Julian Jaynes Argued that Language Gives Rise to Consciousness

— But He Opposed Linguistic Determinism

Summary: “Julian Jaynes Argued that Language Gives Rise to Consciousness — But He Opposed Linguistic Determinism” by Brian J. McVeigh discusses Jaynes’s theory that consciousness is not innate but develops through language. He posits that early humans operated under a “bicameral mind,” where decisions were guided by auditory hallucinations perceived as commands from gods. As language evolved, it enabled introspection and self-awareness, leading to modern consciousness. Jaynes supports his theory by analyzing ancient texts, noting the absence of introspective language in early literature. This perspective challenges traditional views, suggesting that consciousness emerged culturally rather than biologically.

Claiming that Bronze Age peoples lacked the internet, supercomputers, and lunar orbiters as well as the scientific know-how to construct such technological marvels is not controversial. And no one would be offended by the claim that these ancient peoples lacked the linguistic terminology that underwrites the knowledge base upon which rests the impressive wonders of human ingenuity.

However, if one claims that Bronze Age peoples lacked words describing subjective introspectable self-awareness (viz. Jaynesian consciousness), one is typically met with strident disagreement, as if such a view looks down on other societies Worse, in our politically-correct charged times, one may be charged with racism. But an examination of the written texts of Bronze Age civilizations reveals a surprising paucity of words describing thinking, emotions, and other mental events. This datum is central to the Jaynesian perspective, i.e., that until about the first millennium BCE people were preconscious. In other words, Jaynes argued (and this
writer has published substantiating findings) that psychological vocabularies were remarkably undeveloped. Of course, we can find in the ancient record a limited number of words that seem to be categorizable as mental words. However, a careful investigation demonstrates that a richness of psychological expressions is oddly lacking.

Knowing How Language Configures Consciousness Is Understanding Jaynesian Psychology

Jaynesian psychology is about the role language played, and continues to play, in the historical — not evolutionary — construction of consciousness. Therefore, debates about Jaynes’s arguments need to begin with discussions about learning, enculturation, and history, not genes, neuroanatomy, or evolution. This is a hard sell for researchers wedded to the assumption that consciousness is rooted in our neurology, rather than a product of enculturation.

Because many assume that consciousness was evolutionarily hardwired into the brain, the constructive role of historico-cultural forces is neglected in explanatory accounts of subjective introspectable self-awareness. Despite growing evidence of neurocultural plasticity (i.e., how the environment can fundamentally sculpt our psyches), mainstream, establishment psychology ignores the role of sociolinguistics in the acquisition of Jaynesian consciousness. But researchers, if they are serious about investigating the relationship between language and cognition, need to pay close attention to the radical ruptures in psychological vocabularies in the late Bronze Age.

Language–ideas and Language Practices, Not Words, Shape Cognition

Thirty-five years ago, when I brought up the topic of language and consciousness in a discussion with Jaynes, he objected to how critics labelled him as a proponent of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis. It is that conversation that inspires my coining of “linguo-concepts.” This expression is intended to avoid the pitfalls of a “hard” deterministic Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (which in any case is a misnomer on several counts that need not concern us here). Linguo-concepts, or “language–ideas,” are meant to acknowledge a “soft,” more nuanced linguistic relativity that sees words influencing cognition, but in subtle, complex ways.

It needs to be stressed that it is not language per se but rather “linguistic practices” that construct cognition, as well as that crucial cultural add-on, consciousness. Linguistic practices are enacted at the interface of psyche and its cultural conditions. Activities of language use concern how we employ words in the world with other people to accomplish things. For example, the highly technical idiom needed to represent and share information about computer design does not exist in a rarefied Platonic realm; rather relevant terms are manipulated to achieve practical outcomes in the real world. This is true of all language. Another example:
Words describing psychological events are utilized to convince others, recount events, navigate the social landscape, and describe behaviors. Besides interpersonal modes, the intrapersonal usage of mental language in psychotherapy is crucial for autocommunication (self-to-self communication, i.e., when the sender and the receiver are the same). Positive self-talk can enhance self-persuasion, while negative self-talk that hinders mental health needs to be identified and confronted.

Related to linguistic practices is the problem of chopping up language into various units. For those brought up in literate societies that use texts, words are considered the most elementary parts of a language; combined, these can build higher level linguistic units such as speeches, sentences, essays, books, etc. In any case, each unit does not equate with one concept; a simple one-to-one mapping does not exist.

Definitions versus Semanticity

A word is typically multi-definitional. However, each definition itself operates on a continuum between monosemy (one meaning) and polysemy (many meanings). In other words, a word can have several definitions, but each definition possesses numerous associative meanings. With this stated, a distinction needs to be drawn between denotative “definition” and connotative “semanticity.” The former means a relatively determinate, delineated, and unambiguous meaning. Semanticity, on the other hand, is more indeterminate, indistinct, and ambiguous (semanticity subsumes definition). Semanticity represents a field of disordered, unstable meanings, while a definition is ordered, i.e., significance pinned down. A word’s definition emerges when a speaker, motivated by contextual usage, demarcates and stabilizes an area of a semantic network.

The strength of linguo-conceptualizations can be measured in two dimensions: Extensivity and intensity. Phrased differently, the potency of a language–idea is a matter of: (1) “clustering” or the number of domains of signification to which a language–idea is hyperlinked; and (2) “mustering” or the degree of emotional valence of a language–idea. Clustering concerns breadth, or how many other ideas within an individual’s psyche are interconnected to a concept. Obviously, the higher the number of areas of signification, the heavier a linguistic unit’s import. Clustering allows one idea to recruit other meanings from semantic networks. Mustering involves depth, or to what degree an individual believes, accepts, or acknowledges a concept. Certain language–ideas, more than others, carry emotional associations instilled though experience that motivate interpretations or behaviors. A simple example is one’s own name; hearing it will evoke a very different cognitive-emotional response than hearing the name of someone else.

As an example of the aforementioned principles, consider “consciousness.” One definition of this term is thinking. Thus, when some hear this word it launches a series of related mental representations, recruiting from its semantic network notions of detached cognition, thoughtful deliberation, careful reasoning, discerning intellection, or rationalism. A second definition is perception. This sets in train various notions about sensation or the senses, with some mistakenly concluding that since both humans and animals perceive, they must both be conscious. A third definition is self-awareness. This sense of “consciousness” triggers ideas about contemplation, introspection, reflection, self-understanding, self-analysis, or soul-searching; it might light up parts of the semantic network related to brooding self-examination or navel-gazing solipsism. A fourth, more specialized use of consciousness heard of late concerns panpsychism. This understanding provokes philosophical arguments with mystical overtones on the connectedness-of-all-things and postmodern versions of an animistic cosmos. Words do not simply map onto subjective introspectable self-awareness.

The Psyche’s Lexicon: Dictionary or Encyclopedia?

From this example of one word, we can see how complicated the relation between language and cognitive processes can be. Words and concepts do not coincide as if the mind functioned like a dictionary, with each term corresponding to only several definitions. The psyche operates more like an encyclopedia, with each linguistic unit an entry into expansive, wide-ranging, and freewheeling meanings. This encyclopedic quality is both a curse and a blessing; it makes scientific theorizing — or a debate — difficult when we do not agree on definitions. More positively, rich linkages also inspire artistic imagery and imaginative descriptions.

Socialization via language contours fields of denotation and connotation as well as how deep a concept takes root in an individual’s mind, i.e., if someone is often exposed to a language–idea and the community attributes to it great significance, obviously that linguistic expression will acquire weight. Languageideas, under certain circumstances, set in motion cascading domino effects that generate elaborate patterns (and note that the relation between linguistic units and ideas is a two-way street, i.e., words can activate concepts and concepts can activate words).

Learn more about Julian Jaynes’s theory by joining the Julian Jaynes Society and reading our books.