, 39, 251.
4.49	B.R. Lennox, et al., “Spatial and Temporal Mapping of Neural Activity Associated with Auditory Hallucinations,” Lancet, 1999, 353, 644.
4.50	Robert Olin, “Auditory Hallucinations and the Bicameral Mind,” Lancet, 1999, 354, 9173, 166.
4.51	Leo Sher, “Neuroimaging, Auditory Hallucinations, and the Bicameral Mind,” Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience, 2000, 25, 3, 239–40.
4.52	Aprosodia is a medical term for a disruption in the expression or comprehension of the changes in pitch, loudness, rate, or rhythm that convey a speaker’s emotional intent.
4.53	H.S. Moffic, “What About the Bicameral Mind?” American Journal of Psychiatry, 1987, 144, 5, 696.
4.54	L.A. Bentaleb, et al., “Cerebral Activity Associated with Auditory Verbal Hallucinations: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Case Study,” Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience, 2002, 27, 2, 110.
4.55	S.S. Shergill, et al., “Temporal Course of Auditory Hallucinations,” British Journal of Psychiatry, 2004,185, 516–7.
4.56	I.E.C. Sommer, et al., “Letters to the Editor,” Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, 2003, 28, 3, 217–218.
4.57	J.M. Cleghorn, et al.,“Toward A Brain Map of Auditory Hallucinations,” Psychiatry Research, 2005, 136, 2–3, 189–200.
4.58	A. Sritharan, et al., “EEG Coherence Measures during Auditory Hallucinations in Schizophrenia,” Psychiatry Research, 2005, 136, 2–3, 189–200.
4.59	For additional research supporting Jaynes’s neurological model, please see my article “Neuroscience Confirms Julian Jaynes’s Neurological Model” on the Julian Jaynes Society website (https://www. julianjaynes.org/blog/featured/neuroscience-confirms-julian-jaynes-neurological-model/). It was first published on June 10, 2020, and is updated periodically as new research becomes available.
4.60	Weissman, Of Two Minds: Poets Who Hear Voices, 1993.
4.61	V.S. Ramachandran and S. Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain: Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind (William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1998) pp. 85–87.
4.62	D.C. Park, et al., “To the ‘Infinite Spaces of Creation’: The Interior Landscape of a Schizophrenic Artist,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 1994, 84, 2, 192–209.
4.63	Aleister Crowley, Equinox of the Gods (New Falcon Publications, 1936/1991), Chapter 7.
4.64	I. Leudar and P. Thomas, Voices of Reason, Voices of Insanity: Studies of Verbal Hallucinations (Taylor & Francis/Routledge 2000), pp. 14–27.
4.65	For both the Yates and Rodriguez cases, see Katherine Ramsland, “Andrea Yates: Ill or Evil?” Court TV’s Crime Library, 2003, crimelibrary.com.
4.66	Jerome Kroll and Bernard Bachrach, The Mystic Mind: The Psychology of Medieval Mystics and Ascetics (Routledge, 1982).
4.67	Julian Jaynes, “Hearing Voices and the Bicameral Mind,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1986 9, 3.
4.68	William D. Morain, The Sword of Laban: Joseph Smith, Jr., and the Dissociated Mind (American Psychiatric Association, 1998).
4.69	Klaus Hansen, Mormonism and the American Experience (University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 21–22.
4.70	Henry Maudsley, Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1886).
4.71	Koenraad Elst, “Wahi: the Supernatural Basis of Islam,” Kashmir Herald, October 2002, kashmirherald.com.
4.72	Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (Donohue, 1841).
4.73	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, pp. 361–378.
4.74	Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, p. 180.
4.75	See also Michael Persinger, Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs (Praeger Publishers, 1987).
4.76	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 183.
4.77	H.W.F. Saggs, Civilization before Greece and Rome (Yale University Press, 1989), p. 15.
4.78	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 318.
4.79	Saggs, Civilization before Greece and Rome, p. 267.
4.80	R. Walter Heinrichs, In Search of Madness: Schizophrenia and Neuroscience (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 272.
4.81	Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind.”
4.82	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, pp. 63–64.
4.83	Ibid., p. 64.
4.84	Ibid., p. 61.
4.85	E.A. Weinstein, “Aspects of Hallucinations,” in L.J. West (ed.), Hallucinations (Grune and Stratton, 1962), pp. 233–238; A.H. Weingaertner, “Self-administered Adversive Stimulation with Hallucinating Hospitalized Schizophrenics,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1971, 36, 422–429.
4.86	Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind.”
4.87	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 423.
4.88	Ibid., p. 432.
5.01	One of the interested staff was Mary Poteet. At a time when I was struggling to understand the residents, she was communicating with them regularly. Being skeptical, I told one of her nonverbal residents to give her the message to call me at 3 p.m. the next day. At three o’clock sharp the following day, Mary Poteet called to ask what I wanted. What I wanted was to observe her communicating with the nonverbal. Her method was rapid and effective, and it was by following her example that I carried out the subsequent interviews with the residents in this study.
5.02	Michael V. Moore, “Binary Communication for the Severely Handicapped,” Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, 1972, 53, 532–33.
5.03	Five of the nine residents were taking Valium as a muscle relaxant at some point during this study. No relationship was observed between the presence or absence of Valium and the “voice” phenomenon. Four of the five medicated residents reported that the “voices” started long before they ever received Valium. One resident was treated with Valium six months after he first reported his “voice” and Valium was later discontinued; there were no related changes in the frequency of occurrence or the content of his “voice.”
5.04	The concept of God was a familiar one to these residents; in their early years they had been influenced about religion by their families; later they attended church services within the institution on a regular basis. Individual concepts of God varied among residents, but it was the generally accepted belief that God was a higher power who directed and controlled their lives.
5.05	John Sappington, S. Reedy, R. Welch, and John Hamilton. “Validity of Messages from Quadriplegic Persons with Cerebral Palsy.” American Journal on Mental Retardation, 1989, 94, 49–52.
6.01	All references to Jaynes’s book (OC) are to the second edition. This includes an Afterword, added in 1990.
6.02	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 447.
6.03	John Limber, “The Genesis of Complex Sentences,” in T. Moore (ed.) Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language (Academic Press, 1973) pp. 169–186.
6.04	Ned Block, “Review of Julian Jaynes’s The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind,” Cognition and Brain Theory, 1981, 4, 81–83.
6.05	Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), Vol. VII, pp. 131–191.
6.06	I designate this as J-consciousness (J-con) to distinguish it from phenomenal conscious (P-con) or access consciousness (A-con), extended consciousness (E-con), self-consciousness (I-con) or one of the several “levels” of consciousness Con_i.
6.07	John Limber, “What Can Chimps Tell Us About The Origins of Language,” in S. Kuczaj (ed.), Language Development: Volume 2 (L. E. Erlbaum, 1982), pp. 429–446.
6.08	Cf. Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
6.09	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 23.
6.10	Ibid., p. 447.
6.11	Ibid., p. 47.
6.12	William James (The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, 1890) says in his “automaton” Chapter 5, which Jaynes cites that consciousness ... is only intense when nerve-processes are hesitant” (p. 142). He concludes that “the distribution of consciousness shows it to be exactly such as we might expect in an organ added for the sake of steering a nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself ” (p. 144). This is one of several perspectives on consciousness shared by James and Jaynes, including the role of vocabulary.
6.13	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 11.
6.14	Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (T. Y. Crowell, 1975).
6.15	Wolfgang Köhler, The Mentality of Apes (Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1925).
6.16	These separable bits of imagery may be necessary in intra-species communication (John Limber, “Interspecies Communication, Consciousness, and the Cognitive Verb Gap,” paper presented at the Toward a Science of Consciousness II, Tucson, Arizona).
6.17	Köhler, The Mentality of Apes, pp. 114–115.
6.18	Ibid., p. 122.
6.19	Ibid., p. 123.
6.20	John Limber, “Language in Child and Chimp?” American Psychologist, 32, 280–295. Reprinted in T. Sebeok and J. Sebeok (eds.), Speaking of Apes (Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 1197–1218.
6.21	Jean Piaget’s (The Grasp of Consciousness: Action and Concept in the Young Child, S. Wedgwood, Trans. (Harvard University Press, 1976) work, for example, is an elaborate and unappreciated account of the development — ontogenetic and cultural — of consciousness in humans. Russian psychologists — taking their cue from Marx — have a long tradition of social effects on consciousness, e.g., Lev Vygotsky, Thought and Language (A. Kozulin, Trans., MIT Press 1934/1986) and A.R. Luria, Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations (Harvard University Press, 1976). Recent work in “cognitive linguistics” further elaborates on the role of metaphor in ramping up the intellectual powers of human minds (e.g., M. Turner, “The Origin of Selkies,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2004, 11, 90–115). And Daniel Dennett (“Julian Jaynes’s Software Archeology,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 149–154; Consciousness Explained [Little, Brown & Company, 1991]) has explicitly articulated a Jaynesian approach to consciousness, while others including Peter Carruthers (Language, Thought and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology [Cambridge University Press, 1996]), Merlin Donald (A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness [W.W. Norton, 2001]), and Antonio Damasio (The Feeling of What Happens [Harcourt Brace & Co, 1999]) offer similar proposals.
6.22	See Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct (William Morrow & Company, 1994) for a good discussion of this issue.
6.23	See Dunbar (Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language) for a perspective compatible with Jaynes’s thoughts; also see Limber (“What Can Chimps Tell Us About The Origins of Language”).
6.24	For recent application of this idea to schizophrenics and in cricket sound production, see J.M. Ford et al., “Neurophysiological Evidence of Corollary Discharge Dysfunction in Schizophrenia,” American Journal of Psychiatry, 2001, 158, 2069–2071 and J.A. Poulet and B. Hedwig, “A Corollary Discharge Maintains Auditory Sensitivity During Sound Production,” Nature, 2002, 418, 872–876, respectively.
6.25	Mistaken attribution about one’s own movements extends beyond speech into a variety of phenomena, e.g., Ouija boards, Chevreul’s pendulum, spirit possession, hypnotism (D. M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will [MIT Press, 2002]). See P.K. Maguire et al.,“Abnormal Monitoring of Inner Speech: A Physiological Basis For Auditory Hallucinations,” Lancet, 1995, 346, 596–600 for an application to auditory hallucinations.
6.26	Yet there is an important difference in referential phrasing — we typically know what we are talking about but our audiences may not. My own introspection on this, for what it is worth, reveals few if any descriptive relative clauses in my inner speech. The issue is similar to children’s use or nonuse of relative clauses (John Limber, “Unraveling Competence, Performance, and Pragmatics in the Speech of Young Children,” Journal of Child Language, 1976, 3, 309–318).
6.27	Jaynes suggests that in pre-conscious humans auditory hallucination served a similar purpose: “enabling non-conscious early man to keep at his task alone.”
6.28	E.g., J.W. Schooler and T.Y. Engstler-Schooler, “Verbal Overshadowing of Visual Memories: Some Things Are Better Left Unsaid,” Cognitive Psychology, 1990, 22, 36–71.
6.29	See J.H. Flavell, “Cognitive Development,” Annual Review of Psychology, 1999, 50, 21–45 for a review.
6.30	Of course without more precise information, there’s no way to be sure about the accuracy or identity of my boat image — but the partial evidence fits.
6.31	I have to expect if mentalese turns out to be a lot like a natural language, then chances of J-con in humans without a conventional language, e.g., English, ASL, are more likely. This of course is contingent on mentalese being “heard” in some way. The different interpretations of “egocentric” speech in young children between Vygotsky (Thought and Language) and Piaget (The Grasp of Consciousness) reflect different views of these issues, with J-con perhaps closer to Vygotsky’s perspective. I interpret self-reports of deaf individuals acquiring thoughts after acquiring some social language as becoming conscious of approximations to existing cognitive processes (e.g., H. Keller, The Story of My Life. [Doubleday, 1954]; S. Schaller, A Man without Words [Summit Books, 1991]; Golden-Meadow and Zheng, 1998). Jaynes’s own conception of “aptic structures” might be relevant here (Jaynes, p. 135).
6.32	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 50.
6.33	Ibid., p. 132.
6.34	William James’s (1890, p. 194–8) critique of introspection is well worth reading in connection with OC, especially his comments on “the misleading influence of speech.”
6.35	Tor Nørretranders, The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down To Size (Viking, 1998); Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers To Ourselves: Discovering The Adaptive Unconscious (Harvard University Press, 2002); Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (MIT Press, 2002).
6.36	Morris Berman, Wandering God (SUNY Press, 2000), p. 37.
6.37	Ibid., p. 38.
6.38	See OC, p. 220 where he discusses this point briefly. At the time, both Jaynes and I were advocates of the Baldwin effect — essentially language shaping the brain via natural selection. Jaynes thought these changes might occur far more rapidly than I did — and I thought the idea of parallel evolution resulting in equivalent language biology was even less plausible. But who knows?
6.39	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
6.40	Michael Balter, “Are Human Brains Still Evolving? Brain Genes Show Signs of Selection,” Science, 309, 1661–1662.
6.41	Temple Grandin, Thinking in Pictures (Vintage Press, 1996).
6.42	Julian Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” Canadian Psychology, 27, 128–148.
6.43	M. Roser and M. Gazzaniga, “Automatic Brains — Interpretive Minds,” Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13, 56–59.
6.44	Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens.
6.45	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 64.
6.46	Many have studied this from varying perspectives; in addition to the above, Nisbett and Wilson’s paper “Telling More Than We Can Know” is informative (Psychological Review, 1977, 84, 231–259). Charlotte Linde’s book Life Stories: The Creation of Coherence (1993) reveals some of the sources of our rationalizations, and recent books by Wilson (Strangers To Ourselves) and Wegner (The Illusion of Conscious Will), in particular, review much evidence on the topic. Much of this recent research is summarized in William Hirstein’s Brain Fiction: Self Deception and the Riddle of Confabulations (MIT Press, 2004).
6.47	R. Fivush and K. Nelson, “Culture and Language in the Emergence of Autobiographical Memory,” Psychological Science, 2004, 15, 9, 573–577.
6.48	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 287.
6.49	In perhaps the most elaborated theory of speech production, W.J.M. Levelt, et al., “A Theory of Lexical Access in Speech Production,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1999, 22, 1–38, suggest three layers — conceptual, lexical concept, and lexical — mediating between thought and speech. The issue in Jaynes’s analyses seems more than just lexical, however; it concerns the difference between direct and indirect speech where the writer explicitly attributes a thought or belief — subject mentality — to the character.
6.50	The exception to this is in children’s acquisition of language where it is possible the language at times precedes the concept. See Limber (“The Genesis of Complex Sentences”) and Jaynes (“Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind”). There is also the use of “lexicalization” in the synchronic sense — converting one’s thoughts into words (phrases) on the fly, as in conversation and inner speech.
6.51	This brief account ignores at least one intermediate step that speech production theories require — binding together semantic features into a pre-lexical unit. See Levelt et al., “A Theory of Lexical Access in Speech Production” on “lexical concepts.”
6.52	E.g., Keller, The Story of My Life.
6.53	E.g., James Gleick, Isaac Newton (Vintage Books, 2003).
6.54	Levelt, et al., “A Theory of Lexical Access in Speech Production,” p. 34.
6.55	Schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations were a significant part of the OC story. This topic remains one of the most researched of all OC topics. It is too simplistic to say that schizophrenia results from a misattribution of speech source but this is certainly a common symptom.
6.56	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, pp. 39, 41.
6.57	E.g., Nisbett and Wilson, “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports On Mental Processes.”; Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will.
6.58	Both Jaynes and I (Limber, “What Can Chimps Tell Us About The Origins of Language”) have appealed to the Baldwin effect as a means of shading the boundary between culture and biology. Thus language can be both artifact and biology!
6.59	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
6.60	Ibid.
6.61	Philip Zelazo, “The Development of Conscious Control in Childhood,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2004, 8, 12–17.
6.62	E.g., D.I. Slobin, “Language and Thought Online: Cognitive Consequences of Linguistic Relativity,” in D. Gentner and S. Golden-Meadow (eds.), Language in Mind: Advances in the Study of Language and Thought (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 157–192.
6.63	Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind.”
6.64	John Limber, “The Genesis of Complex Sentences,” in T. Moore (ed.), Cognitive Development and the Acquisition of Language (Academic Press, 1973), pp. 169–186.
6.65	T. Ruffman, L. Slade, and E. Crowe, “The Relation between Children’s and Mother’s Mental State Language and Theory-of-Mind Understanding,” Child Development, 2002, 73, 734–751.
6.66	P.L. Harris, M. de Rosnay, and F. Pons, “Language and Children’s Understanding of Mental States,” Current Directions in Psychological Science, 2005, 14, 69–73.
6.67	Angelina Lilliard, “Ethnopsychologies: Cultural Variations in Theories of Mind,” Psychological Bulletin, 1997, 123, 3–32.
6.68	Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind.”
6.69	E.g., Fivush and Nelson, “Culture and Language in the Emergence of Autobiographical Memory.”
6.70	Ibid.
6.71	Piaget’s studies of logical operations using verbal justification as a criterion, might be viewed as a narrowly focused study of introspection. This also predicts a slow developmental process that in the final stage of formal operations is culturally determined.
6.72	J.H. Flavell, “Cognitive Development”; J.H. Flavell et al., “Development of Children’s Awareness of Their Own Thoughts,” Journal of Cognition and Development, 2000, 1, 97–112.
6.73	J.W. Astington, “Talking It Over with My Brain,” Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 1995, 60, 104–111.
6.74	A.R. Luria, Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations.
6.75	J.R. Flynn, “Searching For Justice: The Discovery of IQ Gains Over Time,” American Psychologist, 1999, 54, 5–20.
6.76	D.G. Singer and J.L. Singer, Imagination and Play in the Electronic Age (Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 114.
6.77	G. Fauconnier and M. Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities (Basic Books, 2002).
6.78	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 50.
6.79	Eve Sweetser, From Etymology to Pragmatics (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 42–44.
6.80	John Limber, “Julian Jaynes’s ‘Preposterous Hypothesis.’” Paper presented at the Cheiron conference, University of Southern Maine, 2000.
6.81	Dennett, “Julian Jaynes’s Software Archeology.”
6.82	For reviews of non-Jaynesian ideas on inner speech and consciousness, see A.N. Sokolov, Inner Speech and Thought (Plenum Press, 1972); Kuczaj and Bean, “The Development of Non-Communicative Speech Systems” (in S.A. Kuczaj, Language Development: Volume 2: Language, Thought, and Culture, 1982); Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained; Tor Nørretranders, The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down To Size; and Alain Morin “Possible Links Between Self-Awareness and Inner Speech” (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2005, 12, 115–134).
6.83	Lev Vygotsky, Consciousness as a Problem in the Psychology of Behavior (Peter Lang Publishing, 1925/1999), p. 246.
6.84	A.R. Luria, “Paths in the Development of Thought,” in M. Cole (ed.), The Selected Writings of A. R. Luria (M.E. Sharpe, 1929/1978), pp. 97–144.
6.85	Bruno Snell (The Discovery of the Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature [Harper & Row , 1953/1960]) is cited twice in OC (p. 71, 457 of the Afterword), with the note that Jaynes had not known about Snell’s work and they came to different conclusions. Astington refers to the 1982 Dover edition.
6.86	J.W. Astington, “Talking It Over with My Brain,” p. 112.
6.87	Jaynes cites Slobin’s (“Soviet Psycholinguistics,” in N. O’Connor (ed.), Present Day Russian Psychology [Pergamon Press, 1966]) review of Russian psycholinguistics with its heavy emphasis on “linguistically mediated cognition” — which of course includes consciousness. In that same volume, there is a review and analysis of Russian/Marxist notions of consciousness. The author, Jeffrey Gray (“Attention, Consciousness, and Voluntary Control of Behavior in Soviet Psychology: Philosophical Roots and Research Branches”), stresses how different the Marxist perspective was from American behaviorists’ view of consciousness as epiphenomenal and irrelevant. Jaynes certainly would agree with this assessment.
7.01	The fieldwork lasted from 1988 until 1991. See Brian J. McVeigh, Gratitude, Obedience, and Humility of Heart: The Cultural Construction of Belief in A Japanese New Religion (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University Anthropology Department, 1991); “Spirit Possession in Sûkyô Mahikari: A Variety of Sociopsychological Experience,” Japanese Religions, 1996, 21, 2, 283–97; and Spirits, Selves, and Subjectivity in a Japanese New Religion: The Cultural Psychology of Belief in Sûkyô Mahikari (Edwin Mellen Press, 1997). Besides guiding my dissertation research on spirit possession, the theories of Julian Jaynes have also inspired my approach to self-presentation as it involves socio-ritualization within a Japanese educational setting and self-appearance (Life in a Japanese Women’s College: Learning to Be Ladylike [Routledge, 1997]; Wearing Ideology: State, Schooling, and Self-Presentation in Japan [Berg Publishers, 2000]). His thinking has also directed my work on “mind–words” in Japanese (“Standing Stomachs, Clamoring Chests and Cooling Livers: Metaphors in the Psychological Lexicon of Japanese,” Journal of Pragmatics, 1996, 26, 25–50).
7.02	Of course, a possession-in-itself approach can only reveal certain aspects of possession. It cannot inform us about why certain people become possessed or what this form of action means to them. This is because possession behavior does not and cannot exist outside some sociocultural patterning. Nevertheless, insights obtained from studying possession-in-itself will have cross-cultural relevance. Some of the noted uses include self-aggrandizement; self-assertion; realignment of marital relations; escape from an unpleasant situation; immediate control of persons around the possessed during actual possession; self-chastisement; attainment of intimacy through fleeting interpersonal relationships desired by the possessed but socially prohibited in the nonpossessed state; desire for a specific object; and the assertion of rights among the socially marginal, especially by women. See V. Crapanzano and V. Garrison (eds.), Case Studies in Spirit Possession (John Wiley and Sons, 1977).
7.03	This coming from an anthropologist who has himself relied on perennially criticized and discredited “Freudian” theorizing.
7.04	This essay has had two previous incarnations. The first, entitled “Towards a Theory of Agency,” was as a research paper for the course Psychology 319 taught by Julian Jaynes in the spring of 1987 at Princeton University. The second incarnation was an article called “Society in the Self: The Anthropology of Agency” (Tôyô Gakuen Daigaku Kiyô [Tôyô Gakuen University Research Bulletin], 1995, 3, 33–48). The present incarnation has been fundamentally revised and updated.
7.05	George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, Vols. 1 and 2 (University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 253.
7.06	Cf. Harré’s opinion: “There may be human beings whose belief systems, imaginary anticipations and so on are organized in some non-unitary way. Necessarily all human beings who are members of moral orders are persons, social individuals, but the degree of their psychological individuality, their personal being, I take to be contingent” (Rom Harré, Personal Being [Harvard University Press, 1984], p. 77).
7.07	For my present purposes, “mentality” describes fundamental differences in mental processes between historical periods, whereas a “psychology” (or ethnopsychology) denotes less radical differences between historical periods and societies.
7.08	Harré, Personal Being, p. 195.
7.09	Ibid., p. 212.
7.10	Ibid., p. 180.
7.11	Ibid., p. 22.
7.12	Cf. Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), pp. 62–3. Mead’s ruminations about the “I” and its relation to the “me” deserve mention here. He discussed these components of the self in various ways, including the view that the “me” is an organized set of attitudes of others while the “I” is the spontaneous response to these attitudes. Related to this is the idea that the “I–me” relationship constitutes sequential phases of the self (Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, pp. 173–78, passim). In my treatment of “I” and “me” I emphasize how intermental communicative events become intramental experience and the related experiences of control and being controlled.
7.13	Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Anchor Books, 1959), pp. 80–81.
7.14	L.S. Vygotsky, Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes (Harvard University Press,1978), p. 34.
7.15	Andrew Lock, The Guided Reinvention of Language (Academic Press, 1980), p. 132.
7.16	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 55.
7.17	Ibid., pp. 48–66.
7.18	Ibid., p. 60.
7.19	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind; McVeigh, “Standing Stomachs, Clamoring Chests and Cooling Livers: Metaphors in the Psychological Lexicon of Japanese.”
7.20	Cf. Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
7.21	Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind (Harvard University Press, 1953); E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (University of California Press, 1951).
7.22	Jean Smith, “Self and Experience in Maori Culture,” in A. Lock and P. Heelas (eds.), Indigenous Psychologies: The Anthropology of Self (Academic Press, 1981), p. 152, quotations in original.
7.23	Ibid., p. 156.
7.24	M.Z. Rosaldo, “Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling,” in R.A. Shweder and R.A. LeVine (eds.), Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self and Emotion (Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 137–57.
7.25	Maurice Leenhardt, Do Kamo: Persons and Myth in the Melanesian World (University of Chicago Press. 1979), p. 61.
7.26	Godfrey Lienhardt, Divinity and Experience: Religion of the Dinka (Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 150.
7.27	Ibid., p. 149, quotations in original.
7.28	See Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
7.29	Andrew Lock, “Universals in Human Conception.” In A. Lock and P. Heelas (eds.), Indigenous Psychologies: The Anthropology of Self (Academic Press, 1981), p. 30, italics in original.
7.30	Ibid., p. 31.
7.31	Ibid., p. 35.
7.32	Paul Heelas, “The Model Applied: Anthropology and Indigenous Psychologies,” In A. Lock and P. Heelas (eds.), Indigenous Psychologies: The Anthropology of Self (Academic Press, 1981), p. 39, quotations in original.
7.33	Ibid., p. 41, quotations in original.
7.34	Ibid., parentheses in original.
7.35	Ibid.
7.36	Ibid., p. 42, parentheses and quotations in original.
7.37	The “modified idealist and modified passiones systems” of Heelas raise this issue: “the boundary between the external and internal is not easy to define” (Ibid., p. 42). Therefore, the “unconscious realm is in a sense external to the autonomous self, although it is internalized in contrast to ‘genuine’ external agencies, such as the stars in astrology” (Ibid., pp. 42–3, quotations in original).
7.38	It is important to note that hypnosis and spirit possession are vestiges of an earlier mentality, not a return to an earlier mentality.
7.39	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 379.
7.40	See, however, Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
7.41	This myth, incidentally, says much about our own cultural values: an emphasis on individual self-control, self-determination, independence, and a consequent fear of losing these to the control of others.
7.42	E.R. Hilgard, Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action (Wiley-Interscience, 1977), p. 163.
7.43	Ibid., p. 227.
7.44	We should keep in mind that, in a certain sense, while in nonhypnotic states the “generalized other” (in the form of cultural prescriptions, expectations, or customs) always stands behind an individual’s “I,” which in turn commands the “me.” In other words, the difference between hypnosis and ordinary subjectivity is continuous, not discontinuous.
7.45	Here it is pertinent to mention that not all individuals (e.g., schizophrenics) can be hypnotized.
7.46	Hilgard, Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action, p. 227.
7.47	Ibid., p. 229.
7.48	Ibid., p. 230.
7.49	T.K. Oesterreich, Possession: Demoniacal and Other (R.R. Smith, Inc., 1930), p. 378.
7.50	E. Bourguignon, “Spirit Possession and Altered States of Consciousness: The Evolution of an Inquiry,” in G.D. Spindler (ed.), The Making of Psychological Anthropology (University of California Press), p. 489–90.
7.51	Erika Bourguignon, “Spirit Possession Belief and Social Structure,” in A. Bharati (ed.), The Realm of the Extra-Human (Mouton Publishers, 1973); Erika Bourguignon, “Cross-Cultural Perspectives on the Religious Uses of Altered States of Consciousness,” in I. Zarestsky and M.P. Leone (eds.), Religious Movements in Contemporary America (Princeton University Press, 1974).
7.52	Some ethnopsychologies regard hypnosis as possession. However, contrary to what many researchers contend, not all possession trancing can be explained as a form of hypnosis. Basically, hypnosis involves trancing (a suspension of belief in the interior “mind-space” usually called consciousness), whereas possession involves trancing plus high levels of alterability.
7.53	My treatment of possession is cursory. For example, I have not examined the two major types of possession often distinguished in the literature. The first is induced, ritualized, desired. The second is spontaneous, inappropriate, and undesired. The distinction between these types is not always clear-cut, but most who have done research have noted two types of possession that roughly correspond to a “voluntary and involuntary” continuum.
7.54	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 355.
8.01	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), p. 1.
8.02	To the contemporary historian, such a claim — one linking a recent figure such as Jaynes to an ancient one like Aristotle — must seem outrageous. There are so many differences in social context, language, and their overall view of the world that any comparison must surely be very limited or simply inappropriate. Ordinarily, I would probably agree; however, my concerns here are attenuated by the fact that I have Jaynes’s own personal notes, manuscripts, and books. I have, in short, a partial record of his thoughts and ideas, and what helped, in a very general sense, give them shape. I also believe and will argue that the connections are sufficiently unique and specific (viz. the ontology of consciousness) to warrant consideration.
8.03	Part of the archival research for this chapter was made possible by a Major Research Grant from UPEI.
8.04	Sam Keen, “Julian Jaynes: Portrait of the Psychologist as a Maverick Theorizer,” Psychology Today, 1977, 11, 66–77; Richard Rhodes, “Alone In The Country of The Mind: When Did Humans Begin Thinking?” Quest, January/February 1978, 71–78.
8.05	Husserl made the exact same analogy, but there is no reference to Husserl or phenomenology in The Origin of Consciousness. However, research for this chapter has discovered that Jaynes was indeed aware, to some extent, of Husserl and phenomenology, and of the importance of this perspective for his own theory. From one of his notepads, dated July 28, 1969, Jaynes wrote: “Phenomenology must precede neurology, let neuroanatomy be where it will.”
8.06	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind; Keen, “Julian Jaynes: Portrait of the Psychologist as a Maverick Theorizer.”
8.07	John Leo, “The Lost Voices of the Gods,” Time Magazine, March 14, 1977, 51–53.
8.08	Rhodes, “Alone In The Country of The Mind: When Did Humans Begin Thinking?”, p. 62.
8.09	Keen, “Julian Jaynes: Portrait of the Psychologist as a Maverick Theorizer,” p. 60.
8.10	Ibid.
8.11	Philip Hilts, “Odd Man Out,” Omni, January 1981, 68–88; Keen, “Julian Jaynes: Portrait of the Psychologist as a Maverick Theorizer,” p. 66.
8.12	John Gliedman, “Julian Jaynes and the Ancient Mindgods, ” Science Digest, 1982, 90, 84–87.
8.13	Julian Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” Canadian Psychology, 27, 128–139.
8.14	Hilts, “Odd Man Out,” p. 87.
8.15	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
8.16	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind; Julian Jaynes, “How Old is Consciousness?” in R. Caplan (ed.), Exploring the Concept of Mind (University of Iowa Press).
8.17	Hilts, “Odd Man Out.”
8.18	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind; Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind”; Julian Jaynes, “Harvard Audio Tape,” December 3, 1988, UPEI Julian Jaynes Collection.
8.19	Julian Jaynes, “University of New Hampshire Audio Tape,” April 28, 1983, UPEI Julian Jaynes Collection.
8.20	Julian Jaynes, “Interview,” undated interview transcript.
8.21	Jaynes, “University of New Hampshire Audio Tape.”; Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind.”
8.22	Based on Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
8.23	Jaynes, “Harvard Audio Tape.”
8.24	More recent work, since the late 1970s, in both neuroscience and cognitive science, has also tended to move away from the homuncular view. Rather, many theories have conceived of consciousness (and self) as distributed processes functioning in concert throughout the brain. However, neither of these broad perspectives sees culture, language, and language use as having the generative role for consciousness the way that Jaynes does.
8.25	For purposes of historical and literary accuracy, it is important to distinguish between the English term “psyche” and the Latin transliteration of the Greek, “psychê.” It is important to remember that not only does the Greek term differ substantially from the English term, but there are important differences in the usages of psychê among Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient Greeks. See C.D. Green and P.R. Groff, Early Psychological Thought: Ancient Accounts of Mind and Soul. Greenwood (Praeger, 2003).
8.26	Green and Groff, Early Psychological Thought: Ancient Accounts of Mind and Soul.
8.27	Jan N. Bremmer, The Early Greek Concept of Soul (Princeton University Press), p. 57.
8.28	Green and Groff, Early Psychological Thought: Ancient Accounts of Mind and Soul.
8.29	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
8.30	Julian Jaynes, “The History of Comparative Psychology.” Unpublished manuscript.
8.31	Ibid.
8.32	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
8.33	Jaynes, “The History of Comparative Psychology.”
8.34	It was in examining Jaynes’s volume of The Basic Writings of Aristotle that I discovered a remark scribbled at the bottom of a page in Book I of De Anima. This started a line of questioning regarding the relationship of Aristotle’s psychê to Jaynes’s theory. Jaynes wrote: “‘psyche’ slips about like a fresh caught trout in inexperienced hands, slithering between a homunculus that knows and a principle and back simply to life or activity.” See Richard McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (Random House, 1941), p. 541n. In this quote, Jaynes is not so much commenting on Aristotle’s concept of psychê, but on Aristotle’s review of previous theories of psychê.
8.35	Jaynes, “The History of Comparative Psychology.”
8.36	McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle, p. 412b.
8.37	Ibid., p. 414a.
8.38	Ibid., p. 412b.
8.39	Ibid., p. 413a.
8.40	Ibid., p. 426a.
8.41	Ibid.
8.42	Since Aristotle stressed the functional quality of psychê and its role in experience, many contemporary writers have regarded Aristotle as a functionalist, or as an early representative of ‘functionalism’ (cf. C.D. Green, “The Thoroughly Modern Aristotle: Was He Really A Functionalist?” History of Psychology, 1998, 1, 8–20). There are clearly some broad conceptual connections, but this may be a somewhat pointless debate, since I do not think Aristotle meant to explain psychê in the way that we would use this term today. Our understanding of an ‘explanation’ is much more influenced by a Galilean conception of causality than the broader Aristotelian one.
8.43	Green and Groff, Early Psychological Thought: Ancient Accounts of Mind and Soul.
8.44	McKeon, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Book III, sec. 5.
8.45	Jaynes, “The History of Comparative Psychology,” p. 8.
8.46	Ibid., p. 14.
8.47	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
8.48	Jaynes, “University of New Hampshire Audio Tape.”
8.49	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 76.
8.50	Unlike Democritus, Aristotle rejected the idea that sensation and perception occurred because objects created and sent off copies of themselves that were picked up by our sense organs (these copies were called eidola). Rather, Aristotle believed that sensation came from a change or movement in the medium that was connected to the functioning of a sense organ. Visual perception was thus the result of movement in light.
8.51	From the Julian Jaynes papers held at the Archives of the History of American Psychology.
8.52	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 269.
8.53	Jaynes noted that the term “nousing” was taken from Randall’s (1960) classic text on Aristotle.
9.01	This section I think reflects several misunderstandings of Jaynes’s theory that I would like to clarify. The first is the idea that the transition from bicameral mentality to consciousness required biological changes to the structure of the brain. Jaynes suggests that consciousness is learned and the transition was cultural, and cites studies of brain plasticity showing that cultural and environmental changes can indeed cause changes to brain function. To use the computer metaphor, the transition from bicameral mentality to consciousness was a software change using the same hardware. Jaynes also was clear that the transition from bicameral mentality to consciousness occurred at different times in different cultures. While the primary shift from bicameral mentality to consciousness occurred around 1500-1200 b.c. in places such as Egypt, Greece, and Mesopotamia, the development of consciousness is still an ongoing process, that varies both in individuals and in different cultures. Vestiges of bicameral mentality are indeed numerous, but this in no way undermines Jaynes’s theory. — Ed.
9.02	This quotation is from my essay “Idealism: A Victorian Horror-Story,” published by Bradford Books/MIT Press, in my collection Cole Porter and Karl Popper, and other Reputations Reconsidered (MIT Press, 1989).
9.03	“The Natural History of Religion,” in Green and Grose (eds.), David Hume, The Philosophical Works (London, 1882), Vol. 4, p. 361. Hume actually wrote, not “Look for,” but “Look out for.” But since the latter would now be apt to be misunderstood as “Beware,” I have omitted the word “out.”
9.04	These words are attributed to Hume by his best friend Adam Smith, in an account which he published of Hume’s last days. See Vol. 3, p. 9, of David Hume, The Philosophical Works.
9.05	Jonathan Sumption, Pilgrimage: An Image of Mediaeval Religion (Rowman & Littlefield , 1975).
9.06	I cannot forbear mentioning the following curious fact. I have elsewhere shown, in something which was written well before I had heard of Jaynes, that this very same law of identity is characteristically in abeyance among another class of persons: namely, those philosophers who are, in the technical sense of the word, idealists. Philosophical idealism has always, of course, been an offspring of religion, and has even been generally recognized as such.
11.01	From: “If You Had Super Ears,” by John, pupil of Y3/4 at St. Bartholomew’s Catholic Primary School (Rainhill, Merseyside UK). Posted on the internet as part of the school’s poetry project; see http://www.st-bartholomews.st-helens.sch.uk.
11.02	See Daniel Dennett, “Julian Jaynes’s Software Archeology,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 2, 149–154 (reprinted in Brainchildren: Essays on Designing Minds [MIT Press, 1998]); Consciousness Explained (Little, Brown & Co, 1991) and Ned Block, “Review of Julian Jaynes’s The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind,” Cognition and Brain Theory, 1981, 4, 81–83; “Consciousness,” in S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A Companion To The Philosophy of Mind (Basil Blackwell, 1994); “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1995, 18, 227–247 (reprinted in N. Block, et al. (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates (MIT Press, 1997). For an overview of Jaynes’s work and its reception, see the Julian Jaynes Society website at julianjaynes.org. An exception to the unfavorable reception in philosophy, besides Dennett, is David Johnson, whose work explicitly aligns with Jaynes’s; see e.g., D.M. Johnson, How History Made The Mind: The Cultural Origins of Objective Thinking (Open Court, 2003). Jaynes’s established repute is now such that the merest association with his views causes suspicion. For instance, when Sarnecki and Sponheimer mention Jaynes in their review of Mithen (The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive Origins of Art and Science [Thames & Hudson, 1996]), the reader senses palpable implication. “It would be unfair, we think, to compare Mithen’s work with Julian Jaynes’s Origins of consciousness [sic],” so the authors submit in a footnote, and they continue, “but it is worth noting that ...”, which does little to improve Mithen’s case (J. Sarnecki and M. Sponheimer, “Why Neanderthals Hate Poetry: A Critical Notice of Steven Mithen’s The Prehistory of the Mind,” Philosophical Psychology, 2002, 15, 2, 173–184).
11.03	Donald Davidson, “The Emergence of Thought,” Erkenntnis, 1999,51, 7–17.
11.04	Mithen, The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive Origins of Art and Science; Terrence Deacon, The Symbolic Species. The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain (Norton & Co., 1997); and Merlin Donald, A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness (Norton & Co., 2001).
11.05	José Luis Bermúdez, Thinking Without Words (Oxford University Press, 2003).
11.06	Nicholas Humphrey, “Cave Art, Autism, and the Evolution of the Human Mind,” Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 8, 2, 165–191 (reprinted in N. Humphrey, The Mind Made Flesh: Frontiers of Psychology and Evolution [Oxford University Press, 2002]).
11.07	Notice that Bermúdez’s proposal and mine are not necessarily in conflict. By extending the standard model of mind to cover fringe minds, Bermúdez also changes the overall framework in terms of which mind is conceived. In particular, in order to be able to describe the thought processes of nonlinguistic creatures, Bermúdez needs to avail himself of a notion of ‘mental content’ or ‘concept’ for such creatures, the identity conditions for which appear to be substantially less stringent than those for concepts as ordinarily understood. My converse approach will involve a similar reconsideration of the notion of mental content, as explained in the section “A-Minds and B-minds?”
11.08	Jaynes also discussed archaeological evidence for similar developments in America (Olmec and Maya cultures in Mexico, Incas and other Andean civilizations) and China.
11.09	Iliad, IX, 702f.
11.10	Iliad, XIX, 86–87.
11.11	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Houghton-Mifflin,1976, with a new Afterword, 1990), pp. 46–47.
11.12	Block, “Review of Julian Jaynes’s The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.”
11.13	Block, “Consciousness”; Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness”; Dennett, “Julian Jaynes’s Software Archeology”; Dennett, Consciousness Explained.
11.14	Block, “Consciousness,” p. 214.
11.15	Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” p. 238.
11.16	Block, “Consciousness,” p. 217.
11.17	In my view, Block seriously misrepresents Jaynes when he says that “it is obvious that ‘consciousness’ in the sense in which it is supposed to have been invented by the Greeks is something like a theory of consciousness in roughly the phenomenal sense” (Block, “Consciousness,” p. 217). Although the matter is difficult to judge because of Jaynes’s idiosyncratic view of (‘generic’) consciousness, I think it is much more apt to say that Jaynes was interested in the emergence of something like A-consciousness in roughly Block’s sense of the word. Accordingly, my concern in this chapter will be mainly with A- consciousness and not with “a theory of consciousness in roughly the phenomenal sense,” nor indeed with P-consciousness as such.
11.18	First, because it appears to be a matter of definition for Block. In his discussion of A-consciousness, Block explicitly says that he wants “to allow that nonlinguistic animals, for example chimps, have A-conscious states,” and he adopts a definition to fit the purpose (Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” p. 231). Secondly, without independent motivation Block’s claim about “much lower animals” simply begs the question against Greek zombies. In addition, notice that the selective reactivity or ‘simple thinking’ of nonlinguistic animals that Block seems to envisage here is of the sort that Jaynes explicitly excludes from consciousness (Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Ch. 1). Notice that the notion of consciousness as described by Jaynes (mind-space and the analog I) is in many respects a fair approximation of the notion of A-consciousness as described by Block. Mindspace is the space in which mental contents are explicitly presented for introspection, deliberation and planning of action by the analog I, or in Block’s terms, where we find contents poised for use as a premise in reasoning and for rational control of action and speech.
11.19	The claim that consciousness is a social construction has also been made by other social constructivists such as George Herbert Mead (Mind, Self and Society [Chicago University Press, 1934]), Lev Vygotsky (Thought and Language [MIT Press, 1962]) and Rom Harré (1986). For clarity and convenience I concentrate my discussion on Jaynes, however.
11.20	Would it be possible to play baseball accidentally without having the concept of baseball? It is certainly conceivable that a group of people would go through (at least some of) the motions of a baseball game, but I think they would not be playing baseball. Not, that is, until the moment when one of the group says, “Let’s do that again,” where that is followed by an articulate description of what makes something a game of baseball (presumably including at least part of the rules of the game). At that moment, we may say, the concept of baseball has been introduced and baseball is born.
11.21	Cf. Dennett, “Julian Jaynes’s Software Archeology.”
11.22	Cf. Jerry Fodor & Ernest Lepore, Holism: A Shopper’s Guide (Basil Blackwell, 1992); Jerry A. Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (Clarendon Press, 1998).
11.23	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, pp. 30f.
11.24	Jaynes’s approach to concepts is purely extensional. “Concepts are simply classes of behaviorally equivalent things,” Jaynes said (The Origin, p. 31), which places them firmly outside the head. (More precisely, they are outside the head, but they are type-individuated in relational terms with reference to the user’s behavioral repertoire.) According to Jaynes, our discriminative aptitude with regard to such classes is partly acquired in experiential development and partly based on innate neural structures. The neurally based aptitudes correspond to “root concepts” that are “prior to experience” and “allow behavior to occur at all” (loc. cit.). Jaynes’s line on concepts is consistent with his treatment of ‘reactivity’, that is, the mind’s aptitude to respond to the environment adequately and discriminatively. According to Jaynes, no consciousness is needed for this ability, nor indeed for the learning processes by which the aptitudes are acquired or modified. Moreover, a similarly ‘automated’ account is given of “simple thinking” and making judgments. As Jaynes put it, in many cases “one does one’s thinking before one knows what one is to think about. The important part of the matter is the instruction [in an experimental set-up], which allows the whole business to go off automatically” (op. cit., p. 39).
11.25	As pointed out earlier, Bermúdez (Thinking Without Words) works with a notion of ‘mental content’ or ‘concept’ for prelinguistic creatures, the identity conditions for which appear to be substantially less stringent than those for concepts as ordinarily understood. This suggests at least a functional equivalent of the distinction between A-concepts and B-concepts, which merits further study. Notice that the line of reasoning proposed here also undermines the straight-forward application of a ‘language of thought’ hypothesis to B-minds. Unless the standard notion of ‘language’ is reconsidered to match B-conceptual possibilities, it is not clear what a mental language in B-minds could be supposed to do. Interestingly, an analogous reconsideration of the notion of language has also been argued by David Olson (The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading [Cambridge University Press, 1994]), based on work in developmental and cultural psychology. Olson’s point is that our common conception of language (including our notions of intention, meaning, concept, and the like) is literate to the bone, which makes its application to other forms of communication such as pristine orality highly suspect. In accordance with this analysis, Olson urges a sharp contrast between the modern literate mind on the one hand, and on the other hand the minds of preliterate children and of preliterate cultures.
11.26	Block’s functional distinction between A-consciousness and P-consciousness is targeted on explaining relatively isolated, abnormal phenomena such as blindsight (A-consciousness without P-consciousness), and brain damaged animals (P-consciousness without A-consciousness). Now, P-conscious Greek A-zombies would structurally and normally be like these brain damaged animals, or, to change the image, they would structurally and normally suffer from massive, pan-modal ‘inverted blindsight’— we would be happy to think of them as having P-consciousness, yet they could not be said ever to have rational access to their conscious contents. This certainly strikes me as a type of mind substantially different from ours. Moreover, it makes me wonder whether the alleged possession of P-consciousness could ever be empirically demonstrated.
11.27	See I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781/2nd edition 1787), T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago University Press, 1962), H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge University Press, 1981).
11.28	Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B131ff.
11.29	As mentioned earlier Jaynes explicitly denied that consciousness is necessary for thinking (The Origin, pp. 36ff). Moreover, in the Afterword added in the 1990 edition of his book, Jaynes suggested that what he has called the analog I is closely related to the Kantian transcendental ego.
11.30	Paul M. Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1979); Paul M. Churchland, A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science (MIT Press, 1989).
11.31	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, p. 1.
11.32	Michael Tomasello, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (Harvard University Press, 1999).
11.33	Richard Shweder, “Cultural Psychology,” in J.W. Stigler & R.A. Shweder (eds.), Essays on Comparative Human Development (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
11.34	For a devastating account of the cultural biases involved in attempts to draw the boundary, see Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (Norton & Co., 1981).
13.01	Tr. Legge, 1895d, p. 135.
13.02	I am grateful to Marcel Kuijsten for proposing that I rewrite my 1985 paper on shi personation as a contribution for this book honoring Prof. Jaynes. Thanks go to Matthew Hanley and Brian McVeigh for their suggestions and comments. This is dedicated to Terry’s and my late parents, James H. Reardon, Jr., Jimmie E. Reardon, Edward R. Carr, and Ruth L. Carr.
13.03	Julian Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (Houghton-Mifflin, 1976/1990).
13.04	Jaynes (ibid., p. 313) says, “Chinese literature jumps into subjectivity in the teaching of Confucius with little before it.
13.05	English translations of Chinese texts are cited from customary versions; all other translations are by the author. Romanization of Chinese is standardized to the toneless Pinyin system, indicated with square brackets in quotations, e.g., substituting “[Zhou]” for “Chou.” Chinese characters are given for the first occurrence of a term, or when necessary to distinguish homonyms like shi 尸 ‘corpse’ and shi 屍 ‘corpse’. N.B., besides the standard usage of single ‘ and double “ quotation marks to punctuate quoted material, this chapter follows the linguistic convention of using double quotation marks to signify literal meanings and single marks to signify semantic meanings, for instance “from the horse’s mouth” means ‘on the best authority, from a reliable source’ (cf. Chinese makoutie 馬口鐵 “horse mouth iron” ‘tin plate’).
13.06	For the sake of consistency, “traditional” Chinese dynastic dates are given. The traditional dating for the Zhou defeat of the Shang was 1122 BCE, but as David Keightley says, “At least twenty different dates have now been proposed for the conquest, ranging from 1122 to 1018 BCE” (Keightley, The Sources of Shang History [University of California Press, 1978], p. 171). Recent scholarship dates this dynastic change at around 1054 BCE.
13.07	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, pp. 48–66.
13.08	Ibid., p. 75.
13.09	Proposals for the origin of the Shang word di 帝 ‘god; divine king; deceased king; sovereign’ include the name of an early Shang ruler, the collective name for ancestors, or the name of a sacrifice (viz. di 褅 with the “spirit/sacrifice radical”).
13.10	Julian Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” Canadian Psychology, 1986, 27, 128–148; Reprinted in Marcel Kuijsten (ed.), The Julian Jaynes Collection (Julian Jaynes Society, 2012).
13.11	11. Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (Methuen, 1982), p. 30.
13.12	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, p. 165.
13.13	Ibid., p. 162.
13.14	Ibid., p. 163.
13.15	Personal communication dated December 20, 1982.
13.16	University of Cambridge sinologist Michael Loewe (Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide [The Society for the Study of Early China, 1993]) wrote an excellent introduction to this subject.
13.17	A lost companion sixth text, the Yuejing 樂經 “Music Classic” was unrecoverable.
13.18	Yijing divination is a type of sortilege based upon permutations of three broken/unbroken lines into eight trigrams (e.g., ☷ Kun ‘Earth’, ☶ Gen ‘Mountain’, ☵ Kan ‘Water’), which combine into 64 hexagrams with six lines (e.g., ‘Earth’ over ‘Water’ forms t Shi ‘The Army’).
13.19	Jaynes (The Origin, p. 242) discusses sortilege. He also describes Yijing divination as “a direct heritage from the period just after the breakdown [of the bicameral mind] in China” (p. 440).
13.20	W.A.C.H Dobson, The Language of the Book of Songs (Toronto University Press, 1968).
13.21	Unlike all the above Chinese texts that are only approximately datable, the Shuowen jiezi is dated with certitude: Xu Shen completed his dictionary in 100 CE, and waited (for political reasons) until September 19, 121 before presenting it to Han Emperor An 安.
13.22	I highly recommend the readable erudition of John DeFrancis (The Chinese Language: Fact and Fantasy [University of Hawai’i Press, 1984]).
13.23	Regular characters were based on the Qin clerical characters (隸書), which were developed for calligraphic brush writing.
13.24	Shi 矢 ‘arrow’ in the Shijing “Classic of Poetry” illustrates the interpretive difficulties with loans. Besides using shi literally meaning ‘arrow’ (e.g., 220/1); this text also uses 矢 as a loan character for shi 誓 ‘swear; vow; oath’ (56/1) and for shi 施 ‘spread out, set forth; extend’ (262/6).
13.25	Electronic copies are available through the Julian Jaynes Society: julianjaynes.org. I will always be grateful to Prof. Jaynes for his counsel and encouragement on my research.
13.26	Jaynes (The Origin, p. 68) asks, “[W]hat is the mentality of the earliest writings of mankind?”
13..27	Michael Carr, “Sidelights on Xin 心 ‘Heart; Mind’ in the Shijing,” Proceedings of the 31st International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Tokyo and Kyoto, Aug. 31–Sept. 7, 1983, 824–825.
13.28	Jaynes (The Origin, p. 361) claims, “The first poets were gods. Poetry began with the bicameral mind.”
13.29	Ibid., p. 83.
13.30	194/1, tr. Bernhard Karlgren, The Book of Odes (Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1950), p. 140.
13.31	Michael Carr, “Personation of the Dead in Ancient China,” Computational Analyses of Asian and African Languages, 1985, 24, 1–107.
13.32	Michael Carr, “Big Heads in Old Chinese,” 18th International Conference on Sino-Tibetan Languages and Linguistics, Bangkok, August 27–29, 1985. [Unpublished]
13.33	Early graphs for 示 are taken to depict either a ‘sacrificial altar/table’ or ‘divination stalks’. On oracle inscriptions, zhu ‘invocator’ frequently had a verbal sense of ‘to carry out invocations’; see Elizabeth Childs-Johnson, “The Ghost Head Mask and Metamorphic Shang Imagery,” Early China, 1995, 20, 79–92.
13.34	In the Yijing, ☱ Dui 兌 “The Joyous/Lake” is one of the eight trigrams, and when doubled forms the hexagram s Dui 兌 “The Joyous/Lake” (58).
13.35	Michael Carr, “The *K’ôg 考 ‘To Dead Father’ Hypothesis.” Review of Liberal Arts (人文研究), 1989, 77, 51–117.
13.36	The Zhouli (5/31, listing official duties of the Bingren 冰人 ‘iceman’) refers to a mortuary ice-basin called the shipan 尸槃 ‘corpse tray’ that was only used when an emperor died. Since there is no full English translation of the Zhouli, the French version by Edouard Biot (1803–1850) is cited: Le Tcheou-Li: ou Rites des Tcheou, 3 Vols. (Benjamin Duprat, 1851), Vol. 1, p. 106.
13.37	Michael Carr, “Ritual Fasts and Spirit Visions in the Liji,” Review of Liberal Arts (人文研究), 1996, 91, 99–126.
13.38	47/2a–2b, tr. auth. Compare the translation of James Legge, The Li chi, 2 Vols (1885); reprinted in the Sacred Books of the East, Vols. 27–28 (Oxford University Press, 1897), Vol. 27, pp. 210–211.
13.39	E.g., 3/2a, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, p. 87.
13.40	This context is about types of ritual goblets. 25/15, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 28, p. 246.
13.41	Jordan Paper, The Spirits are Drunk: Comparative Approaches to Chinese Religion (State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 112–114.
13.42	Writing shi 屎 ‘dung’ with mi 米 ‘rice; food’ is euphemistic; compare the pictographic oracle shi G without rice. Another oryzi-scatological character, fen 糞 ‘dung, excrement; manure; fertilizer’ ideographically denotes that which is yi 異 ‘different; separate’ from 米 ‘rice’.
13.43	A second oracle character J identified with yi ‘barbarian’ shows a smaller person kneeling alongside a larger one with outstretched arms.
13.44	Zhongshu Xu, 徐中舒. (ed.), Jiaguwen zidian 甲骨文字典 [Shell and Bone (i.e., Oracle) Character Dictionary] (Sichuan Cishu, 1988), p. 942.
13.45	Another bronze logograph identified with yi ‘barbarian; level’ is L, showing something wrapped around an arrow (or person).
13.46	Compare the character for bei 北 ‘north; turn ones back’ that shows two people back-to-back.
13.47	Because jia 甲 is the first cyclical character in the Ten Heavenly Stems, this amounts to addressing divinations to “Ancestress A,” in a cycle of ten divinations.
13.48	Since many oracle inscriptions are dated, cyclical and calendrical characters have relatively high frequencies of usage. The preeminent Chinese scholar of oracle inscriptions Dong Zuobin 董作賓 (1895–1963) analyzed the epigraphic evolution of cyclical characters across his “Five Periods” of the Later Shang kings (ca. 1401 bce–ca. 1122 BCE), and found zi 子 was written Y in Periods I–IV and X in Periods IV–V. See Keightley, The Sources of Shang History, p. 200.
13.49	Jôken Katō 加藤常賢, Kanji no kigen 漢字の起源 [The Origins of Chinese Characters] (Kadokawa, 1970), pp. 944–945.
13.50	Shirakawa and Kobayashi, 1982, p. 556. Both these Japanese interpretations gloss Chinese shi 尸 ‘personator’ with the Japanese word katashiro 形代 “shape represent” ‘ritual representative of a dead person’s spirit; a paper doll in Shinto purification rites’.
13.51	Xu, Jiaguwen zidian, p. 1571.
13.52	William H. Baxter, A Handbook of Old Chinese Phonology (Mouton de Gruyter, 1992).
13.53	Bernhard Karlgren, Grammata Serica Recensa (Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1957).
13.54	Fagao Zhou, “Lun Shanggu yin he Qieyun yin 論上古音和切韻音” [On the phonology of Old and Middle Chinese], Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1970, 3, 321–457. Note that standard IPA j replaces the “yod” i̭ consonant used by Karlgren and Zhou.
13.55	Axel Schuessler, A Dictionary of Early Zhou Chinese (University of Hawai’i Press, 1987).
13.56	Paul K. Benedict (James A. Matisoff, contrib. ed.), Sino-Tibetan: A Conspectus (Cambridge University Press, 1972).
13.57	Personal communication dated August 4, 1984.
13.58	Hellmut Wilhelm, tr. The I Ching or Book of Changes, tr. Cary F. Baynes (Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 525.
13.59	James Legge, tr., The Chinese Classics, Vol. II: The Works of Mencius (Oxford University Press, 1895), p. 259.
13.60	Bernhard Karlgren, “Word Families in Chinese,” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1934, 5, 9–120. These only differ in aspiration. Compare Baxter’s sjijʔ 死 and hljij 尸 reconstructions.
13.61	Akiyasu Tōdō, 藤堂明保, Kanji gogen jiten 漢字語源辞典 [Etymological Dictionary of Chinese Characters] (Gakutosha, 1965), pp. 749–753.
13.62	Compare English cadaver < Latin cadere ‘fall; die’ and Greek ptoma ‘fall; corpse’.
13.63	Tetsuji Morohashi 諸橋轍次, et al., (eds.), Kō kanwa jiten 広漢和辞典 [Expanded Chinese-Japanese Dictionary], 4 Vols. (Taishukan, 1982), Vol. 2, p. 1346.
13.64	Tr. Wilhelm, The I Ching or Book of Changes, pp. 34–35.
13.65	Op cit, p. 34.
13.66	Bruno Schindler, “The Development of the Chinese Conceptions of Supreme Beings,” Asia Major, 1923, 1, 298–352.
13.67	James Legge, tr., The Chinese Classics, Vol. V: The Ch’un Ts’eu with the Tso Chuan (Oxford University Press, 1895), p. 208. Note that Zuozhuan citations are given by the Western calendar rather than Chinese reign title years; thus 631 bce rather than 28th year of Duke Xi 僖公.
13.68	22/21, tr. Legge, The Li chi., Vol. 28, p. 181. Cf. “easy stool” in fn. 79.
13.69	Paper, The Spirits are Drunk, p. 112.
13.70	Tr. Karlgren, 1950. Since Shijing citations are by ode/stanza, translation pages are omitted for the sake of brevity.
13.71	Tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. IV.
13.72	Arthur Waley, tr., The Book of Songs (Random House, 1937).
13.73	Tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. IV, p. 369.
13.74	All tr. Karlgren, The Book of Odes.
13.75	Bernard Karlgren, Glosses on the Book of Odes (Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1964), No. 1042.
13.76	Tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. IV, p. 447.
13.77	Tr. Waley, The Book of Songs, p. 215.
13.78	Shirakawa & Kobayashi, Kanji ruihen 漢字類偏, p. 339. Cf. dui 兌 ‘penetrate’ as a hexagram in fn. 34.
13.79	Karlgren, Glosses on the Book of Odes, No. 120. Yanji 燕几 “easy stool” was the name of a stool used to prop up the feet of a corpse (Liji 22/21, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 28, p. 181, see page 366, cf. fn. 68).
13.80	The Mao commentary says this yi 宜 means ‘to be good at one’s shi 事 ‘business; sacrifice; service’ (cf. Erya 1A/28 on page 369).
13.81	Karlgren, Glosses on the Book of Odes, No. 894.
13.82	166/4, tr. Karlgren, Glosses on the Book of Odes.
13.83	All tr. Karlgren, Glosses on the Book of Odes.
13.84	6/1/15, tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. IV, p. 400.
13.85	18/14, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 28, p. 88.
13.86	10/25, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, pp. 405–406. This context uses the word ju 醵 ‘pool money (for a feast, etc.)’.
13.87	7/9, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, pp. 369–370.
13.88	24/6, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, p. 212. Compare what the Liji 2/3 says about serving the living and the dead (see page 397). Cf. fn. 173.
13.89	While Legge translates shi as “representative,” the verb in 神象也 “He personated the spirit” is xiang 象 ‘delineate; depict; outline; represent; symbolize’. For the Shujing (see page 378), Legge more literally translates this phrase as “The image of the spirit.” Cf. fns. 106 and 138.
13.90	11/69, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, p. 446.
13.91	Marcel Granet, Chinese Civilization (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1930), p. 337.
13.92	7/39, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, pp. 337–338.
13.93	1/73, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, p. 87.
13.94	Granet, Chinese Civilization, pp. 316, 337–338.
13.95	Wolfram Eberhard, The Local Cultures of South and East China (E.J. Brill,1968), p. 338.
13.96	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, pp. 344–345.
13.97	John Clendinning Steele (1868–?) translated the Yili into English. 17/12b-13a. Steele, tr. The I-Li, or Book of Etiquette and Ceremonial (Probsthain, 1917), pp. 195–196.
13.98	14/9b, tr. Steele, The I-Li, or Book of Etiquette and Ceremonial, p. 119.
13.99	15/26, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 28, p. 75.
13.100	11/15, 14/63. This quotes the translation by English sinologist Angus C. Graham (1919–1991). Tr. Graham, Chuang-tzu (George Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 212, 214.
13.101	1/24, tr. Graham, Chuang-tzu, p. 45.
13.102	254/5, tr. Karlgren, The Book of Odes. The following line uses shi 屎 ‘dung’ as a loan character for xi ‘groan’, see Table 2.
13.103	Op cit., p. 214.
13.104	10/16, tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. I: The Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean (Oxford University Press, 1895), p. 235.
13.105	8/1/1, tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. III: The Shu Ching (Oxford University Press, 1895), p. 156.
13.106	Tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. III, p. 157. Cf. fns. 89 and 138.
13.107	9/4/1. Tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. III, pp. 165–166.
13.108	13/50. Tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 28, p. 25.
13.109	Karlgren, Loan Characters in Pre-Han Texts (Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1967), No. 1511.
13.110	2/47 and 35/2, tr. Legge 1885, Vol. 27, p. 117 and Vol. 28, p. 374.
13.111	185/3, tr. Karlgren, The Book of Odes.
13.112	573 BCE, tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. V, p. 405.
13.113	689 BCE, tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. V, p. 77.
13.114	Karlgren, Grammata Serica Recensa, No. 129a.
13.115	624 BCE, tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. V, p. 233.
13.116	9/23, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, p. 247.
13.117	David Hawkes, tr., Ch’u Tz’u: The Songs of the South (Clarendon, 1959), p. 55. Hawkes (1959) wrote the preeminent English translation of the Chuci.
13.118	Ibid.
13.119	Schindler, “The Development of the Chinese Conceptions of Supreme Beings,” p. 320.
13.120	Eduard Erkes, “Idols in Pre-Buddhistic China,” Artibus Asiae, 1928, 5–12.
13.121	Karlgren, “Some Fecundity Symbols in Ancient China,” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1930, 2, 1–67.
13.122	4/2b. Tr. Schindler, “The Development of the Chinese Conceptions of Supreme Beings,” p. 320.
13.123	Eduard Erkes, “Some Remarks on Karlgren’s ‘Fecundity Symbols in Ancient China,’” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1931, 3, 63–68.
13.124	Ibid.
13.125	Some commentators take Shijing ode 185 (see page 292, cf. fn. 111) to use shi meaning zhu ‘manage; preside over’, but it is more likely in the sense of chen ‘lay out’.
13.126	Tr. Karlgren, The Book of Odes. Cf. the Zuozhuan quote on page 298.
13.127	573 BCE, tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. V, p. 405.
13.128	515 BCE, tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. V, p. 717.
13.129	Xiaoding Li 李孝定, Jiagu wenzi zhishi 甲骨文字集釋 [Collected Explanations of Shell and Bone Characters], 8 Vols (The Institute of History and Philology, 1965), p. 2745.
13.130	Kunio Shima, 島邦男, Inkyo bokuji sō rui 殷墟卜辞綜類 [Concordance of Oracle Writings from the Ruins of Yin], 2nd rev. ed. (Hoyu, 1971), p. 5.
13.131	This could grammatically read as a verb-object, ‘to calm/bless the personator’.
13.132	Tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. V, pp. 514–515.
13.133	Tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. V, pp. 542–543. Cf. footnote 126.
13.134	I am grateful to Hashimoto Sensei’s encouragement and suggestions on my first shi personation paper presented in Tokyo on June 21, 1984.
13.135	As a modern indication of how strongly the Chinese believe in ancestral/spirit tablets, the Red Guards systematically destroyed them as part of the “Four Olds” (old ideology, culture, customs, and habits). Internet shoppers can purchase ancestral tablets online. To see what is available, suggested search terms are Chinese paiwei 牌位 or shenzhu 神主 and Japanese ihai 位牌.
13.136	Henry Doré, Researches into Chinese Superstitions, 15 Vols., Tr. M. Kennelly (Tusewei, 1914), Vol. 1, pp. 99–102.
13.137	Op cit., p. 99.
13.138	Cf. footnotes 89 and 106.
13.139	Doré, Researches into Chinese Superstitions, Vol. 1, p. 100.
13.140	Op cit., p. 101.
13.141	Ibid.
13.142	Op cit., pp. 101–102.
13.143	Op cit., p. 102.
13.144	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, p. 290.
13.145	The frequent references to inebriation suggest a period when personators could only marginally hear voices, namely, drinking “spirits” to contact ‘spirits’.
13.146	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, p. 324.
13.147	Although we cannot know how personators perceived their speaking in voices of ancestral spirits, Jaynes (The Origin of Consciousness, p. 91) describes a schizophrenic patient admitting, “They are not at all real voices but merely reproductions of the voices of dead relatives.”
13.148	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, pp. 329–330.
13.149	The difference between (2) “prophet” and (3) “trained prophet” oracles may be graphically fossilized in xiong 兄 ‘elder (brother); invocator’ and zhu 祝 (with the “spirit/sacrifice radical”) ‘invocator; priest’.
13.150	Lothar von Falkenhausen, “Reflections on the Political Role of Spirit Mediums in Early China: The Wu Officials in the Zhou li,” Early China, 1995, 20, 297–300.
13.151	There is a dictionary distinction between wu 巫 ‘shamaness’ and the rare word xi 覡 ‘shaman’.
13.152	11/69, cf. footnote 90.
13.153	Robert H. Van Gulik, Sexual Life in Ancient China (E.J. Brill, 1961), p. 4.
13.154	In analyzing the uneven chronological distribution of divination inscriptions, Keightley (The Sources of Shang History, pp. 139–140) notes that “approximately 55 percent of all fragments come from period I” (ca. 1240–ca. 1181 bce). This could be owing to “an accident of discovery” or other factors, but it remains uncertain “whether divination was indeed more frequent in period I than in all the other periods combined.”
13.155	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, p. 236.
13.156	Ibid. Chinese methods of divining were diverse. The Shijing, for example, mentions divination with dreams (e.g., 189, 190, 192), tortoise shells alone (50, 166, 209, 244), shells and milfoil stalks [i.e., Yijing sortilege] (58, 169), and grain (196).
13.157	Keightley, The Sources of Shang History, p. 136.
13.158	University of Chicago professor and curator emeritus Tsien Tsuen-hsuin (Written on Bamboo and Silk: The Beginnings of Chinese Books and Inscriptions [University of Chicago Press, 1962], p. 3) wrote an excellent introduction to the history of Chinese writing.
13.159	Jaynes mentions the right hemisphere as the possible location of bicameral hallucinations, and it apparently has a special role in processing Chinese characters. See Ovid J.L. Tzeng, et al., “Reading the Chinese Character: An Information Processing View,” Journal of Chinese Linguistics, 1978, 6, 288–305. Recent research suggests both hemispheres are used in reading Chinese.
13.160	To digress briefly, the early written forms of Chinese si 死 ‘die; death’ and wang 亡 ‘lost; gone’ are illustrative. The modern character 死 for si ‘death’ combines two uncommon radicals: e 歹 ‘bone fragment; skeletal remains’ (also read dai 歹 ‘bad; evil’) and bi 匕 ‘person; spoon’ (primary form of bi 妣 ‘deceased mother’, see Table 1). This same depiction of si ‘death’ is evident in the seal P and bronze O, which show people with bone fragments, perhaps denoting provisional or secondary burial. However, the oracle graph N for si pictures a corpse in a box/coffin, which may have distinguished interment from exposure burial. The modern character 亡 (or graphic variant 兦) for wang ‘perish; die’ derives from enigmatic oracle R, bronze S, and seal T graphs. Most scholars take these to show the bent body of a dead 人 ‘person’, placed in something.
13.161	Chinese has an exceptional category of coordinate compounds involving synonyms, for instance, genben 根本 “root and root” ‘basic; essential’ or huodong 活動 “lively and moving” ‘active; movable’. See DeFrancis, The Chinese Language: Fact and Fantasy, pp. 182–183.
13.162	Erkes, “[Si er bu wang] 死而不亡,” Asia Major, 1952, 3, 156–159.
13.163	Erkes, “[Si er bu wang] 死而不亡,” p. 156.
13.164	Daodejing commentaries, which Erkes mentions, and the Han-era text excavated in 1978 at Mawangdui give a graphic variant of wang 忘 (with the “heart radical”) ‘forget’ for wang 亡 ‘perish’. University of Pennsylvania professor of Chinese language and literature Victor H. Mair (Tao Te Ching, the Classic Book of Integrity and the Way [Bantam, 1990], p. 100) has a different interpretation: “To die but not be forgotten is longevity.” He mentions that the received text has wang ‘perish’ instead of wang ‘forget’, and says, “Here is a good example of the imposition of a religious interpretation on the [Daodejing] that was not present in the original. Few commentators have questioned the absurdity and illogicality that result from the unwarranted emendation ‘He who dies but does not perish has longevity’” (p. 118).
13.165	5/12b, tr. Erkes, “[Si er bu wang] 死而不亡,” p. 156. Cf. Edouard Biot, tr., Le Tcheou-Li: ou Rites des Tcheou, 3 Vols (Benjamin Duprat, 1851) Vol. 1, p. 423.
13.166	Erkes, “[Si er bu wang] 死而不亡,” p. 158.
13.167	For a detailed study, see Ken E. Brashier, “Han Thanatology and the Division of ‘Souls’,” Early China, 1996, 21, 125–158.
13.168	Eberhard, The Local Cultures of South and East China, p. 337.
13.169	Homer H. Dubs, “A Note to Erkes’ Paper,” Asia Major, 1952, 3, 159–161.
13.170	548 BCE, tr. Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. V, p. 507.
13.171	Eduard Erkes, “A Note on Dubs’s Note in A.M. III, 2,” Asia Major, 1954, 4, 149–150.
13.172	Compare the modern words zhisi 至死 ‘unto/until death’ and zhisi 致死 ‘cause death; lethal, deadly’.
13.173	2/3, tr. Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, p. 148. Ancient Chinese philosophers debated the proper balance of frugality and extravagance for burials. Jeffrey Riegel (“Do Not Serve the Dead as You Serve the Living: The Lüshi chunqiu Treatises on Moderation in Burial,” Early China, 1995, 20, 301–330) mentions a popular late Zhou saying (cf. fn. 88), “Serve the dead [si] as you serve the living, serve those gone [wang] as you serve those here.”
13.174	Bernhard Karlgren, Glosses on the Li Ki (Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1971), No. 115.
13.175	Legge, The Li chi, Vol. 27, p. 148.
13.176	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, p. 68.
13.177	Op. cit., p. 163.
13.178	Personal communication dated March 23, 1984.
13.179	People in China have buried dogs with the dead (frequently in “waist-pits”) since Neolithic times. Eberhard (The Local Cultures of South and East China, pp. 461–463) discusses reasons dogs accompanied the dead: companionship, protection from demons, and food [sic].
13.180	The first two features are temples as “the houses of the gods” and “the living dead.”
13.181	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, p. 165.
13.182	Jessica Rawson, Ancient China: Art and Archeology (Harper and Row, 1980).
13.183	Early cultures in China had regional differences in constructing spirit tablets. Chinese archeologist and anthropologist Kwang-chih Chang (1931–2001) says archaeological evidence shows, “In the north these images were made of clay, and, occasionally, of lead: wooden ones prevailed in the south” (Kwang-chih Chang, The Archeology of Ancient China [Yale University Press, 1977], p. 366).
13.184	These pictures come from “Treasures from a Lost Civilization: Ancient Chinese Art from Sichuan” exhibition, https://www.metmuseum.org/exhibitions/listings/2002/sichuan/photo-gallery, where they can be seen in color.
13.185	Jay Xu, “Bronze at Sanxingdui,” in Robert Bagley (ed.), Ancient Sichuan: Treasures from a Lost Civilization (Princeton University Press), p. 96.
13.186	Ibid., p. 108.
13.187	Wen-ting Tsai, “Riddle from the Ancient Past: The Mysteries of Sanxingdui,” Taiwan Panorama (May 1999), tr. David Mayer, https://www.taiwan-panorama.com/en/Articles/ Details?Guid=bc96703d-a5a2-4603-b8fc-c0f627d4382a.
13.188	Ibid.
13.189	Yang Liu, “Behind the Masks: Sanxingdui Bronzes and the Culture of the Ancient Shu,” In Yang Liu and Edmund Capon (eds.), Masks of Mystery: Ancient Chinese Bronzes from Sanxingdui (Art Gallery of New South Wales, 2000), 23–48.
13.190	Jaynes, The Origin of Consciousness, p. 165. See the quote on page 347.
13.191	Jan Jakob Maria De Groot, The Religious System of China, 6 Vols (E.J. Brill, 1892–1910), pp. 114, 173.
13.192	In commenting on the first version of this study, Alexis Rygaloff, professor of sinology at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris, noted that in order to test the bicameral hypothesis it will be necessary to use information from all specializations. For example, several early texts (e.g., Liji 12/34 and 30/20) say the dead were buried with their heads to the north, associated with Yin and the land of the dead. In fact, many excavated Shang and Zhou graves are oriented to the north, but not all, other orientations are also found.
13.193	Jaynes, “Consciousness and the Voices of the Mind,” p. 143.